SEC. 7. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.

Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the

mons.

The practical effect of this clause is, not that a member of Congress cannot be appointed to office under the United States, where the office or its emoluments have not been the work of the time for which he was elected, nor that a United States' officer cannot be chosen a member of Congress; but that in such cases, the office first held is vacated. Mr. Randolph proposed in his plan checks even more strong

than those found here.

SEC. 7. "All bills," etc. By this limitation the right of originating bills on any other subject is given to the Senate as well as the House of Representatives. The object of it is the same as that of giving the same power to the British House of Commons. It was for the greater 'security of the people that this right was given exclusively to the popular branch of the Legislature, the representatives of the democracy. It was strenuously supported as a guard against aristocracy. On the other hand, it was strongly opposed as needless, clogging the government, and depriving the nation of the best talents, on a subject where they were especially needed. Mr. Randolph's plan was opposed to it.

"Every bill which shall have passed," etc. This clause furnished matter for long and strenuous debate. Numerous attempts were made to obviate difficulties, and guard equally against Executive and Legislative tyranny. By some, an absolute negative was sought for the Executive; by others, three fourths of each House were thought necessary to overrule the negative of the Executive; and this regulation once

What is the practical effect of this clause?

What of the plans of Mr. Randolph ?

Where must all revenue bills originate?

What power has the Senate? What right is given to the Senate by this limitation?

What foreign body has the same power?

What was the object in this arrangement?

On what ground was it supported? On what ground opposed?

On which side was Mr. Randolph's plan?

What is necessary that a bill after being passed should be a law?

United States; if he approve, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

prevailed in the Convention. By others still, an attempt was made to unite the Judiciary with the Executive in the revision of bills, and give their objections equal weight with that of the President.

The exception, "unless Congress by their adjournment prevent its return," gives the President an opportunity sometimes to frustrate the designs of Congress, without returning a bill with his objections. When the time for which the Representatives were chosen is so near its expiration that the House must be dissolved before the lapse of ten days, the

What if the President do not approve it? What shall the House do with his objections? And with the bill?

If two thirds agree to pass it, what then?

What if two thirds of the other House pass it?

What is to be done in all such cases?

What if the President do not return a bill in ten days? What exception?

What numerous attempts were made?

What different views prevailed?

What opportunity does the exception give the President? In what case? And how?

Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary, (except on a question of adjournment,) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be re-passed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

President can silently retain a bill till the dissolution, or inevitable adjournment, of Congress, in which case it fails of course of becoming a law. Perhaps this is a defect in the Constitution. No one will deny that the veto power may sometimes be a very salutary restraint on hasty and injudicious legislation; but we may safely assert that if a President veto a bill which has been long considered both in and out of Congress, and which he has reason to think agreeable to a majority of the people, or if, having a reasonable time for considering a bill, he defeat it by silently retaining it till the day of the constitutional dissolution of the House, he is liable to a charge of abuse of power.

"Every order, resolution," etc. This clause was added to prevent the Legislature from evading the negative of the President by passing laws in the shape of resolves, orders,

etc.

The kings of Great Britain and France have an absolute negative on the bills passed by their respective Legislatures. The king of Great Britain, however, has not exercised this power since the year 1692. He depends on his influence to prevent the passage of bills which he does not approve. If this influence should fail of such prevention, that fact would show so strong a bias in the nation toward the bill passed in opposition to it, that he would not think it safe to withhold his assent. The Convention had this example in view, and doubtless thought that the veto power would very rarely be

exercised.

Is this in your opinion a defect in the Constitution?

Is the veto power ever necessary? What may we safely assert? What is the object of the last clause of the Section? Repeat the substance of it.

What power have the kings of Great Britain and France?

How long since the king of Great Britain has exercised this power? What does he depend on instead? What if his influence fails? What did the Convention think of this example?

SEC 8. The Congress shall have power:

To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises;

SEC. 8. "To lay and collect taxes," etc. This clause gives to Congress the full power of adjusting a tariff of duties, whether for protection, or revenue, or both, on the trade of the United States. Duties, in distinction from imposts, were explained to mean what is paid on things not matters of commerce with other nations, as a duty on stamped paper. Excises are also imposts on the retail business, or the selling of goods to the consumer; while imposts, in their unrestricted sense, have application to foreign commerce alone. Hence the power of Congress extends not only to the regulation of foreign, but also of domestic trade. The restriction of this power, contained in the next Section, which prohibits a tax on exports, was much discussed here. Some considered it highly proper to tax exports in many cases. They would, for instance, tax the export of raw material, in order to encourage home manufacture. Thus they would tax the export of cotton in order to promote the making of all kinds of fabric from that article. They would tax articles in which we are not rivalled in the foreign market, so as to raise the price of them abroad, and in effect make the foreign consumer pay the export duty. Of this kind of articles are cotton and tobacco. The Southern members, however, saw, or thought they saw, an intention to use the power of taxing exports for the suppression of slavery and the slave trade. A majority of Congress must, for the present at least, be from the Northern States; and the fear was that they might diminish the value of slaves and slave-labor by high duties on the export of cotton, rice, indigo, and tobacco. Col. Mason,

What power does the first clause of Sec. 8 give to Congress?
Define duties. Give an example.

What are excises? Name examples. (Hawkers, pedlars, retailers of spirits, etc.)

What are imposts? Did you ever hear either the constitutionality or expediency of protection denied?

Did you ever hear of free trade? What does it mean?

To what does the power of Congress extend?

What restriction was discussed here?

Why would some tax exports? Give the cases supposed.

What alarmed Southern members? What did they fear from a Northern majority?

of Virginia, repeatedly expressed his expectation, that soon the Southern States would be more populous than the Northern, and of course hold the balance of power; and he reminded the Northern members, that when such should be the case, the North would need a guard against the discouraging of exports as much as the South did then. He probably had no idea of the wretched influence of slavery, in preventing the population, wealth, and industry of a country.

The experience under the Confederation was enough to convince most men of the propriety of uniform imposts in all the ports of the United States.

As so much has been said on the constitutionality of the encouragement of domestic manufactures, as a primary object of legislation, it may be well to add a little on that head. No one doubts the propriety of encouraging them incidentally ; i. e. that when it is necessary to construct a tariff for revenue, a secondary regard may be had to the fostering of home industry in the selection of the articles to be dutied. The question is, "Does the constitution give Congress the power to protect home manufactures, without any reference to the raising of a revenue, or even though the revenue should be diminished by such protection?”

It is important to know what the framers of the Constitution thought and intended on this matter. They were perfectly familiar with the idea of protection, for protection's sake; they had learned it under British government, and had been trying their utmost to effect it under the Confederation. They considered it as one of the rights of sovereignty, inherent in all the States. No one of them ever suspected that this power was to be given up by the States, and yet not delegated to the union to be exercised for them. Such a requirement would have been fatal to the adoption of the Constitution. They therefore thought the power to protect domestic manufactures, as a primary object of legislation, was given to Congress by the Constitution under their hands. This is what they intended it should do; and if they failed here, it was their mistake.

What did Col. Mason expect? Of what did he remind Northern members? What made him think so?

What did the experience of the Confederation show?

Of what has much been said?

On what are all agreed? Explain this.

What is the true question? What is it important to know?

What were they acquainted with? Where had they learned it? What had they been trying to do? What did they consider it? What did they not suspect? What would such a requirement have been? What did they think was given to Congress? What did they intend?