The chief places visited were Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, Hanover, Leipzig, Dresden, Magdeburg, and Cassel.

Of the officers who carried out these investigations, Captain E. W. Tennent is working director of C. Tennent, Sons and Co., Ltd., Metal and Chemical Merchants; Lieutenant H. A. Rose is a barrister practising at the English Bar; Captain C. W. Bell is an employé of an important Indian Trading firm; Captain W. Stewart Roddie is employed by the Treasury.

2. Employment and Labour Conditions. Unrest and disturbances are diminishing owing to the more stable political conditions and the firm line adopted by Noske, the Minister of National Defence, whose position has been very much strengthened against the Spartacus movement by the large combined Social-Democratic majority in the newlyelected National Assembly.

At the same time, unemployment, accompanied by an inevitable rise in the cost of living, is on the increase. In Berlin this increase is estimated at 5,000 a day, the number of unemployed being over 200,000. In Hamburg the number is 72,000, in Munich 32,000, and in Leipzig 22,000.

This great and constant increase in unemployment is due to the rapid demobilisation of the army of war industries, coupled with the inability of peace industry to get started, owing to the dearth of raw materials and coal. Concomitant causes are:

(a.) Reluctance on the part of capital to embark on fresh enterprises. (b.) High prices and wages prevailing.

(c.) Lack of will to work on the part of the workers; partly due to idleness and the high unemployment grants, partly to the physical and mental inertia engendered by malnutrition.

This increase in unemployment forms the most dangerous element in the present situation, especially where the large industrial centres are concerned. Unemployment and hunger are the chief predisposing causes of Bolshevism, and if these are removed there is no chance of Bolshevism gaining foothold in Germany.

3. Coal and Transport. All over Germany, except actually in the coalfields areas, industry is stagnant and shutting down altogether owing to the lack of coal. The Silesian and Saar Valley coal supplies have been entirely cut off; coal is still being raised in Westphalia, but over a million tons are waiting at the pit-mouth for lack of transport facilities.

Railway transport has been crippled throughout the country owing to the enormous quantity of rolling-stock lost since last November. To the number handed over under the terms of the Armistice must be added a great quantity abandoned and lost on all fronts, especially in the East, since last November. This applies more especially to

locomotives. At the same time, the facilities for repairing locomotives have decreased considerably owing to the lack of essential raw materials. Throughout Germany the average percentage of locomotives undergoing repair has increased from 172 to 40 since August, 1914.

In the Hanover district the number of locomotives in peace time was 1800, of which 1,450 were in continual use; at the time of the Armistice 1,300 were on charge, and on the 6th February, 1919, only 850 remained, of which 35 to 40 per cent. were worn out and incapable of repair. Many of the best heavy locomotives have had to be handed over to the Allies, consequently the passenger traffic has had to be reduced to 29 per cent. of the normal.

The transport difficulties in the north-east of Germany have been still further enhanced by the cessation of the coasting trade between the Baltic and North Sea ports since the Armistice.

4. Food. The shortage of staple articles of food throughout the country is such that the mass of the population are living upon rations which, whilst maintaining life, are insufficient to nourish the body adequately. Mothers and young children are particularly affected. Malnutrition has increased the mortality and diminished the birthrate; it has given rise to new diseases (e. g., war oedema and "mangold wurzel disease”), besides aggravating the previously known ones.

It is difficult to confirm the accuracy of the official statement as to the dates on which the present food-stocks will be exhausted. These dates vary for different districts in proportion to the local transport and agricultural conditions; Saxony, for instance, is in a particularly unfortunate position, being an industrial district cut off from her normal agricultural resources.

In general, the following terminal dates given by the Central Food Office in Berlin are probably generally correct:

The meat ration can be continued indefinitely at the cost of the slaughtering of all milch-cows and breeding-stock.

In Saxony, however, the official date for the cessation of potato stocks in [is] the middle of February, in Bavaria the end of February, and in Hamburg the end of March.

The above estimate of the continuance of the meat ration seems to be optimistic, considering that in Hamburg and Hanover cows in calf, milch-cows, and draught oxen are being already slaughtered, as well as 8-day calves.

Given normal weather conditions during 1919, the coming harvest is expected to yield only half the average pre-war crop.

5. General conclusions. The general impressions of all the visiting officers is that the need for revictualling Germany is really urgent. The country is living on its capital as regards food supplies, and either famine or Bolshevism, probably both, will ensue before the next harvest, if help outside is not forthcoming. The need of fats is especially urgent.

The present social and political condition of Germany is sufficiently stable to guarantee the orderly distribution of food under the existing rationing machinery.

On the other hand, while Germany is still an enemy country which has not yet signed Peace Terms, it would be inadvisable to remove the menace of starvation by a too sudden and abundant supply of foodstocks. This menace is a powerful lever for negotiations at an important moment. It is still impossible to gauge the period within which Germany's military power could revive, although there is no immediate danger on this score. The allotment of foodstuffs should be carefully controlled, but, provided they are handed over to the authorised representatives, there seems no reason for anxiety as to their ultimate equable distribution.

MILITARY SECTION,

BRITISH DELEGATION, February 16, 1919.

Report by Captains E. B. Trafford, Scots Guards, and D. Christie Miller, Coldstream Guards, on their visit to Hanover, from the 2nd February, 1919, to the 10th February, 1919, where they had been sent by the Armistice Commission, Spa, for the purpose of enquiry into and reporting on the economic situation as regards food:

Before making our report, we should like to say that we were prisoners of war in Germany for 40 months-the ten worst months were spent in the Hanover Army Corps Command, notorious for its illtreatment of prisoners. We have been during our captivity spat at by a German officer and made to perform menial tasks in the presence of German non-commissioned officers and men. We can, therefore, hardly be accused of having any friendly feeling towards them.

6. Economic Life. Although this is a military report, we feel it our duty to add a few words on the economic situation as regards food. We studied the question of food and its issue most closely. We visited the largest factories and interviewed deputations of workmen. We paid surprise visits to workmen's tenements, to one school, and many large shops, and examined their stocks. We had interesting interviews with the Police President, the manager of the Dresdner Bank, and other public men, about food, political, and financial questions.

There cannot be the slightest doubt that Hanover district and town are extremely short of food. There is at present quiet, but an undercurrent of Bolshevism may very easily come to the surface. They estimate that they cannot hold out after the 1st May, as they are three months short on their last harvest. No milk, except for children under six and a few sick people. Milk cows are slaughtered for food and tuberculous cattle eaten.

The manager of the Dresdner Bank estimates that throughout Germany about 1,000,000 men were at this moment doing no work and drawing about five to eight marks a day. He was partially satisfied with the new Government, but not quite, as they were not strong enough. With his 43 years' business experience, he had not the slightest hesitation in saying that, if the extremist movement were to spread, not only Germany but the whole of Europe would be engulfed. 7. Summary. We have not the slightest hesitation in saying that— The situation is at present quiet in Hanover.

a)

The food shortage in Hanover is very serious indeed.

(c) Serious internal disorders are certain to break out if food (especially fats) is not soon forthcoming.

(d) That there is a great shortage of engines and rolling-stock, particularly the former.

Appendix 6

[Report by the American Food Investigation Mission to Germany]

MR. HERBERT HOOVER, Director-General,

Supreme Council of Supply and Relief.

FEBRUARY 22, 1919.

SIR: We have the honour to present herewith, on the basis of personal observation, examination of official statistics and conference with German Government officials and technical experts, the following summarised statement of nutritional conditions in Germany, with recommendations covering the period to the 1st September, 1919. The complete data will be filled later, in extenso, in a formal general report.

1. The agricultural statistics indicated in September, 1918, that the supplies available to Germany from her domestic production would represent about eleven months' food supply at a ration approximating the mean of the past two years, excluding the critical summer months of 1917 and 1918. In September it was the belief of the German authorities that the requirements for the twelfth month with the continuation of hostilities could be covered with comestibles drawn from the occupied areas.

2. With the collapse of the military forces and the signing of the Armistice, not only were all seizures from occupied territory pre

vented, but at the same time considerable amounts of foodstuffs already in hand were lost directly, and other amounts escaped the hands of the authorities and entered into private trade. In addition it was necessary at once to raise the ration beyond that previously enforced. The Germans suggest that the total of the foodstuffs therein involved might represent a three months' supply on a minimal basis.

3. The control of illicit trading has been greatly reduced under the new Government and the morale of distribution seriously undermined. Because of this, a further loss in the supply of controlled food has resulted.

4. The sum of these considerations leads to the conclusion, which is supported by estimates which have been derived from authorities in charge of food affairs in cities exceeding 30,000 inhabitants, that the machinery of distribution will, after the 1st May, be unable to supply large sections of the German industrial population with foodstuffs, and large classes of non-producers will be reduced to competitive illicit traffic in foodstuffs. This estimate of date may be too early or too late, depending upon industrial, economic, and political considerations, the exact development of which, in time and extent, one does not presume to estimate in a casual opinion.

5. The German Food Administration and the scientific experts to whom the Administration has entrusted the technical evaluation of their food resources have suggested the following programme as covering their requirements up to the new harvest in a manner that will be satisfactory, under the circumstances, and provide a better ration than is at present available:—

MONTHLY PROGRAMME FOR SIX MONTHS

Wheat flour, 320,000 tons, or wheat in part, as determined by the seller (80 parts of flour corresponding to 100 parts of wheat). The Germans would accept a small amount of rye, if of high extraction; they do not wish barley flour; they would accept rice or rolled oats in small part, but only if at equal prices.

One hundred thousand tons mixed pork products, including lard substitutes.

Ten thousand tons vegetable oil per month for four months, for margarine.

Ten thousand tons condensed milk per month for four months, if available; otherwise the lacking amounts to be delivered in terms of vegetable oil.

It is our judgment that these imports, plus domestic stocks, would not represent a per capita ration of over 2,400 calories per day. The intake of the industrial classes would be materially lower than this figure.