their fecurity. At that time fir C. Grey meditated an attack on Cayenne, and for that purpose detained the 35th regiment; but afterwards, thinking his force infufficient, fent it to join the three at St. Domingo. All that government had done to determine fir Charles to this measure, was an intimation, that, if circumftances allowed it, it might be expedient to fend the four regiments to St. Domingo; but even this letter was not fent from England till June, and fir C. Grey had difpatched the regiments in May, which proved him totally uninfluenced. With refpect to what had been ftated of fir C. Grey's demand for a reinforcement, that demand was not made till long after, when our attempt to difpoffefs the enemy of their fituation in Guadaloupe had been ineffectual. Sir Charles's letter bore date July 11th; that the Weft Indies, therefore, were fafe fo late as June, was deducible not only from thefe facts, but from the character of fir C. Grey, who would not other wife have thought of returning home. Previous to his departure home, which his health demanded, he had vifited and infpected all the islands, and was as far as St. Kitt's on his return, when he was informed that the enemy had taken poffeffion of part of Guadaloupe. With the utmoft gallantry he had divested himself of every perfonal confideration, and returned to a conteft which, though unfortunately unfuccefsful, was concerted with vigour, and carried into effect with the utmost courage and refolution. It was not till after the unfortunate even at Point au Pierre that any application had been made for reinforcements. In Auguft and September 1794, 6000 were demanded by colonels Dundas and Coote, 1200

or 2000 of which were immediately required. Two thoufand three hundred were difpatched from Gibraltar, who reached the Weft Indies in November,and further equipments were fet on foot here. At this time the whole of the forces in Great Britain amounted only to 17,475, including the fick; the number of effective men now was fomewhat under 17,000. By the 29th of May he had sent out to the Leeward Inlands and to St. Domingo a force amounting to 15,500 men. After this exertion, he argued the little probability there was that every measure had not been taken to expedite their failing. They were at first stopped by contrary winds, and were afterwards blocked up by the Brest fleet; which neceffarily delayed their failing till February 1795. Under all the complicated claims to which government had to attend, he left it to the candour of the houfe, whether the attention paid to the Weft Indies deferved the imputation of neglect. The last reinforcement confiderably exceeded the demand of fir C. Grey, though it arrived too late to enter upon any confiderable plan of operation in 1795, which, combined with the almost unprecedented fickness of the climate, occafioned our debility, the capture of Guadaloupe and St. Lucia, and the infurrection in St. Vincent's and Grenada. Let it be recollected, too, that this demand for troops was not wholly for the defence of the Leeward Inlands; it was with a view to offenfive operations, including, further, the conqueft of St. Domingo. The application confequently did not imply an infecurity tantamount to the force required. The capture of Tobago was, he contended, to be in a great measure attributed to the eager wishes of government to ex

tend

tend protection to every part of the West Indies that had been connected with us. As to the late arma. ment under general Abercrombie and admiral Chriftian, the expedition was to consist of two distinct bodies, one of 15,000, the other of 12,000 men. The celerity with which this armament was equipped, was, Mr. Dundas stated, a matter of aftonishment. There were at that time 32 old regiments, and 47 new, making 31,154 men; but these were fo irregular in their combination, that a new regulation was obliged to take place in the whole army. Not one regiment was in a proper ftate for foreign service; and from 114 regiments, by draught ing and incorporation, they were reduced to go. In the process of the new arrangement, regiments were relieved by fencibles in Jerfey, Guernsey, Ireland, &c. the corps to be incorporated brought together; and after all, the force was to be equipped for diftant and arduous fervice. The expedition required, befides, the equipment of a large fquadron of men of war, and 100,000 tons of fhipping for tranfports, when the tranfport board had only 40,000 at command; provifions were extremely dear, feamen extremely fcarce. To alle viate the difficulties, recourfe had been had to the Eaft and Weft India fleets juft arrived; without which the plan could not have been carried into execution. But as time was neceffary for unloading these fhips, a great and unavoidable delay enfued. Amidft every difficulty, he would, however, appeal to the candour of any unprejudiced perfon, whether more zeal and activity could have been manifefted. The ordnance office had also been called upon, and had made unparalleled exertions; and when to all

this was added the equipment of each regiment, the completion of the medical staff, and hofpital fhips, fome idea might be conceived of the magnitude of this expedition, which not only included the two armies of 27,000, but a corps of 1,000 German riflemen, and another of foreigners employed under the command of the duke of York on the continent, of nearly 6,000, but neceffaries for the Weft Indian army of Europeans and Creoles confifting of 3,000 militia, and 6,000 blacks. Every expedient, he afferted, had been devifed for the comfort and accommodation of the troops on board fhip, and for the fuccefs of the expedition; in confirmation of which, Mr. Dundas read fome letters from fir Ralph Abercrombie; and to refute what had in former debates been stated refpecting the inattention fhewn towards the accommodation of the troops fent to the West Indies from Cork, he read a letter from general Wright. Of all the fhips which had failed under admiral Chriftian, four only were miffing; 67 had fafely arrived at Barbadoes, containing above 7,000 regular troops, artillery, &c. and only 400 were in a fickly state. Of those who had been obliged to return to port, a still more favourable account had been received. The facts were, he said, fo different from what they had been reprefented, that he was anxious to lay the correspondence which he had had with the transport board upon the fubject, before the houfe. The laft charge of which government need be apprehenfive, was, that of neglecting the Weft Indies. One expedition had been fent there, while a force was collecting against the French in the Eaft Indies; another, while that was in agitation, which had fince

been fo fuccefsful against the Cape of Good Hope, which we now poffeffed, and he hoped ever fhould, and that no man would ever dare to give it up, He was, he faid, ready to confent to fome of the propofitions which had been made, and even to bring forward others as fupplementary to them.

He

Mr. Grey thought it would have been more regular to have produced the documents before entering upon fo wide a field of difcuffion. rofe, he faid, merely on account of the allufion which had been made to the opinions of a perfon whom it was his duty to respect and honour. He wished, before any argument was founded upon the opinion of that perfon, every document which could explain its nature, and the circumftances in which it was given, should be produced. The opinion given by fir C. Grey refpecting the afety of the Leeward Islands, he was authorized by him to fay, had been given in the confidence that no force could get out of any of the ports of France to the West Indies till the promifed reinforcement arriv. ed. In exerciting the difcretion allowed him to dispatch the regiments to Jamaica and Barbadoes, for Charles had understood that he was complying with the wishes of administration. Of the reinforce. ment demanded, though it was required in June, none had arrived till November; and this he stated at the defire of his honoured relation.

Mr. Sheridan deprecated the idea of reafoning on official papers not regularly before the Loufe, for the authenticity of which the honourable gentleman (Mr. Dundas) would have credit, and which he had ufed in this way to make that imprefion upon the house which would refit the effect of any future confideration

of the fubject more regularly intraduced. The papers, he taid, had been gone through before they were on the table: the defence was prior to the accufation; and the exculpatory proof preceded the trial. The appeal to official papers, however, inftead of acquitting minifters, convinced him that the utmost criminality was attached to them. After a fpeech of four hours and a half, not one thing had been said which had haken the foundation on which he wished to institute an inquiry. He heard, with alarm for the future, that our late peace eftablifhment had occasioned our dif afters in the West Indies. Mr. Sheridan obferved that he had never heard a commander more highly complimented in words than fir C. Grey; but it was remarkable that he was the only commander who had not, by the advice of minifters, received fome fignal mark of royal favour. When the troops deftined for the West Indies were difpatched under lord Moira, it was now faid the state of the country required the facrifice, and demanded the preference of an im portant to a less important fervice. At the time, however, that this detachment was made, it was contended that it would not cripple the exertions in the Leeward lands; that only one or two regiments had been promifed; and that, beyond this, fir C. Grey could not look for any reinforcements. Ministers were not, however, to be acquitted upon this miferable quibble; the quantity of reinforcement was not to be measured by what fir C. Grey had thought neceffary in the commencement of his career, but by the neceffity of maintaining the brilliant advantages he had obtained. As to criminating fir C. Grey by affirming that the detachments to Ja

maica and Barbadoes were dangerous to the fafety of the Leeward Iilands, that business had been well explained; but without fuch motives as fir Charles had acted upon, his conduct would have deferved blame. Had the attack on Guadaloupe been made by troops in the Weft Indies, when the commander pronounced the islands in a state of fafety, fault might have been imputed to him; but if the contrary was the cafe, the argument refolved itself into a mere quibble, and the guilt devolved upon minifters. In the failing of the French fleet were admitted to be an event which could not be prevented, yet the difafters in the West Indies were imputable to minifters in another view. Not only the reinforcements did not arrive, but the troops were deftitute of cloathing, and overwhelmed with fatigue. This he could prove: yet the inquiry was refifted. It was ftated that in Auguft 1794 news arrived of the difafter which befel Guadaloupe, accompanied by a requifition for 6,000 men. If an inquiry was inftituted, it would be found that this was owing to a want of troops, and a want of neceffaries for the troops there already. The demand, however, met minifters unprepared. Only 17,0cotroops were in the kingdom, of which 3,000 were destined for marine fervice. How came that fervice to have been previoufly neglected? Of the 9,000 fent out, why were they not, according to the advice of fir C. Grey, fent out in detachments? Or was it to be fuftained, in excufe for the delay, that we had not a fleet which could meet the French fleet at fea? As well might it be faid, that, fhould the French land an army in Ireland when our fleet was in port, no blame would be imputable to government. Great care

3

might have been taken of the health of the troops; but Mr. Sheridan perfifted in declaring that every day immenfe numbers were thrown overboard, who died of ficknets and difeafe occafioned by neglect: where the blame lay, would be difcovered on inquiry. He flated the great inconfiitency of its having been faid, that out of the 31,000 regular troops in England, it would not have been fafe to fend a large force on foreign fervice; yet when the militia and fencible corps were increafed, it was reprefented that this force would fuffice for the internal defence of the country, and enable us to apply our army to foreign fervice. The declaration made refpecting the Cape, was, he thought, very comfortable news to the ftadtholder; it amounted, however, he thought, to a declaration that minifters did not wifh for the re-establifhment of what was called the regular government of Holland, but were fatisfied with the prefent republican anarchy. A fcheme was at last formed for fending 27,000 men to the West Indies; but they were difficult to be procured. The moft difgraceful mode of defence had been adopted that ever appeared before a British houfe of commons. There was conveyed a mighty army upon paper; but, when it came to be reviewed, it was good for nothing. He had feen this motley aflembly at Southampton, confifting of children, feeble old men, and boys at their head. Such was the confequence of converting the army into a job. Was it no

guilt to delude the country with fuch mockeries? Mr. Sheridan reprefented, in a very ludicrous light, the difficulties ftated to have attended the expedition; unfortu nately, he faid, the difficulties always got the better; and incredible

difafters