The FWPCA directs the Administrator of the EPA to seek an injunction to restrain immediately discharges of pollutants he finds to be presenting "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the welfare of persons." 33 U. S. C. § 1364(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). This rule of immediate cessation, however, is limited to the indicated class of violations. For other kinds of violations, the FWPCA authorizes the Administrator of the EPA "to commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation for which he is authorized to issue a compliance order 33 U. S. C. § 1319(b). 12 The provision makes clear that Congress did not Acts: "In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate." Id., at 15; see Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 (1981). But, as we have also observed in construing this Act: "The question... is not what a court thinks is generally appropriate to the regulatory process, it is what Congress intended. . . ." E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U. S., at 138. Here we do not read the FWPCA as intending to abolish the courts' equitable discretion in ordering remedies.

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12The statute at issue in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944), contained language very similar to that in § 1319(b). It directed the Price Administrator to seek "a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order" to halt violations. Id., at 322. The Court determined that such statutory language did not require the court to issue an injunction even when the Administrator had sued for injunctive relief. In Hecht Co., the court's equitable discretion overrode that of the Administrator. If a court can properly refuse an injunction in the circumstances of Hecht Co., the exercise of its discretion seems clearly appropriate in a case such as this, where the EPA Administrator was not a party and had not yet expressed his judgment. The action of the District Court permitted it to obtain the benefit of the EPA's recommendation before deciding to enjoin the discharge.

In Hecht Co., unlike here, the violations had ceased by the time the injunction was sought. The Court, however, explained that "the cessation of violations, whether before or after the institution of a suit by the Administrator, is no bar to the issuance of an injunction." Id., at 327. Thus, contrary to the dissent's characterization, post, at 327-328, the Court did not base its decision on the fact that violations had ceased.

anticipate that all discharges would be immediately enjoined. Consistent with this view, the administrative practice has not been to request immediate cessation orders. "Rather, enforcement actions typically result, by consent or otherwise, in a remedial order setting out a detailed schedule of compliance designed to cure the identified violation of the Act." Brief for Petitioners 17. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 320-322 (1981). Here, again, the statutory scheme contemplates equitable consideration.

Both the Court of Appeals and respondents attach particular weight to the provision of the FWPCA permitting the President to exempt federal facilities from compliance with the permit requirements. 33 U. S. C. §1323(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). They suggest that this provision indicates congressional intent to limit the court's discretion. According

13

to respondents, the exemption provision evidences Congress' determination that only paramount national interests justify failure to comply and that only the President should make this judgment.

We do not construe the provision so broadly. We read the FWPCA as permitting the exercise of a court's equitable discretion, whether the source of pollution is a private party or a federal agency, to order relief that will achieve compliance with the Act. The exemption serves a different and complementary purpose, that of permitting noncompliance by federal agencies in extraordinary circumstances. Executive Order No. 12088, 3 CFR 243 (1979), which implements the exemption authority, requires the federal agency requesting such an exemption to certify that it cannot meet the applicable pollution standards. "Exemptions are granted by the President only if the conflict between pollution control standards and crucial federal activities cannot be resolved through the development of a practicable remedial program." Brief for Petitioners 26, n. 30.

13 See n. 6, supra.

Should the Navy receive a permit here, there would be no need to invoke the machinery of the Presidential exemption. If not, this course remains open. The exemption provision would enable the President, believing paramount national interests so require, to authorize discharges which the District Court has enjoined. Reading the statute to permit the exercise of a court's equitable discretion in no way eliminates the role of the exemption provision in the statutory scheme.

Like the language and structure of the Act, the legislative history does not suggest that Congress intended to deny courts their traditional equitable discretion. Congress passed the 1972 Amendments because it recognized that "the national effort to abate and control water pollution has been inadequate in every vital aspect." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 7 (1971). The past failings included enforcement efforts under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (Refuse Act), 33 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. The "major purpose" of the 1972 Amendments was "to establish a comprehensive longrange policy for the elimination of water pollution." S. Rep. No. 92-414, supra, at 95. The permit system was the key to that policy. "The Amendments established a new system of regulation under which it is illegal for anyone to discharge pollutants into the Nation's waters except pursuant to a permit." Milwaukee v. Illinois, supra, at 310-311; see generally EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200 (1976). Nonetheless, "[i]n writing the enforcement procedures involving the Federal Government the Committee drew extensively upon the existing enforcement provisions of the Refuse Act of 1899." S. Rep. No. 92-414, supra, at 63. Violations of the Refuse Act have not automatically led courts to issue injunctions. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F. 2d 492, 535-538 (CA8 1975); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 500 F. 2d 167, 175 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 962 (1975); United States v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 491 F. 2d 562, 571 (CA1 1973), on remand, 399 F. Supp. 754, 759-760 (Me. 1975).

This Court explained in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944), that a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied. As we did there, we construe the statute at issue "in favor of that interpretation which affords a full opportunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings . . . in accordance with their traditional practices, as conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect." Id., at 330. We do not read the FWPCA as foreclosing completely the exercise of the court's discretion. Rather than requiring a district court to issue an injunction for any and all statutory violations, the FWPCA permits the district court to order that relief it considers necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act. That relief can include, but is not limited to, an order of immediate cessation.

The exercise of equitable discretion, which must include the ability to deny as well as grant injunctive relief, can fully protect the range of public interests at issue at this stage in the proceedings. The District Court did not face a situation in which a permit would very likely not issue, and the requirements and objective of the statute could therefore not be vindicated if discharges were permitted to continue. Should it become clear that no permit will be issued and that compliance with the FWPCA will not be forthcoming, the statutory scheme and purpose would require the court to reconsider the balance it has struck.

Because Congress, in enacting the FWPCA, has not foreclosed the exercise of equitable discretion, the proper standard for appellate review is whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying an immediate cessation order while the Navy applied for a permit. We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

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POWELL, J., concurring

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court. In my view, however, the record clearly establishes that the District Court in this case did not abuse its discretion by refusing to enjoin the immediate cessation of all discharges. Finding that the District Court acted well within the equitable discretion left to it under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions that the decision of the District Court should be affirmed.*

The propriety of this disposition is emphasized by the dissenting opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, post, p. 322. I agree with his view that Congress may limit a court's equitable discretion in granting remedies under a particular statute, and that some statutes may constrain discretion more narrowly than others. I stand with the Court, however, in finding no indication that Congress intended to limit the court's equitable discretion under the FWPCA in the manner suggested by JUSTICE STEVENS. As the Court's remand order might be thought to leave open whether the District Court in this case acted within its range of permissible discretion under the

*The District Court's thorough opinion demonstrates the reasonableness of its decision in light of all pertinent factors, including of course the evident purpose of the statute. The District Court concluded as matters of fact that the Navy's violations have caused no "appreciable harm," Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 706 (PR 1979), and indeed that the Navy's control of the area "probably constitutes a positive factor in its over all ecology," id., at 682. Moreover, the District Court found it "abundantly clear from the evidence in the record . . . that the training that takes place in Vieques is vital to the defense of the interests of the United States." Id., at 707. Balancing the equities as they then stood, the District Court declined to order an immediate cessation of all violations but nonetheless issued affirmative orders aimed at securing compliance with the law. See id., at 708. As I read its opinion, the District Court did not foreclose the possibility of ordering further relief that might become appropriate under changed circumstances at a later date.