that the infidel evinces more credulity than the Christian*. But, perhaps, some hasty and superficial caviller may be disposed to call in question the precise bearing of our author's argument on the truth of our religion. Looking rather to Mr. Faber's short title-page, than to the contents of his volume, he may pretend that our author's reasoning, even supposing it to be sound and correct, has but little to do with the truth of the sacred oracles. "The particular creed," he will say, "of some particular infidel may be wrong; but how does this prove the creed of the Christian to be right? And, if not, to what good purpose is the discussion? Christianity, though it should be found to contain fewer difficulties than some other given system, may yet contain enough to justify its rejection, or at least great hesitation respecting it in a thinking mind." Now, these might be valid remarks, as applied to Infidelity and Mohammedanism; but they are quite irrelevant in the present instance. Our author in this work is contemplating infidelity, not as it assumes a forin unconnect ed with the Bible, but solely as it stands identified with objections to the Bible. And this is the infidelity of the present day in our country. This is always implied by its very name. As Paley well remarks, the question is between the Christian revelation and no revelation at all; for none with whom we have to contend, are likely to support the pretensions of any other. There is little danger, we apprehend, that the educated unbeliever of this Christian country should turn Mussulman or Bhuddist, under a pretence that the religion of Bhudd or of Mohammed is clogged with less difficulty than the religion of Christ. If, then, the doctrine of the deistical infidel, as it stands connected with

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* The subject of this essay was pro posed as the competitory thesis for 1823, by the Church Union Society in the diocese of St. David's. The premium was adjudged to Mr. Faber

CHRIST. OBSERV. No. 275.

objections to the Bible, is proved to be encumbered with far more formidable difficulties than the Christian doctrine, the objector seems bound, upon his own principles, to embrace Christianity. He does not, like the sceptical Phyrronist, pretend to stand neuter; and his choice, by his own admission, lies between two systems only. If, therefore, he be compelled to abandon the shifting sand of mere natural religion, on which he has hitherto attempted to rest his footing, where can he betake himself but to the sure rock of Christianity? Hence we perceive the close connexion which subsists between Mr. Faber's line of argument, and the evidence for the Gospel. That connexion will indeed be obvious to any one who takes the trouble to read his work with attention; but still we think he would have done well to have pointed it out more particularly, for the benefit of that numerous tribe of "Freethinkers," who display more "smartness" than either modesty or good sense.

"

We shall first present our readers with Mr. Faber's concluding section; in which he saves us the trouble of analyzing his work, by giving a brief summary and recapitulation of its contents.

theological systems are acknowledged impostures, therefore every theological system is a mere human fabrication; nor yet is our unaw isted reason so potent, as to exclude the very necessity of a Divine revelation. On none of these points are the arguments of infidelity conclusive and satisfactory: on the contrary, they are vague, illogical, and insufficient.

"2. Infidelity, when not degraded into absolute brutish Atheism, specially claims to itself the appellation of Deism. Yet, without the aid of revelation, we cannot clearly demonstrate or certainly know, even so much as that there is no more than one God; and, if, for the sake of argument, the unity of the Godhead be conceded to the infidel, he will still be unable positively to develop and firmly to esta blish the moral attributes of the Deity. But, to suppose that an infinitely wise Being (for the wisdom and power of God may be proved by unassisted reason, though his moral attributes cannot be similarly demonstrated) would create a race of intelligent agents, and then turn them loose into the wide world without giving them the slightest hint as to his will or their duties, is a notion so flatly contradictory to every idea which we can form of the Supreme Reason, that it may justly be said to beggar all credibility.

3. Insurmountable difficulties, moreovor, repeatedly attend upon infidelity in regard to historical matters of fact. An important specimen of this mode of reasoning is afforded by the fact of the universal deluge. This fact, of necessity, involves such consequences, that the infidel must either, in the face of all testimony, deny the fact itself, or he must admit that a Divine revelation has actually taken place.

4. Nor do less difficulties attend upon infidelity in regard to accomplished prophecy. As a specimen of the argument from prophecy, the present state of the Jews may be aptly selected. The high antiquity of the prediction respecting them, delivered by Moses, cannot be controverted: and its exact accomplishment in the condition of the house of Judah is a naked matter of fact, which can neither be denied nor evaded. Now the denial, that a prophecy thus minutely fulfilled and still fulfilling must have proceeded from the inspiration of God, involves a gross absurdity: and the acknowledgment, that such a prophecy did indeed proceed from the inspiration of God, inevitably draws after it the additional acknowledgnent that the Law of Moses was a Divine

“ 5. Difficulties increase upon infidelity, as the facts and circumstances and character of the Christian dispensation are considered. These are such and so strongly marked, that to deem Christ and his early disciples enthusiasts or impostors requires a more vehement effort of belief than to deem them the inspired messengers of Heaven.

"6. Similar difficulties occur, on the infidel hypothesis, in regard to the rapid propagation of Christianity and the evidence by which the performance of miracles is supported. The Deist, after every effort has been made, unphilosophically contends for the existence of effects without any adequate cause; and is content simply and gratuitously to deny alleged facts, which rest on the unbroken testimony, not merely of friends, but also of acute and inveterate enemies.

"7. Lastly, the infidel is still impeded by the most perplexing difficulties, if from the external he directs his attention to the internal evidence of Christianity. In the case of all acknowledged impostures, their leading characteristics constitute that very internal evidence, by which they are the most strongly and indubitably evinced to be impostures. But the leading characteristics of Christianity, in respect both of its Author and of itself, are the precise opposites of the leading characteristics of all false religions. Therefore, by the rule of contraries, if the leading characteristics of false religions demonstrate their falsehood, the leading characteristics of Christianity must demonstrate its truth. Unless this be admitted, we maintain, in effect, that directly opposite premises may bring out precisely the same conclusions. To such a position the theory of the infidel will be found inevitably to conduct him. Let him disguise his reasoning as he may, it truly and ultimately amounts to this: that two men and two religious systems, though respectively marked by characteristics in all points diametrically opposite to each other, are yet to be viewed as mutually possessing precisely the same character." pp. 268-272.

In his statement of the first two of the "possible grounds or reasons of deistical infidelity," Mr. Faber may perhaps be regarded by some as fighting with a shadow. No infidel, it may be said, ever held, either that a Divine revelation was " in itself abstractedly impossible," or even that it was "so improbable an occurrence as to beggar all credibi

lity." We believe indeed, that very few, if any, have seriously professed such opinions. But does not Mr. Hume's doctrine amount to the same thing? In attempting to make the proof of a revelation impossible, has he not, in effect, denied the possibility of a revelation itself? A doctrine incapable of proof is a doctrine incapable of being revealed; and to say that no religion can ever be shewn to be a revelation from above, is the same as to say that a revelation from above is a thing incredible and impossible. The following passage is excellent, as it exposes, in lively colours, the evasive arts of Infidelity, and shews her what she ought to do before she can justly boast of any thing like a triumph.

"It is nugatory to say, that the evidences in favour of the Bible being a Divine revelation are weak and unsatisfactory; while yet no regular confutation of the arguments, upon which those evidences rest, is pretended to be brought forward. To start difficulties is one thing: to answer arguments, another. Now the mere starting of an insulated difficulty is no answer to a regular argument. The work, which we have a right to demand from the sceptic or infidel, is a work, in which the author shall go regularly through the treatises (we will say) of Leslie and Paley; taking argument after argument, successively shewing their utter inconclusiveness, and then bringing out the triumphant result that the evidences of a Divine revelation are too weak and unsatisfactory to command our reasonable assent. Let this be done; and we may allow the present ground of infidelity to be tenable but simply to assert that the evidences are insufficient, while not an attempt is made to give a regular answer to the various arguments which have been brought forward by writers on the evidences, is plainly an assertion without proof." pp. 7, 8.

Mr. Faber makes great use, in this treatise, of the syllogistic form of reasoning, which, if not always available for the discovery of truth, is doubtless, as Locke has observed, a good detector of sophistry. In discussing the fourth ground of infidelity, that " numerous objections and difficulties exist in the case of

each system claiming the character of a Divine revelation; which ob jections and difficulties cannot be answered and removed;" he throws the infidel argument into the form of the following syllogism :

"A religion claiming to be a revelation from Heaven is demonstrated to be such by a train of close reasoning upon its evidences; which it has been found impossible to confute through the medium of a regular answer, article by article. But, in regard to sundry matters connected with this religion, objections may be made, and difficulties may be started. Therefore such religion has no legitimate claim to be deemed a revelation from Heaven." pp. 9, 10.

This sophism he afterwards illustrates by an apt historical reference.

"The fact of the existence of Cyrus,. as the sovereign of the Medo-Persian and the subverter of the Babylonian empire, is established by such strong moral evidence that, if we reject it, we must reject all history and sink into universal scepticism. But, in regard to this fact, a serious difficulty occurs; for Herodotus and Xenophon give us two accounts of Cyrus so essen-: tially different that by no human ingenuity can they be reconciled together. Therefore no such person as Cyrus ever existed."pp. 10, 11.

Under the fifth possible hold of infidelity, our author exposes the futility of Volney's argument against the Bible, grounded on the pretence, that other systems have alike claimed to be revelations from above; and does it follow then, says our author, that because all cannot be true, all are necessarily false?

Under the sixth ground, he disposes, with equal ease and success, of another argument of the same writer, founded on the alleged sufficiency of unassisted reason for all moral and religious purposes. He here shews the very different sentiments which are put by Plato into the mouth of Socrates, and observes, "Socrates thinks with the Christian; Mr. Volney with the Deist. Shall, we symbolize with the Greek, or with the Frank ?"

Our author's object, in his second section, is to shew the insufficient ᏎᏃ 2

of natural religion, even on some points connected with the existence and attributes of the Deity. He maintains that such are the difficulties attendant on deistical infidelity, that, without the aid of revelation, neither the unity nor the moral perfections of the Divinity can be demonstrated. All we can collect with certainty is, his necessary existence as Creator his wisdom and his power. Upon these points Mr. Faber has doubtless reasoned ingeniously, but we think not quite conclusively; at least he is at issue with some Christian writers of the first eminence and ability. Clarke, we know, has attempted (and, in the opinion of many, not unsucessfully) to demonstrate the unity and moral perfections of the Deity by metaphysical reasoning; and, as for those who dislike his "high priori road" and we confess that we are not very partial to it ourselves-they may have recourse to Bishop Butler and Dr. Paley, who have endeavoured to build the same great truths on principles of experimental reasoning. We must confess that we consider the unity and moral perfections of the Divine Being, as resting on very strong grounds of probability, independently of revelation. When Mr. Faber speaks of the possibility of the universe having been "created by a collective body of gods, perfectly harmonising in design, and jointly bringing the great work to a completion," he supposes infinite power, instead of residing in any single being, to be shared among a number of beings of equal pretensions. Hence every one of these beings would be necessarily imperfect; and the idea of a perfect being, perfect in any sense whatever, must be given up. This may be possible, but appears to us encumbered with greater difficulty than the admission of the Divine unity; and, if so, the Divine unity may be collected even from the light of reason. Mr. Faber admits that, independently of revelation, it is highly probable that there is

but one God. We think, however, that this is hardly saying enough, and that the appearances of unity of design in the creation are so prominent, as to afford a degree of probability on this point, almost amounting to a moral certainty of the fact, or at least quite sufficient for every thinking mind to act upon. With respect also to the moral perfections of the Deity being incapable of proof without revelation, we must be allowed to hesitate. Whoover reads Paley's chapter on the "Goodness of the Deity," and the second, third, fourth, and fifth chapters of the first part of Butler's "Analogy," will see, we think, very strong grounds for admitting the moral perfections of the Deity, on the principles of natural religion. Indeed, without admitting his moral perfections, it is evident that no such thing as what is called natural religion can properly exist.

It may be asked likewise, how, without some previous assurance of the moral perfections of God, revelation itself is to be depended on as a true record, and a sure guide of action. But the force of this argument, though the argument itself is not entirely without weight, is much diminished by the character of the Christian revelation, as being, throughout, a character of moral dignity and moral excellence, every where tending to purify and elevate the mind, and to promote the improvement and happiness of the human race. Being such, could it have proceeded from any source but the will of a good and holy Being? Or, according to our Saviour's unanswerable remonstrance with his accusers, “How could satan cast out satan ?"

Mr. Faber admits, that the perfect wisdom of the Deity, as well as his power, is abundantly deducible from the appearances of the

* We think this chapter excellent, as

far as it goes. But we have often had occasion to remind our readers of its deficiencies, as being limited to the consideration of a single attribute of the Deity.