tizen of Geneva boast to the Archbishop of Paris, that he is A MAN MADE UP SOLELY OF TRUTH; THE ONLY AUTHOR OF THIS AGE, AND OF MANY OF THE FOREGOING, WHO HATH WRITTEN WITH GOOD FAITH *.

CHAP. V.

IN WHICH AN OBJECTION TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THIS ALLIANCE IS REMOVED.

The

HERE I should have concluded this Second Book, but that it appeared reasonable to obviate an objection, which may seem to affect our fundamental principle, the REALITY of this free convention. objection is this, "That as the two Societies are supposed to be formed out of one and the same num• ber of individuals, those very men who compose the state composing the church also, it is a convention of the same individuals with themselves, under dif ferent capacities. Which convention is as trifling and ineffectual as that which one individual would make with himself." The objection, we see, goes upon

this

* Mes ennemis auront beau faire avec leurs injures; ils ne m'ôteront point l'honneur d'être UN HOMME VERIDIQUE EN TOUTE CHOSE, D'ETRE LE SEUL AUTEUR DE MON SIECLE, & DE BEAUCOUP D'AUTRES QUI AIT ECRIT DE BONNE FOI. Lettre à M. de Beau. mont, p. 65.-Now, with all his good faith, he has surely a very unsound mind or memory. In writing against me, he says, as we have seen above, QUE LA LOI CHRETIENNE EST, AU FOND, PLUS NUISIBLE QU'UTILE A LA FORTE CONSTITUTION DE L'etat, But when he writes against the French philosophers, he says just otherwise: Nos GOUVERNEMENS MODERNES DOIVENT INCONTESTABLEMENT AU CHRISTIANISME LEUR PLUS SOLIDE AUTORITE,

Emile, v. iii. p. 200.

suppo

supposition, that the circumstances which prevent one individual's compacting with himself do unavoidably attend a compact attempted to be made by many individuals with themselves, under the distinction of two Societies.

Now, to shew the supposition groundless, is to overthrow the objection. But we shall do more; we shall not only shew our free convention to have none of the circumstances attending it, which prevent one individual's compacting with himself; but, that it hath all the circumstances that make a compact binding between two.

Let us see what it is which prevents a man's contracting with himself. It is of the essence of all contracts that there be, 1. The concurrence of two wills; and, 2. A mutual obligation on two persons for the performance of their mutual promises. But one man having but one will, there is no foundation for a compact, which requires the concurrence of two wills and having but one person, there is no efficacy in the compact; because no obligation: for what a man promises to himself, himself can acquit. Therefore an obligation, which the obliged can destroy by the sole act of his will, is not real but fanciful. Hence it appears, that a man's contracting with himself is, of all fancies, the most impertinent.

Thus, we see, the defect of that compact of one individual with himself, proceeds from the want of two wills and two persons. If then, two Societies have really two distinct wills, and two distinct personalities; the subject matter's being one and the same (of which these two artificial bodies are composed) cannot possibly hinder those two societies from entering into compact; nor that compact from having all the effects of such as are adjudged most real,

VOL. VII.

P

That

That two such societies have two distinct wills and personalities I shall shew. When any number of men form themselves into a society, whether civil or religious, this society becomes a body, different from that aggregate which the number of individuals composed before the society was formed. Else the society would be nothing; or, in other words, no society would be formed. Here then is a body, distinct from the aggregate composed by the number of individuals: and is called factitious, to distinguish it from the natural body; being, indeed, the creature of human will. But a body must have its proper personality and will, which, without these, is no more than a shadow or a name. This personality and will are neither the personality and will of one individual, nor of all together. Not of one, is self-evident. Not of all, because the MAJORITY, in this factitious body, hath the denomination of the person and of the will of the society. We conclude then, that the will and personality of a community are as different and distinct from the will and personality of the numbers of which it is composed, as the body itself is. And, that as in the erection of a community, a factitious body was created, so were a factitious personality and will. The reality of this personality is clearly seen in the administration of the law of nations, where two states are considered as two men living in the state of

nature.

But the force of this reasoning will be better seen and supported by an example. The writers of the law of nature and nations allow that the second convention, as it is called, in a pure democratic state, is as real and binding as the same convention in a state of any other form. The second convention is that whereby protection and allegiance are mutually promised by sovereign

sovereign and people: "For in the collective body

(says Hooker) that have not derived the princi“ pality of power into some one, or few, the whole "of necessity must be head over each part*:" So that here the people contract with themselves. And yet is the contract adjudged most real. This conclusion is founded on the very principle I lay down to prove the reality of the convention between church and state; namely that, in entering into society, a factitious person is created. In a democracy, this person, the sovereign, is the WHOLE: and, with this person, the natural persons of all the individuals

convene.

If this be the case, then it follows that the self-same number of individuals, which have formed and erected, of themselves, one society or factitious body, endowed with a distinct personality and will, may erect, of themselves, as many such societies as they please. Because the body, personality, and will, of such societies being all factitious, the storehouse, from whence they come, is as inexhaustible as the wants of mankind. Whereas, were the will and personality of the individuals, the will and personality of the society composed by them, then, on the contrary, the selfsame number of individuals could not erect above one society: Because their personality and will being already bestowed upon one society, they had them not to give again, in order to animate any other.

Here then we have two societies, made up of one and the same number of individuals, with each its distinct personality and will; each different from the personality and will of the other, and from the personality and will of the individuals. But the different natures of the societies not only make their wills and * Eccl. Pol. b. viii,

P 2

personalities

personalities distinct, but their different ends will keep them so. For each society being created for one certain end, it hath its own proper views and interests: and though each be so closely related to the other as to have one common suppositum, yet it pursues its proper interests only; without further regard to the interests of the other, than as these interests support its own. In this, the artificial man, society, is much unlike the natural; who being created for several ends, hath several interests to pursue, and several relations to consult; and may therefore be considered under several capacities, as a religious, a civil, a rational animal, &c. and yet they all make but one and the same man. But one and the same political society cannot be considered, in one view, as a religiousin another, as a civil--and, in another, as a literary community. One society can be precisely but one of these communities *

But, now it is to be observed, that, let this objection to a real convention, from the want of distinct personalities and wills in the two societies, be as strong as we have shewn it to be weak, yet it reaches only to those two societies under a pure unmixed democratic form; in which the sovereignty of the society resides in the whole number of individuals. either, is under any other form, the clearly seen to have no weight.

When both, or

objection is more Because then the

* Ecclesiastica potestas seu respublica Christiana, quæ sub nomine ecclesiæ sæpe explicatur, eam significat clericorum et laïcorum collectionem, qui in unum corpus adunati, ecclesiasticis legibus se subjiciunt: non quidem quatenus homines civilem rempublicam componentes, sed quatenus in spiritualem cœtum admissi. Eadem ratione civilis respublica dici potest, quæ vel ex infidelibus principibus & rebuspublicis constet, vel quæ ex Christianis hominibus quidem, sed nullo ad religionem respectu habito, componitur. Marca, 1. i. c. 1, F. T.

sovereignty