the act of 1854; but it had been adjudged in a court of law,' that the payment of travelling expenses was not bribery, if paid bonâ fide to indemnify a voter for the expenses he had incurred in travelling to the poll, and not as a corrupt inducement to vote. The act of 1858, following the principle of this judgment, but adding a further security for its observance,-permitted the candidate, or his agent appointed in writing, to provide conveyance for voters to the poll; but prohibited the payment of any money to voters themselves, for that purpose." But it was objected at the time,-and the same objection has since been repeated,-that the legalising of travelling expenses, even in this guarded manner, tends to increase the expenses of elections; and this debatable question will probably receive further consideration from the legislature. Policy of concerning It was the policy of these acts to define clearly the expenses which a candidate may lawfully incur, and to ensure publicity to his legislation accounts. So far their provisions afforded bribery. a security to the candidate who was resolved to resist the payment of illegal expenses; and an embarrassment, at least, to those who were prepared to violate the law. That they were not effectual in the restraint of bribery, the subsequent disclosures of election committees, and commissions sufficiently attest. Though large constituencies, in some instances, proved themselves accessible to corruption, bribery prevailed most extensively in the smaller Cooper v. Slade; 6 E. and B., 447; Rogers on Elections, 334. 221 & 22 Vict. c. 87; further amended in 1863. boroughs. Hence it appeared that some remedy might be sought in the enlargement of electoral bodies, and the extension of the area of voting. To repress so grave an evil, more effectual measures were again devised: but they may still be expected to fail, until bribery shall be unmistakably condemned by public opinion. The law had treated duelling as murder, yet the penalty of death was unable to repress it; but when society discountenanced that time-honoured custom, it was suddenly abandoned. Voters may always be found to receive bribes, if offered: but candidates belong to a class whom the influence of society may restrain from committing an offence, condemned alike by the law, and by public opinion. Other questions affecting the constitution of Parliament, and the exercise of the elective franchise, have been discussed at various times, as well before as since the reform act, of 1832, and here demand a passing notice. To shorten the duration of Parliaments, has been one of the changes most frequently urged. Duration of Parliaments. Prior to 1694, a Parliament once elected, unless dissolved by the crown, continued in being until the demise of the reigning king. One of the Parliaments of Charles II. had sat for eighteen years. By the Triennial Act every Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, came to a natural end in The Sept ennial Act. three years. On the accession of George I. this period was extended to seven years, by In 1867-8, after the period comprised in this history, a wide extension of the suffrage was conceded, and anothe act was passed for repressing corrupt practices at elections. 26 Will. and Mary, c. 2. the well-known Septennial Act. This act, though supported on the ground of general expediency, was passed at a time of political danger;-when the country had scarcely recovered from the rebellion of 1715, and the Jacobite adherents of the Pretender were still an object of apprehension to the govern ment. 6 In the reign of George II. attempts were made to repeal the septennial act; and early in the next reign, Alderman Sawbridge submitted motions, year after year, until his death, for shortening the duration of Parliaments. In 1771 Lord Chatham with the most deliberate and solemn conviction declared himself a convert to triennial Parliaments.'4 The question afterwards became associated with plans of parliamentary reform. It formed part of the scheme proposed by the Friends of the People' in 1792. At that period, and again in 1797, it was advocated by Mr. Grey, in connection with an improved representation, as one of the means of increasing the responsibility of Parliament to the people." The advocates of a measure for shortening the duration of Parliaments, were not then agreed as to the proper limit to be substituted: whether one, three, or five years.6 But annual Parliaments have generally been embraced in schemes of radical reform. In times more recent, the repeal of the Septennial 11 Geo. I. c. 38. 2 Parl. Hist., vii. 311; Boyer's Political State of Great Britain, xi. 428: Preamble of Act. 3 In 1734 and 1741. 5 Ibid., xxxiii. 650. Parl. Hist., xvii. 223. 3 Act as a distinct question of public policyhas often been fairly and temperately discussed in Parliament. In 1817, Mr. Brougham gave notice of a motion on the subject; but did not bring it forward. In 1818, Sir Robert Heron moved for leave to bring in a bill, and was supported by Sir Samuel Romilly and Mr. Brougham; but the proposal met with little favour or attention.' The subject was not revived until after the passing of the reform act. It was then argued with much ability by Mr. Tennyson, in 1833, 1834, and 1837; and on each occasion met with the support of considerable minorities. On the last occasion, the motion was defeated by a majority of nine only. It did not, however, receive the support of any of the leading statesmen, who had recently carried parliamentary reform. That measure had greatly increased the responsibility of the House of Commons to the people; and its authors were satisfied that no further change was then required in the constitution of Parliament. In 1843, Mr. Sharman Crawfurd revived the question; but met with scant encouragement. Lastly, in 1849, Mr. Tennyson D'Eyncourt obtained leave to bring in a bill, by a majority of five. But notwithstanding this unexpected success, the question, if discussed elsewhere as a matter of theoretical speculation, has since ceased to occupy the attention of Parliament. Hans. Deb., 1st Ser., xxxviii. 802. Ibid., 3rd Ser., xix. 1107; Ibid., xxiii. 1036; Ibid., xxxviii. 680. Hans. Deb., 3rd Ser., lxix. 490. Ayes, 46; Noes, 41. Ibid., cv. 848. against ennial The repeal of the septennial act has been repeatedly advocated on the ground that the Arguments Parliament of George I. had abused its the Septtrust, in prolonging its own existence; and Act. that, even admitting the overruling necessity of the occasion, the measure should at least have been temporary. To this it has been answered, that if any wrong was done, it was committed against the people of that day, to whom no reparation can now be made. But to contend that there was any breach of trust, is to limit the authority of Parliament, within bounds not recognised by the constitution. Parliament has not a limited authority,-expressly delegated to it: but has absolute power to make or repeal any law; and every one of its acts is again open to revision. Without a prior dissolution of Parliament, the Unions of Scotland and Ireland were effected, at an interval of nearly a century,-measures involving the extinction of the Parliaments of those countries, and a fundamental change in that of England, much greater than the septennial act had made. That act could have been repealed at any time, if Parliament had deemed it advisable ; and no other ground than that of expediency, can now be reasonably urged, for shortening the duration of Parliaments. The main ground, however, on which this change has been rested, is the propriety of rendering the representatives of the people more frequently accountable to their constituents. The shorter the period for which authority is entrusted to them, the more guarded would they be in its exercise, and |