Parties and Gentlemen of the Long Robe, it became, after 1672, an open committee, in which all who came were allowed to have voices. This committee was henceforth exposed to all the evils of large and fluctuating numbers, and an irresponsible constitution; and at length, in the time of Mr. Speaker Onslow, a hearing at the bar of the House itself,which in special cases had already been occasionally resorted to, was deemed preferable to the less public and responsible judicature of the committee. Here, however, the partiality and injustice of the judges were soon notorious. The merits of the election, on which they affected to adjudicate, were little regarded. To use the words of Mr. Grenville, "The court was thin to hear, and full to judge." tried their strength,-the friends of rival candidates canvassed and manoeuvred, and seats corruptly gained, were as corruptly protected, or voted away. The right of election was wrested from the voters, and usurped by the elected body, who thus exercised a vicious self-election. The ministers of the day, when they commanded a majority, sustained their own friends; and brought all their forces to bear against the members of the Opposition. This flagitious custom formed part of the parliamentary organisation, by which the influence of the crown and its ministers was maintained. It was not until a government was falling, that its friends were in danger of losing their seats. The struggle between Sir Robert Walpole and his enemies was determined in 1741,— This had been previcusly said of the House of Lords, by the Duke of Argyll. not upon any question of public policy,-but by the defeat of the minister on the Chippenham Election Petition. ville Act, To remedy these evils, and remove the opprobrium of notorious injustice from the House of The GrenCommons, Mr. Grenville introduced, in 1770. 1770, his celebrated measure,-since known as the Grenville Act, and a landmark in the Parliamentary history. He proposed to transfer the judicature, in election cases, from the House itself, to a committee of thirteen members, selected by the sitting members and petitioners from a list of forty-nine, chosen by ballot, to whom each party should add a nominee, to advocate their respective interests. This tribunal, constituted by Act of Parliament, was to decide, without appeal, the merits of every controverted election: being, in fact, a court independent of the House, though composed of its own members.' The main objection urged against this measure was that the privileges of the House were compromised, and its discretion limited, by the binding obligations of a statute. It is certain that much might have been done by the authority of the House itself, which was henceforth regulated by a statute,--the only legal power required, being that of administering an oath. But Mr. Grenville distrusted the House of Commons, and saw no security for the permanence, or honest trial of the new system, except in a law which they could not set aside. This Act was at first limited to one year; and Horace Walpole insinuates that Mr. Grenville, when Parl. Hist., xvi. 904-923; Cavendish Deb., i. 476, 505. 6 in opposition, was willing to give a sore wound to the influence of the crown:' but hoping to return to office, took care not to weaken his own future power as a minister.1 But the suggestion for making the Act temporary proceeded from Lord Clare, and not from Mr. Grenville, who was honestly persuaded that the 'system must end in the ruin of public liberty, if not checked.'3 At this time his health and spirits were failing; and he died a few months after the passing of his measure. Made per The Grenville Act was continued from time to time; and in 1774, Sir Edwin Sandys petual. brought in a bill to make it perpetual. It encountered a strong opposition, especially from Mr. Fox, who dreaded the surrender of the privileges of the House but the successful operation of the Act, in the five cases which had already been tried under its provisions, was so generally acknowledged, that the bill was passed by a large majority. This happy event,' wrote Lord Chatham, is a dawn of better times; it is the last prop of Parliament: should it be lost in its passage, the legislature will fall into incurable contempt, and detestation of the nation.' 6 The Act does honour to the statute-book, and will endear for ever the memory of the framer.'" 6 This Act was passed on the eve of another general election, which does not appear-so far as evidence Walp. Mem. Geo. III., ii. 384, n. 2 Cavendish Deb., i. 513. Hatsell's Prec., ii. 21. 250 to 122; Parl. Hist., xvii. 1071; Fox Mem., i. 95, 133; Walpole's Journ., i. 314-325. ⚫ Letter to Lord Shelburne, March 6th, 1774; Corr., iv. 332. is accessible to have been marked by so much corruption as that of 1768. But the value of boroughs had certainly not declined in the market, as Gatton was sold for 75,000l.1 success. For a time this measure undoubtedly introduced a marked improvement in the judicature Its imperfect of the House of Commons. The disruption of the usual party combinations, at that period, was favourable to its success; and the exposure of former abuses discouraged their immediate renewal, in another form. But too soon it became evident, that corruption and party spirit had not been overcome. Crowds now attended the ballot, as they had previously come to the vote,—not to secure justice, but to aid their own political friends. The party which attended in the greatest force, was likely to have the numerical majority of names drawn for the committee. From this list each side proceeded to strike thirteen of its political opponents; and the strongest thus secured a preponderance on the committee. Nor was this all. The ablest men, being most feared by their opponents, were almost invariably struck off,-a process familiarly known as 'knocking the brains out of the committee;' and thus the committee became at once partial and incompetent. The members of the committee were sworn to do justice between the rival candidates; yet the circumstances under which they were notoriously chosen, their own party bias, and a lax conventional morality,-favoured by the obscurity and 'Lord Mahon's Hist., vi. 27. inconsistencies of the election law, and by the conflicting decisions of incapable tribunals,-led to this equivocal result:-that the right was generally discovered to be on the side of the candidate who professed the same political opinions as the majority of the committee.' A Whig candidate had scant justice from a Tory committee: a Tory candidate pleaded in vain before a Whig committee. Improved constitution of election committees. By these means, the majority of the House continued,-with less directness and certainty, and perhaps with less open scandal,—to nominate their own members, as they had done before the Grenville Act. And for half a century, this system, with slight variations of procedure, was suffered to prevail. In 1839, however, the ballot was at length superseded by Sir Robert Peel's Act: committees were reduced to six members, and nominated by an impartial body,-the general committee of elections. The same principle of selection was adhered to in later Acts, with additional securities for impartiality; and the committee was finally reduced to five members.3 The evil was thus greatly diminished: but still the sinister influence of party was not wholly overcome. In the nomination of election committees, one party or the other necessarily had a majority of one; and though these tribunals undoubtedly became far more able and judicial, their constitution and proceedings 1 These evils were ably exposed in the Report of the Committee on Controverted Elections (Mr. C. Buller), 1837-38, No. 44. 2 2 & 3 Vict. c. 38; Haus. Deb., 3rd Ser., xlv. 379; Ibid., xlvii. 576, &c. 4 & 5 Vict. c. 58, and 11 & 12 Vict. c. 98; Report on Contr verted Elections, 1844, No. 373. |