object his Government had in view. Having been furnished at an early day, through his Government, with a copy of my instructions, he had the advantage of knowing that I was in no way hampered in regard to the channel through which the boundary line was to be run, while he knew that he dare not go further than the channel east of the island of San Juan. I cannot well conceive of a more dishonest mode of attempting to evade the obligations of a treaty, or a greater outrage upon the confiding disposition of the Government of the United States, than is exhibited in these instructions for the guidance of the British commissioner. Nor can I understand how an officer of the British navy could conscientiously undertake to carry a treaty into effect under such instructions.

"I have never regarded the duty of commissioner to carry the treaty into effect as of a diplomatic character. I have, therefore, from the outstart, been open and unreserved in my communication with my colleagues both of the land and water boundary. But I have learned by experience that their views of duty are widely different from mine. I came out here to do a fair and honest business-to carry out faithfully, on the part of my Government, a contract entered into with Great Britain. Although the language of the treaty is as clear as day, and scarcely admits of more than one meaning, I did not plant myself upon its mere letter, but, finding that the lapse of time, the changes of administration in our Government, and selfish interests on the part of the British Government, instigated by the Hudson's Bay Company, had enveloped its meaning in an air of obscurity, I made diligent search for evidence which would throw light upon the intention of the negotiators, framers, and ratifiers of the treaty, fully determined, whatever might be the result of my investigations, to give due weight to it, without partiality, fear, or favour. The various documents I have laid before the department will attest the sincerity with which I have laboured to bring forward the truth. The British commissioner, Captain Prevost, on the contrary, has taken the very opposite course. The pursuit or fair consideration of evidence to elucidate any obscurity in which the language of

the treaty might be involved from any cause whatever has been most studiously avoided. A blind adherence to a tortured interpretation of the meaning of the words of the treaty has been with him apparently a sacred act of duty. This perverted reading of the treaty has been his infallible guide throughout my connection with him. And he has so resolutely shut his eyes to the light of the most authentic contemporaneous evidence I have laid before him, not only of the views of my Government, but also of his own, that I sincerely believe, though one should rise from the dead to confirm it, he would not give it credence.

"That so amiable and estimable a gentleman as Captain Prevost should pursue a course so inconsistent with the ordinary dictates of common sense and good judgment, to say nothing of the demands of high honour, has been to me a source of the most unfeigned regret and mystification. If the British Government, however, has the right to exact of its agents an implicit obedience to its mandates, regardless of all considerations but its interests, I must do Captain Prevost the justice of bearing witness to his devoted loyalty.

"I would respectfully call the attention of the department to the fact that there are still some points which must be embraced in the instructions for Captain Prevost's guidance which are not to be found in the extract forwarded to me. It is evident from the correspondence of Captain Prevost, that his claim to Rosario Straits on the ground of the very peculiar wording of the treaty, and his main objection to the Canal de Haro by his interpretation of the word southerly in the treaty, are derived from instructions; for he says in his letter of November 24, 1857, The high and official authority to whom I alluded in my letter of the 9th instant as the source of my information that the Vancouver, or Rosario Strait, was the channel contemplated by the British Government, is Her Majesty's present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Earl of Clarendon, and I cannot presume that he would intimate to me in writing, as he has done, that such was the case, unless he had substantial grounds for doing so.' Lord Napier, while

repudiating the very peculiar wording' of the treaty, and Captain Prevost's interpretation of the word 'southerly,' informed me that the Earl of Clarendon seemed to attach some importance to them. I cannot but think, therefore, that these instructions or suggestions have been purposely omitted from the extract, and, as they really formed the great obstacles to an agreement between Captain Prevost and myself, I think it important they should be obtained.

"A difficulty has also occurred in regard to an agreement upon the common initial point of the water and land boundary on the west side of Point Roberts, which, probably, is also the result of instructions. And I have also good reason to believe that Captain Prevost was authorised in some shape or form to negotiate with me for the disposal of the southern end of Point Roberts by exchange, make-weight, or otherwise. The manner in which the demarcation of the line across Point Roberts is held in abeyance by the refusal of the British commissioner to mark it as the initial point, satisfies me that considerable importance is attached by the British Government to the possession of it, and that they hope by some fortuitous circumstance to secure it.

"As the department has furnished the British Government with a full copy of my instructions, there is no reason why they should not in return furnish full copies of their commissioner's instructions. I would therefore respectfully recommend that a full copy of the instructions of Captain Prevost be requested for the information of the Government, and that when received, a copy of so much of them as I have not already received in the extract be transmitted to me.

"I transmit herewith, for the information of the department, a recent correspondence with Captain Prevost, from which it will be seen that there is little prospect of any progress in the determination of the line until the British Government are called upon to give their commissioner peremptory instructions to adopt the Canal de Haro. At present he seems to be divested of all power to act by his reference of the question to his Government, a condition of affairs anything but satisfactory.

"Circumstances to which I will allude in a subsequent. communication (1) show the necessity of a speedy settlement of the boundary question. And I would strongly urge upon the department decisive measures to bring it about.

"As far as I am concerned, I am, as I have ever been, ready to settle it upon principles of common sense and international law. It is for the department to take such steps as will provide me with a colleague whose powers shall be equal to my own, and whose sense of right and duty will not be so crippled by special instructions for his guidance as to render the honest and faithful execution of the treaty an impossibility. “I have the honour to be, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL,

"Commissioner North-west Boundary Survey.

"Hon. Lewis Cass, Secretary of State."

It is desirable, both in the interests of Great Britain and the United States, that Point Roberts should be placed in the possession of Great Britain, although by the treaty it is given to the United States. If its possession be insisted on by the latter country, a valueless strip of land jutting out into the sea will be placed beyond the jurisdiction of the adjoining territory of British Columbia. Being also, by its position and little value, placed virtually out of the jurisdiction of the nearest United States authorities, this strip of land will prove a refuge for the wrongdoers of both countries, and will be the source of numerous disputes.

(1) American State Papers, p. 112.

CHAPTER X.

Ir further argument be necessary in aid of that of Capt. Prevost, I would base the claim of Great Britain to the Haro Archipelago firstly and mainly upon the clear and express language of the treaty of 1846, and shall contend that no gloss or explanation of the same can be given outside the words themselves of that treaty, as, for example, by evidence of the probable views and intentions of its negotiators.

Secondly (if such gloss or explanation be admitted), I shall argue that from the nature of the subject, from its inherent probabilities, from the evidence which is extant as to the views and intentions of the negotiators, from that which is required by international equity and by strict justice, as tending to place the contracting parties on an equality, the claim of Great Britain to the archipelago is incontestable.

In proceeding to construe this treaty, I do not think it absolutely necessary, but it may be convenient (having regard to the statements above quoted of Mr. Campbell), to state that the negotiator on the part of Great Britain was evidently actuated by perfect good faith; and was influenced by no desire or thought of overreaching the United States, or of leaving any loophole (as is sometimes done by parties contracting) for escape from the provisions of the contract into which he was about to enter. It will be conceded