land-tax was frequently allowed twice over to lessees ; from which error alone, a loss was sustained of upwards of fifteen hundred pounds a year. Even without mismanagement, the wide dispersion of the estates of the crown multiplied the charges of superintendence and administration. 2 From these various causes the noble estates of the crown, for the first twenty-five years of the reign of George III., produced an average net revenue little exceeding six thousand pounds a year.' Some of these abuses were exposed by Mr. Burke in 1780, who suggested as a remedy, a general sale of the crown lands. In 1786, the king sent a message to Parliament, by the advice of Mr. Pitt, recommending an inquiry into the condition of the woods, forests, and land revenues of the crown; and a commission was accordingly appointed by Act, to make that inquiry, and to suggest improvements in the system of management. The recommendations of this commission led to the passing of an Act in 1794, by which an improved administration of the land revenues was introduced; and means were taken for making them more productive. This commission had reported that, in their opinion, the estates which had hitherto yielded so insignificant a revenue might, under improved management, eventually produce no less than 400,000l. a year. Existing interests postponed for a time the realisation of so Reports of Commissioners of Inquiry into the Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues, under Act 26 Geo. III. c. 87. Ibid., xxvi. 186, 202. 2 Parl. Hist., xxi. 26. 34 Geo. 111. c. 75. 2 sanguine an estimate: but in 1798 the crown lands were valued at 201,250l. a year; in 1812 they were valued at 283,160l. ; in 1820 they actually yielded 114,852l. ; in 1830, they produced 373,770l.; and in the year ending 31st March 1860, they returned an income of 416,5301.3 tion of the the land But when the land revenues of the crown were at length becoming nearly an equivalent for Appropriathe civil list, a considerable proportion of proceeds of the income was still diverted from the revenues. Exchequer. The land revenues, and the woods and forests, were originally managed, each by a Surveyor-General: but in 1810 the functions of these two offices were combined in a commission of woods, forests, and land revenues." In 1832, the superintendence of public works was added to the duties of this commission;5 when it soon became evident that what they received with one hand, they were too ready to pay over to the other. The revenue derived from the property of the crown, was applied with too much facility, to the execution of public works and improvements: the Exchequer was deprived of the funds which were due to it, in exchange for the civil list; and Parliament was denied its proper control over an important branch of the public expenditure. To arrest this evil, another administrative change was necessary; and in 1851, the departments of Woods and Forests and Report of Surveyor-General, Com. Journ., liii. 187. • 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 1. of Public Works were again entirely separated.' Hence, whatever may be the net proceeds of the property of the crown, they form part of the public revenue; and whatever sums may be needed for public works, are voted by Parliament out of the general income of the state. Civil list A very important part of the expenditure of the civil list has been caused, in every reign pensions. but the present, by the payment of pensions. The grant of pensions by the crown has so often been the subject of political discussion, that a brief explanation of the law and usage by which they were granted, and the funds from which they were payable, will not be devoid of constitutional interest. Prior to the reign of Queen Anne, the crown had exercised the right of charging its heredi Restrictions of pensions charged upon crown lands. upon grants tary revenues with pensions and annuities; and it had been held that the king had power, in law, to bind his successors.2 But on the accession of Queen Anne, in 1701, when alienations of crown lands were for the first time restrained by Parliament, it was also provided that no portion of the hereditary revenues could be alienated for any term, longer than the life of the reigning king.5 1 14 and 15 Vict. c. 41. 2 Bankers' Case, 1691; State Trials, xiv. 3-43. 3 Supra, p. 229. The hereditary revenues specified in the Act were these: the hereditary duties on beer, ale, or other liquors, the post-office, firstfruits and tenths, fines on writs, post fines, wine licenses, sheriffs' processes and compositions, and seizures of uncustomed and prohibited goods. 51 Anne, st. 1. c. 7. Pensions on the hereditary This Act, however, having been passed before the union with Scotland, did not extend to the hereditary revenues of the Scottish crown. Nor was any similar Act passed in the Par- revenues. liament of Ireland, restraining grants from the hereditary revenues of Ireland: neither did the Act of Anne extend to the 4 per cent. duties. Subsequently to this Act, pensions on the hereditary revenues of the crown in England could only be granted during the life of the reigning sovereign : but were practically re-granted at the commencement of every reign. But pensions charged on the hereditary revenues of Scotland and Ireland, and on the 4 per cent. duties, continued to be granted for the lives of the grantees. on the On the accession of George III., the larger branches of the hereditary revenues of the Pensions crown of England being surrendered in ex- civil list of change for a fixed civil list, the pensions George III. which had previously been paid out of the hereditary revenues, were henceforth paid out of the civil list. There was no limit to the amount of the pensions so long as the civil list could meet the demand; and no principle by which the grant of them was regulated, but the discretion of the crown and its advisers. the pension No branch of the public expenditure was regarded with so much jealousy, as that arising out Jealousy of of the unrestricted power of granting list. pensions by the crown. Not only did it involve a serious public burthen,-being one of the principal causes of the civil list debts, but it increased the influence of the crown, and impaired the independence of Parliament. Mr. Burke, in bringing forward his scheme of economical reform in 1780, dwelt much on the excessive amount of the pension list, and the absence of proper regulations; and particularly adverted to a custom which then prevailed, of granting pensions on a private list, during pleasure, by which dangerous corruption might be practised. Mr. Burke proposed that the English pension list should be gradually reduced to 60,000l., and that pensions should be restricted to the reward of merit, and 'real public charity;' extraordinary cases being in future provided for by an address of either house of Parliament. By the Civil List Act of the Rockingham admi Restriction upon the grant of pensions in 1782. nistration in 1782, the power of granting pensions was considerably limited. It was provided that until the pension list should. be reduced to 90,000l. no pension above 300l. a year should be granted: that the whole amount of pen*sions bestowed in any year should not exceed 600l., a list of which was directed to be laid before Parliament: that the entire pension list should afterwards be restricted to 95,000l.; and that no pension to any one person should exceed 1,200l. This Act fully recognised the principles of Mr. Burke's plan: it affirmed almost in his very words, that by the usage of granting secret pensions during pleasure, 'secret 122 Geo. III. c. 82. On the 21st February, 1780, Sir G. Savile's motion for a list of the pensions was lost by a majority of two only -Parl. Hist., xxi. 104; Lord Stanhope's Life of Pitt, i. 37 (Letter from Pitt). |