INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ALLIED INTERNATIONAL, INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT No. 80-1663. Argued January 18, 1982-Decided April 20, 1982 Respondent is an American importer of Russian wood products and had contracts with an American shipper for shipment of the products from the Soviet Union to American ports. The shipper in turn employed a stevedoring company to unload its ships. The stevedore's employees were members of petitioner longshoremen's union (hereafter petitioner). Petitioner, as a protest against the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, refused to handle cargoes arriving from or destined for the Soviet Union. As a result respondent's shipments and business were disrupted completely. Respondent then brought an action in Federal District Court for damages under § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, claiming that petitioner's refusal to unload respondent's shipments constituted an illegal secondary boycott under § 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act. Section 8(b)(4)(B) prohibits a labor union from engaging in activities designed to influence individuals employed by "any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce," and from inducing such employees to refuse to handle goods with the object of forcing any person "to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing" in the products of, or "to cease doing business" with, another person. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that petitioner's boycott was a purely political, primary boycott of Russian goods and thus not within the scope of § 8(b)(4)(B). The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: Petitioner's boycott was an illegal secondary boycott under § 8(b) (4)(B). Pp. 218-227. (a) Petitioner's activity was "in commerce" and within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act. Its refusal to unload respondent's shipments in no way affected the maritime operations of foreign ships, was not aimed at altering the terms of employment of foreign crews, and did not seek to extend the bill of rights of American workers and employers to foreign seamen or shipowners. Accordingly, the longstanding tradition of restraint in applying United States laws to foreign ships is irrele vant. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138; Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Assn., 415 U. S. 104; and American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S.S. Assn., 419 U. S. 215, distinguished. Pp. 219-222. (b) By its terms, § 8(b)(4)(B)'s prohibition against secondary boycotts applies to the facts of this case. Petitioner's sole complaint was with the Soviet Union's foreign and military policy, and however commendable its objectives might have been, the effect of its action was to impose a heavy burden on neutral employers. It is just such a burden that the secondary boycott provisions were designed to prevent. Pp. 222-224. (c) That the specific purpose of petitioner's action was not to halt business between respondent, its shipper, and the stevedore, but to free union members from handling goods from an objectionable source, does not place the action outside the prohibition of secondary boycotts. When a purely secondary boycott reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss, the pressure on those parties must be viewed as at least one of the objects of the boycott or the statutory prohibition would be rendered meaningless. P. 224. (d) Neither is it a defense to the application of § 8(b)(4)(B) that the reason for petitioner's boycott was not a labor dispute with a primary employer but a political dispute with a foreign nation. Section 8(b) (4)(B) contains no exception for "political" secondary boycotts, and its legislative history does not indicate that political disputes should be excluded from its scope. Pp. 224-226. (e) That respondent has alleged a violation of § 8(b)(4)(B) does not infringe the First Amendment rights of petitioner or its members. Conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce merits little consideration under that Amendment. Pp. 226-227. 640 F. 2d 1368, affirmed. POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Ernest L. Mathews, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Thomas W. Gleason and Charles R. Goldburg. Duane R. Batista argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Danielle E. DeBenedictis, David M. Saltiel, and Steven R. Berger. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Harriet S. Shapiro, Norton J. Come, Joseph E. Mayer, and James Holcomb.* JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. The question for our decision is whether a refusal by an American longshoremen's union to unload cargoes shipped from the Soviet Union is an illegal secondary boycott under §8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 61 Stat. 141, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4). I On January 9, 1980, Thomas Gleason, president of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA), ordered ILA members to stop handling cargoes arriving from or destined for the Soviet Union. Gleason took this action to protest the Russian invasion of Afghanistan.' In obedience to the order, *J. Albert Woll and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Kenneth C. McGuiness, Robert E. Williams, Allen A. Lauterbach, and C. David Mayfield for the American Farm Bureau Federation; and by Thomas P. Gies for Occidental Chemical Co. 'The directive provided: "In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of the Union, the leadership of ILA today ordered immediate suspension in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed. "This order is effective across the board on all vessels and all cargoes. Grain and other foods as well as high valued general freight. However, any Russian ship now in process of loading or discharging at a waterfront will be worked until completion. "The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international events that have affected relations between the U. S. and the Soviet longshoremen up and down the east and gulf coasts refused to service ships carrying Russian cargoes.2 Respondent Allied International, Inc. (Allied), is an American company that imports Russian wood products for resale in the United States. Allied contracts with Waterman Steamship Lines (Waterman), an American corporation operating ships of United States registry, for shipment of the wood from Leningrad to ports on the east and gulf coasts of the United States. Waterman, in turn, employs the stevedoring company of John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc. (Clark), to unload its ships docking in Boston. Under the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement between ILA Local 799 and the Boston Shipping Association, of which Clark is a member, Clark obtains its longshoring employees through the union hiring hall.3 As a result of the boycott, Allied's shipments were disrupted completely. Ultimately, Allied was forced to renegotiate its Russian contracts, substantially reducing its purchases and jeopardizing its ability to supply its own "However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by the demands of the workers. "It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes under present conditions in the world. "People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a decision in which the Union leadership concurs." App. 10a-11a. 'Several lawsuits have resulted from the ILA's Russian boycott. See Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 626 F. 2d 445 (CA5 1980); New Orleans S.S. Assn. v. General Longshore Workers, ILA, 626 F. 2d 455 (CA5 1980), cert. granted sub nom. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Longshoremen, 450 U. S. 1029 (1981). 'Article 40 of the collective-bargaining agreement contains a broad nostrike, no-lockout clause: "The Employers agree that there shall be no lockout or work stoppage by the Employers, and the Union agrees that there shall be no strike or work stoppage by the employees. The right of the employees not to cross a bona-fide picket line is recognized by the Employers." App. 29a. customers. App. 24a-28a. On March 31, 1980, after union officals informed Allied that ILA members would continue to refuse to unload any Russian cargo, Allied brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Claiming that the boycott violated the prohibition against secondary boycotts in § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4), Allied sued for damages under § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 158, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 187,5 which creates a private damages remedy for the victims of secondary boycotts." 'Section 8(b) provides in relevant part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents (4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is— “(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person...." 'Section 303 of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 158, as amended and as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 187, provides in pertinent part: "(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158(b)(4) of this title. "(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason [of] any violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor in any district court of the United States. . . and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit." 'Allied also alleged that the ILA boycott violated the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, and amounted to a tortious interference with Allied's business relationships in violation of admiralty law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of these claims, and they are not before us See 640 F. 2d 1368, 1379-1382 (CA1 1981). now. |