clear that this justifies and necessitates inter-Allied control. The best hope of ameliorating the position seems to lie in the establishment of some such form of control, if workable from the nationality point of view, working from, perhaps, Trieste, as a centre (where it could survey the distribution of imported coal), and having local controls operating from centres conveniently near to each of the main Coalfields, e. g.:

Application has been made by these countries for British coal through Baltic ports. This is the natural method of supply.

Appendix 89

[Resolution From the Raw Materials Section Regarding the Coal Situation in Europe]

At the 6th meeting of the Section (April 16, 1919) the following resolution was adopted relative to item 3 of Agenda "Report on the Coal Situation in Europe."

Resolution:

That the Report on the Coal situation in Europe be referred:

(a) As regards the occupied area of Germany, to the French Ministry of Industrial Reconstruction to enquire into the statements made by the German representatives as to the reasons for their failure to execute the Luxembourg Protocol of 25th December 1918, and to report to this Section at its next meeting.

(b) As regards the Ruhr and the Silesian mines, to the Food Section with a recommendation that the distribution of food by the German Government to the miners should receive special attention, with the request that they inform this Section and M. Loucheur as Chairman of the Coal committee as to action taken.

(c) As regards the mines of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, to the Director General of Supplies and Relief and to the Communications Section with a recommendation that the scheme of extended control by the Allies over the railways and mines be favorably considered. (d) To the Supreme Economic Council for consideration generally, and with the special suggestion that the attention of the Supreme War Council be drawn to the importance, from the point of view of

the coal supply of Eastern Europe, of obtaining an early political settlement in Silesia.

That the Secrétariat communicate this action to the Supreme Economic Council.

Appendix 90

Memorandum by the British Ministry of Shipping on Italian Coal Supply

1. The Italian Government find the present position of the Italian coal supply to be so serious that they fear internal disturbances in their country which may well prove extremely embarrassing to the general cause of the Associated Governments. The British Government, recognising the gravity of the position, has taken every possible step to meet the immediate needs of Italy, and if their action were supplemented by the resumption at once of the railing of French coal to Italy at about the rate of despatch prevailing at the Armistice, Italy's difficulties would be met. The British Government very much regret to learn, however, that the French Government has refused to supplement the Italian supply and to meet the balance of that country's needs in the only possible manner, viz.: by the railing of French coal to Italy.

2. A brief survey of the Italian Coal Supply during the last twelve months shows that it was the first subject of discussion at the First Session of the Allied Maritime Transport Council in March 1918, when it was unanimously agreed that a supply of 600,000 tons of Coal a month to Italy was the absolute minimum necessary to meet her requirements. It was further arranged that this supply should be furnished as follows:

150,000 tons a month of British coal by long sea route to Italy. 100,000 tons a month of British coal to be shipped to Blaye and to be railed thence to Italy.

350,000 tons a month of French coal to be railed from French Southern mines to Italy, or to Marseilles or other French port, for short sea shipment.

The French coal was to be replaced in France by British coal shipped from the United Kingdom.

3. During the eight months from mid-March 1918 to the date of the Armistice in November 1918, the average monthly quantity of coal sent to Italy was approximately 595,000 tons, of which France supplied 210,000 tons and Great Britain 385,000 tons.

4. It was only by the greatest sacrifices, and often by gravely imperilling essential services, that Great Britain was able during these

eight months to provide Italy with 150 per cent. of the British coal, which was arranged for under the agreement of March 1918, viz.: 385,000 tons a month as against 250,000 tons, and thus to secure to Italy her agreed essential minimum.

5. Since the Armistice, the supply of French coal, which at that date was being sent at the rate of 150,000 tons a month, has gradually diminished, and by the end of January 1919 had practically ceased.

6. In the three months mid-November 1918-mid-February 1919, Great Britain sent coal to Italy at rate of 468,000 tons a month, while the supply of French coal averaged 36,000 tons, Italy's coal supply during this period being thus at the rate of 504,000 tons monthly.

7. During the period of six weeks to end of March 1919, 516,000 tons of coal were shipped from the United Kingdom, while the supply of French coal amounted to 24,000 tons. Italy thus received 540,000 tons, or 360,000 tons short of the approved minimum requirement, i. e., 900,000 tons for the present.

8. The shipments of British coal during this period, and, indeed, during the greater part of the previous three months, were only effected with the greatest difficulty. Labour troubles at the ports immobilised a vast amount of shipping under repair, and strikes of varying lengths, at many of the coal mines, coupled with the threat of a general coal strike, interfered to a serious extent with the coal shipments, that the British Government did all that was humanly possible in the circumstances, as indicated by the level to which the shipments were brought in spite of the many grave hindrances. Had the supply of French coal not ceased, Italy's minimum supply of 600,000 tons a month over the 42 months would have been secured.

9. During present month of April, 730,000 tons of shipping have been allocated to load coal to Italy. It is feared, however, that the Easter Holidays (which will doubtless be lengthened by the receipt of the miners of back pay under the Sankey award) will prevent a considerable amount of the tonnage actually loading in the month. Every possible diversion to this, however, is being made and every priority is being given to Italian coal.

10. Great Britain can do no more, and in any case additional shipments from the United Kingdom cannot reach Italy in time to cope with the immediate requirements for the internal transport and distribution of food in that country, for which there are no available stocks in consequence of the shortage in supply since the Armistice.

11. This urgent need can only be met in one way, i. e., by railing coal from France, and in the interests of everybody, France should arrange for this to be commenced forthwith.

59320447-VOL. X-13

Appendix 91

Recommendation From the Mixed Sub-Commission on Currency Questions To Be Transmitted to the Supreme Economic Council

WHEREAS the Austro-Hungarian Bank, after the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy on 30th October, 1918, has, contrary to all right and precedent, continued to print and issue notes similar to those previously in circulation in Austria-Hungary;

AND WHEREAS, the issue of such notes is now, for the first time on record, effected not only in Vienna but in Budapest;

AND WHEREAS, by reason of the above, the circulation, which on 31st October, 1918, had attained the figure of 30 milliard crowns, had increased to over 35 milliard crowns at the end of 1918, to 371⁄2 milliard by the end of February 1919, and will shortly attain 40 milliards;

AND WHEREAS these notes are liable to come into circulation in territories emancipated from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, thus indirectly increasing the liabilities of the interested States; THE MIXED SUB-COMMISSION THEREFORE RECOMMENDS :

That the Supreme Allied Economic Council should without delay adopt all measures which would:

(1) authorize the seizure of the plates used for printing these notes issued by the Austro-Hungarian Bank, and of all the issues put into circulation to date;

(2) prohibit the Austro-Hungarian Bank from printing and circulating notes bearing the stamp of any former issue.

(3) allow of confiscation (for stamping or destroying[)] of all notes printed from former plates and not yet in circulation which may be held by the Austro-Hungarian Bank in Vienna, Budapest and other branches, and in the German-Austrian or Hungarian Treasuries;

(4) permit the formation of a controlling Inter-Allied Commission at which the nations concerned should be represented, which would ensure the carrying out of the measures provided for in the preceding paragraphs, being:

(a) the stamping of all or part of the notes printed from old plates, and not yet in circulation;

(b) the printing of new bank-notes peculiar to German Austria and Hungary.

Appendix 92

Recommendation from the Mixed Sub-Commission for Currency Questions for Transmission to the Supreme Economic Council

1. WHEREAS the Germans, during their occupation of Roumania, issued paper money to a value exceeding 24 milliards, on the form of notes of the Banca Generala Romana;

AND WHEREAS furthermore, according to their ledgers a reserve of such printed notes to the value of 111 millions was held in Berlin;

AND WHEREAS the bad technical conditions under which this issue was effected, and the insufficient control thereof, have facilitated to a large degree the circulation of spurious notes by individuals;

AND WHEREAS detailed information has been received from the Roumanian Government to the effect that even now the Germans are introducing in neutral markets bank-notes of the type issued by the Banca Generala Romana and intended to make their way back to Roumania, which will constitute a grave danger to that country, particularly as the enemy holds the plates in Berlin and can use them at pleasure, the continuance of these proceedings by Germany after the Armistice amounting in effect to an issue of spurious coin, against which unparalleled abuse the Roumanian Government protests energetically;

THE MIXED SUB-COMMISSION RECOMMENDS:

That the Supreme Economic Council should undertake with the utmost speed all measures necessary for the purpose of seizing in enemy countries all designs, photographic negatives, dies and plates used for the printing of notes issued in Roumania through the intermediary of the Banca Generala Romana, also all designs, dies and stamps used for the minting of metal currency corresponding to the above-named paper currency, together with all stocks of such banknotes and metal currency discovered within enemy territory.

FOR THE SAME REASONS, THE SUB-COMMISSION RECOMMENDS

That the Supreme Economic Council should undertake with the utmost speed all measures for the purpose of seizing in enemy countries all designs, photographic negatives, dies and plates used for the printing of Polish Marks and Ober-Ost roubles issued by special Loan Banks created by the enemy for the purpose, and all designs, dies and stamps used for the minting of the metal currency corresponding to the above-named paper currency, together with all stocks of such bank-notes and of metal currency which shall be discovered within enemy territory.

2. AND WHEREAS the enemy Governments established in the Italian territories temporarily occupied by them, an institution known as the Casa Venetia dei Prestiti, which issued bank-notes for forced circulation within the said territories;

AND in view of the unanimous recommendations as to confiscation of plates used for the issue of notes of types formerly issued by the Austro-Hungarian Bank, and of those of the Banca Generala Romana, and seizure of such of the said notes as are not yet in circulation;

AND WHEREAS this recommendation referred to the dispatch, to Vienna and Budapest, of an Inter-Allied Commission for the purpose of ensuring the execution thereof;