highway was taken over by the State road department. Refunding bonds have been issued and were validated in State v. State Board of Administration (157 Fla. 360, 25 So. 2d 880 (1946)). It now appears that much of this highway has unwittingly been built on Federal property.)

Territory beyond the 3-mile belt: To add to the confusion that inevitably follows the California decision, the boundary claimed by Florida is 3 marine leagues, with some exceptions, or 9 nautical miles. (This is approximately 10.36 statute miles.) The California boundary extended 3 statute miles into the ocean; the United States claimed 3 nautical miles, or 0.45 mile beyond the California boundary. If, however, the California decision be applied to Florida, it may embrace 3 nautical miles only, leaving the beaches in trust for the public, the Federal Government owner of the next 3 nautical miles, and Florida owner of the next 6 nautical miles seaward, separated from the coastline by the strip owned by the United States.

This is stated purely as conjecture, since it is presumed that if the tidelands belong to the United States and not to California for 3 nautical miles, the Federal Government would extend its claim to the Florida tidelands to the full extent of Florida's boundary, or 9 nautical miles from the low-water mark. This is by no means certain, however, and no brilliant light is shed on the subject in the California opinion.

The Supreme Court discusses the matter of local police power functions over the marginal seas as follows (United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1667 (1947)):

Conceding that the State has been authorized to exercise local police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared boundaries, these do not detract from the Federal Government's paramount rights in and power over this area. Consequently, we are not persuaded to transplant the Pollard rule of ownership as an incident of State sovereignty in relation to inland waters out of the soil beneath the ocean; so much more a matter of national concern. If this rationale of the Pollard case is a valid basis for a conclusion that paramount rights run to the States in inland waters to the shoreward of the low-water mark, the same rationale leads to the conclusion that national interests, responsibilities, and therefore national rights are paramount in waters lying to the seaward in the 3-mile belt.

I am not sure I know what that language means, but I believe it fairly can be said it is not to be construed as a final holding eliminating the police power of the State.

Senator DONNELL. Might I interpose just a moment?

I note an inadvertent error in the quotation from the Supreme Court in its reference to the transplanting of the Pollard rule of ownership.

The copy which I have before me of your address says:

Consequently, we are not persuaded to transplant the Pollard rule of ownership as an incident of State sovereignty in relation to inland waters out of the soil beneath the ocean, so much more a matter of national concern.

The decision, page 14, does not say "out of the soil." It says:

Consequently, we are not persuaded to transplant the Pollard rule of ownership as an incident of State sovereignty in relation to inland owners out into the soil beneat hthe ocean so much more a matter of national concern.

I am sure it is purely an inadvertent error, but I think it ought to be noted here.

Governor CALDWELL. I had this manuscript in the typewriter when I left Florida, but this California weather kept the planes from flying and I didn't get here.

Senator DONNELL. Does California desire, Mr. Chairman, to have rebuttal on that statement?

Senator FERGUSON. They probably will desire to be heard.
Governor CALDWELL. I am sorry that mistake crept in.

Senator DONNELL. It is very minor, but in the interest of accuracy I thought I would call attention to it.

Governor CALDWELL. Generally, the purchase by the Federal Government of State lands within State boundaries requires the cession of jurisdiction to the Federal Government before full jurisdiction of the Federal courts can attach (James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 143 (1937); see Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 650-652 (1930); Fort Levenworth R. R. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 531, 539 (1885)).

In the tidelands decision, however, the boundaries claimed by the State of California were diminished and in effect a new boundary line drawn, and all land lying seaward of that boundary became the property of the United States. The opinion takes the position that this area never has been the property of California (United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1665, 1668 (1947)) ; therefore it follows that no cession of jurisdiction from the State is required in order to give the Federal Government control over the area. California's political authority and police power cease where its boundaries end (N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234, U. S. 149 (1914); Mississippi and Missouri R. R. v. Ward, 2 Black 485 (U S. 1862); United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336 (U. S. 1818); see American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber Co., 250 U. S. 2, 11 (1918)).

It may be confidently expected that some case will soon develop demonstrating that the California decision has abolished State power to control and regulate the waters which previously had been considered within its boundaries. There do not appear to be any legal principles granting a State jurisdiction over criminal acts started and completed outside its boundaries.

Certainly the tidelands of America, as closely interwoven as they are with the commerce and activity of the people of the several States, cannot be considered as a jurisdiction no man's land. Accordingly Congress, unless it returns the law to its former status, will be faced with the necessity of enacting legislation to provide for Federal control of all activities in these waters; as long as they are the exclusive property of the United States they can be disposed of and regulated by act of Congress only (U. S. Constitution, art. IV, sec. 3).

It seems inconceivable that Congress would go so far as to set up a new Federal bureau or agency, or confer power on some already-existing agency to assume the control which the various States have exercised for decades over this great domain in all respects except navigation. Government will be further removed from the people, instead of being brought closer to them, if fishing, cultivating oysters, building docks and ports, removing seaweed, oyster, and coquina shell, digging oil wells, and engaging in all other activities in the marginal sea are controlled by bureaus in Washington. Yet the decision leads to precisely this.

As to vested rights and interests: the California decision recognizes that, regardless of the prior ownership of the tidelands, rights previously considered vested have arisen as the result of dealing with this area as property of the State of California (United States v. Calijornia, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658, 1668-1669 (1947)).

It left to Congress the entire responsibility of working out a fair settlement of the respective claims arising from the situation in California, and presumptively in all other States, when it said (ibid):

we cannot and do not assume that Congress, which has constitutional control over Government property, will execute its powers in such a way as to bring about injustices to States, their subdivisions, or persons acting pursuant to their permission.

Accordingly, it seems probable that in any legislation adopted Congress will not demand an accounting to it for the use made of the tidelands, or for revenues derived by the States therefrom, prior to the California decision or during such reasonable period thereafter as may be required to achieve final settlement of the matter by congressional action. This, however, does not meet the major difficulties.

The developments in the tidelands include extensive oil fields in California, Texas, and Louisiana. Docking facilities, oil and coal stations, ports and military bases (the latter established, incidentally, by the Federal Government after getting permission from the different States involved) are constructed on the tidelands of the various States. In many instances it seems evident that the fixing of lowwater mark, and any rule adopted for determining the line between the inland waters and the ocean areas will physically cut through many of these projects.

Some ports were built on lands granted by the State with the aid of funds advanced by Federal corporations; others, by private capital. How the precise rights of private interests that have invested their money in such projects can ever be determined following this overnight switch of landlords, when the difficulties of fixing the boundaries afresh are so serious, is beyond conception as a practical proposition unless Congress conveys the title back to the States. (Several bills are in process of preparation for introduction in Congress which will, if enacted into law, revest title and jurisdiction over the tidelands in the respective States. As will be noted in its 1947 minutes, the National Conference of State Governors has adopted resolutions memorializing Congress in favor of such legislation. So have numerous other groups, such as the Interstate Oil Compact Commission (minutes of August 12, 1947)).

To be sure, the Supreme Court intimates and even suggests that in these instances Congress should execute its power in such a way as to avoid injustices to States, their subdivisions, or private interests affected (United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658-1669 (1947)). The fact remains, however, that any general rule will of necessity perpetrate serious injustices, though formulated with the best of intentions. The alternative is to examine the merits of thousands of special acts covering particular circumstances. And in any event, a flood of litigation may reasonably be expected, by States as well as by individuals. (The Governor of Florida, in an address delivered before the Texas Mid-Continent Petroleum Institute in San Antonio

in October 1947, stated that Florida would certainly litigate the question before surrendering her tidelands to the United States. The interests of the other Gulf States are equally vital, as the following table shows: Alabama, 6 leagues (Alabama Constitution, art. II, sec. 37); Louisiana, 27 marine miles (Louisiana Acts of 1938, No. 55, sec. 1; Louisiana General Statutes, sec. 9311.1 (dart 1939)); Mississippi, 6 leagues (Mississippi Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3); Texas, edge of continental shelf (Texas Laws, 1947, ch. 253).

The Texas boundary extension became effective May 23, 1947, just 1 month prior to the California decision. Formerly its boundary was similar to that of Louisiana, or 27 marine miles (Texas. Stat., art 5415a, Vernon Supp., 1942). The present Louisiana boundary was established in 1938; as to constitutional and international law issues involved see 39 Columbia Law Review 317 (1939).)

Strictly speaking, it is probably true that "demarcation of the boundary is not an impossibility" (United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658 1662 (1947)). But it is equally true that government is, or should be, a practical means of living together rather than an unnecessary legal labyrinth through which the unfortunate laymen are forced to grope their way for the better part of their

lives.

As to the alleged dangers of State ownership, the opinion of the Court bases its refusal to countenance State ownership of the respective marginal belts on the ground that the United States alone regulates foreign commerce; that it alone conducts our relations with other nations; and that it alone undertakes the defense of the several States and bears the responsibility for waging war. The Court obviously regards the supply of oil available to the United States as a matter of such grave import that this warrants paramount rights and power in the Federal Government to determine in the very first instance where, when, how, and by what agencies, either foreign or domestic, the oil and other resources of the marginal sea, whether now known or hereafter discovered, may be exploited (id., at 1666-1667).

The first and obvious answer is that the United States is in fact not only an outstanding commercial and industrial nation, but has also achieved the distinction, unique among larger nations, of struggling through to victory somehow in every war it has ever fought (an exception to this statement, technically quite tenable, may be found in the Seminole wars), in spite of the alleged evils of State ownership of the marginal area.

The second answer is that the division of powers and duties between the Federal Government and the States was deliberately and carefully set forth in the Constitution and the citizens of this country have not yet seen fit to alter the compact in this respect, even though the Constitution provides methods of doing so (U. S. Constitution, art. V).

Certainly oil is no more important for purposes of war and foreign commerce than steel, or coal, or certain other products. The next step, logically, having in practical effect overruled The Abby Dodge in the California case, is to overrule the Pollard case, wherever strategiv materials under inland waters are found, and to assign these to the Federal Government. The final step is to overrule the other cases that stand in the way and allocate to the Federal Government all stra

tegic resources wherever situated. Once the process has begun, on the basis outlined in the California case, there is no logical reason for halting only one third of the way.

Finally, of course, what is probably the best answer to the reasons advanced in the majority opinion is succinctly enunciated in the passage quoted from Mr. Justice Frankfurter; namely, that all those "paramount rights" so eloquently championed in the majority opinion were already possessed by the Federal Government prior to the California decision. The war power, the commerce power, the treatymaking power, and the power of eminent domain have long been in active use, with results deemed adequate until the California decision. (See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (commerce clause); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev, 645, concluded 883 (1946); Santovicenzo v. Egan, 284 U. S. 30 (1931) (treaty-making power), note 58 infra; and United States v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 279 (1943) (eminent domain).)

The power of eminent domain requires compensation to the State for the property seized (Town of Bedford v. United States, 23 F. 2d 453 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927); Wayne County v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 417 (1918), affirmed, 252 Ú. S. 574 (1920); see St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 101 (1893); Jefferson County v. TVA, 146 F. 2d 564, 565 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945), but it has always seemed fundamental to most American statesmen and jurists that the expense of national projects, precisely because they are national, should be nationally borne rather than saddled exclusively upon maritime States or some other class of States. The California decision, however, in its combination disposal of the questions of fee simple title and poltiical dominion, seems to have taken from the several coastal States not only the ownership of submerged oil lands but also the right to control all use of the tidelands. The States, under the dual-sovereignty system obtaining prior to this decision, managed the development and exploration of tideland resources most successfully, yet without conflicting with the superior rights of the Federal Government.

During the war, as the last two have conclusively demonstrated, the United States has evidenced adequate authority to enact legislation placing all the resources of the aÑtion, including oil, at the disposal of the Federal Government to any extent that the exigencies of the situation have demanded. (See, e. g., Second War Powers Act, 56 Stat. 176 (1942), as amended, 50 U. S. C. A., sec. 631 (1944); Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23 (1942), as amended; 50 U. S. C. A., sec. 901 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943); see United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U. S. 605, 622-624 (1931).)

We are not at war now; Congress can readily pass legislation revesting title to coastal lands in the States affected, with such further restrictions on State power to exploit oil resources as may be required to guarantee the availability of that oil for use by the Federal Government in reservoir pools, if necessary, and certainly for immediate use in war or upon threat of war. This would be a far sounder solution, it is submitted, than placing oil under the direct control of the Federal Government, at the expense of cerating chaos among the States and those individuals and various other interests that have invested their money, time, and ingenuity in the exploitation of the tidelands.