appurtenant to the mainland, embracing as natural appendages to its coast the islands between it and the Canal de Haro. Your argument that the Rosario Straits must be the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island would apply with equal force to Vancouver's Island if it were situated as far distant as the Sandwich Islands. For, you say: 'It would seem indisputable that where several channels exist between the two (that is, between the continent and Vancouver's Island) that channel which is the most adjacent to the continent must be the channel which separates the continent from any islands lying off its shores, however remote those islands may be.' This process of reasoning would elevate an island to a much higher degree of importance than a continent, by making all intermediate islands appendages to it instead of to the continent, a doctrine which I am not prepared to admit, nor do I think, upon further reflection, you will maintain.

"You decline to admit the correctness of my conclusion that if the term 'southerly' be taken in a strictly technical or nautical sense, the treaty cannot be carried into effect. But I do not understand you as denying the fact that the word 'southerly' applies equally to the Straits of Fuca as to the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island. Still, while denying a liberal construction of term as far as may be applicable to the Canal de Haro, you appear to be willing to appeal to the dictates of common sense, or to seek for the intention of the negotiators of the treaty when it applies to the Straits of Fuca. I must respectfully repeat, if the term 'southerly,' as used in the treaty, is to be construed as you still construe it in relation to the course of the Canal de Haro, the same meaning must be given to it in regard to the course of the Straits of Fuca, for the channel and straits are so connected in the language of the treaty as to be governed by the preceding words, 'southerly through the middle of.' The object of my remarks on that subject was to prevent the treaty from becoming a nullity, by adopting the natural meaning of the word instead of its

In

strictly technical or nautical sense; but it seems to me not entirely just to apply it in one sense to the Canal de Haro and in another to the Straits of Fuca. I think, therefore, you will be obliged to abandon your objection to the Canal de Haro on the ground that a line cannot be traced through it in a southerly direction. I refer to Mr. Benton's speech for his understanding of the word to confirm my own. giving his reasons for voting in favour of the treaty he says: When the line reaches the channel which separates Vancouver's Island from the continent, it proceeds to the middle of the channel, and thence turning south through the Channel de Haro to the Straits of Fuca, and thence west through the middle of that strait to the sea.' Here is the true reading of the language of the treaty, and it is in perfect accordance with that contained in my letter of the 2nd instant.

"In your remarks upon the evidence of Mr. McLane and Mr. Benton, showing which channel' was intended and proposed by the British Government, and understood and accepted by the United States Government, you observe that 'it has had its full weight' with you, but add that neither Mr. McLane nor Mr. Benton were the actual negotiators of the treaty, and however valuable their opinions may be to the elucidation of obscure points, yet these opinions can in no way alter the actual wording and terms of the treaty.'

"I am not aware that there is any rule in the law governing the interpretation of treaties that would require the evidence of the actual negotiators. What is required in such cases is that which was probably in the thoughts of the author or authors of the treaty. And here I beg to call your attention on that point to the quotations (in my letter of the 2nd instant) from Vattel in his article on the interpretation of treaties, by which you will perceive that I have gone much further than is required. I have shown their actual intentions at the time the treaty was drawn up, proposed, and accepted, and I propose to go a step further and show that this intention and understanding remained unchanged up to the complete ratification of the treaty by both Governments.

H

"Although Mr. McLane and Mr. Benton were not the signers of the treaty, both of them had that official connection with the negotiation that gives their evidence equal weight with that of the signers themselves, and in the absence of evidence from the latter it must be regarded as indisputable. Nothing short of positive contradictory testimony from equally reliable authority can invalidate it.

"I will, however, show you clearly the understanding of Mr. Buchanan, the Secretary of State, one of the negotiators and signers of the treaty. Immediately upon the receipt of Mr. McLane's letter of the 18th of May, stating the substance of the proposition that was to be made by Lord Aberdeen, a conference was held in the State Department between Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Pakenham. The protocol of this proceeding accompanied the President's message to the Senate asking their advice as to the acceptance of the proposition. It is as follows:

"A conference was held at the Department of State on the 6th of June, 1846, between the Hon. James Buchanan, Secretary of State, the American plenipotentiary, and the Right Honourable Richard Pakenham, the British plenipotentiary, when the negotiation respecting the Oregon territory was resumed. The British plenipotentiary made a verbal explanation of the motives which had induced Her Majesty's Government to instruct him to make another proposition to the Government of the United States for the solution of these

long-existing difficulties. The Secretary of State expressed his satisfaction with the friendly motives which had animated the British Government in this endeavour. Whereupon the British plenipotentiary submitted to the Secretary of State the draught of a convention (marked A) setting forth the terms which he had been instructed to propose to the Government of the United States for the settlement of the Oregon question.'

"The draught of the convention is in the same words as the ratified treaty. The instructions of Lord Aberdeen, and Mr. McLane's letter to Mr. Buchanan, stating the nature of the proposition to be submitted for the settlement of the

Oregon question, were dispatched to the United States by the same steamer the day after their conference, and the letter was received in Washington on the 3rd of June. The conference between Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Pakenham was held on the 6th of June. On the same day Mr. Buchanan writes to Mr. McLane as follows:

"I transmit to you herewith a copy of the projet of a convention, delivered to me by Mr. Pakenham this morning, for the adjustment of the Oregon question, together with a copy of the protocol of the proceeding. This being the regular day for the meeting of the Cabinet, the subject was brought before them by the President. The result was a determination on his part to submit the projet to the Senate for their previous advice. This will be done as soon as the proper message can be prepared, and the necessary papers copied.'

"The papers necessary to accompany this projet of the treaty were the protocol mentioned above and a copy of Mr. McLane's letter of the 18th of May, containing his statement of the substance of the treaty as communicated to him by Lord Aberdeen. The object of sending this letter to the Senate was to explain to the senators the intentions of the British Government as to the details of the treaty, that they might be able to give their advice to the President understandingly. And as the letter was copied in the Department of State by direction of Mr. Buchanan, to accompany the projet of the treaty, it must be considered as expressing the understanding between himself and Mr. Pakenham; being in harmony with the proposition submitted to him by the latter in conformity with the instructions he received from his Government. therefore, quite clear that Mr. Buchanan must have understood the language describing the boundary line in the treaty as intending the Canal de Haro' for the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island.' With the letter of Mr. McLane in his possession, and deeming it necessary that it should accompany the projet of the treaty to the Senate for their information, there cannot be a doubt that

It is,

Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Pakenham understood the language of the treaty alike.

"You state that Mr. McLane, in his report to the Secretary of State, writes that the proposition of the Government most probably will offer substantially as follows,' and quotes his language, giving the substance of the first article of the treaty; and add, 'Now this is stated to have been the probable proposition; it appears strange, if it was the adopted proposition, that the simple and unmistakable wording used by Mr. McLane should not have been retained.

"Mr. McLane could hardly have used a stronger expression to convey to his Government the intentions of Lord Aberdeen, as communicated to him in their full and free conversation,' and 'lengthened conference,' than the words 'most probably,' without having actually seen his despatches to Mr. Pakenham. At the date of his letter he most certainly believed that the proposition would be substantially as he stated, for he does not pretend to give the words of the treaty in his statement of any of the articles, but confines himself to its spirit and gives its substance. Having stated this fact in my previous letter, it ought not to appear strange to you that 'the simple and unmistakable wording used by Mr. McLane should not have been retained.'

"With the projet of the treaty and the chart before them, Mr. McLane and Lord Aberdeen could not fail to see at a glance that the concise language of the treaty clearly indicated 'the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island.' The Gulf of Georgia washing the continent at the northern end of the line; the Canal de Haro, Vancouver's Island, at the southern end, and at its junction with the Straits of Fuca, presented to the eye a continuous channel that unmistakably separated, throughout its whole length, the continent from Vancouver's Island, and about which it might well have been supposed by them (with their full knowledge of the motive that induced this deflection from the fortyninth parallel) there could be no question. But a glance at the chart of the United States Coast Survey, on a large scale,