voluntary or compelled; and that the agent has no right, in any case, to complain.

Now, then, we come to the moral world, and we shall soon see that the Free-willer's argument-That man ought not to be held accountable to the moral law if he is compelled to break it-will vanish, like Macbeth's Witches, into air.

We cannot doubt that God's principle of government is the same in the moral as in the material world. He never contradicts himself, never governs upon opposing principles; and I mean to argue that as it is just and right for a man to suffer the pain of a broken limb, although he was not the cause of the act, so it is also just and right for a soul to endure the effects of a broken moral law, although it did not originate the will that caused the infringement

It is difficult to imagine how this can be disputed: for it is evident that if the Free-willer asserts that man has a right to complain of being held accountable to moral laws which he is forced to break, he has also a right to complain of being held liable to physical laws which he is compelled to infringe: and this is to arraign the Almighty at the bar of human judgment, and to condemn the system on which He governs the world.

Perhaps, however, it may be said, That although it cannot be denied that in the world of matter the Almighty makes man liable to the results of consequences which he can in no wise control, still in the moral world this is not the case. But on what ground is this assertion made? Is it because the soul is invisible and immaterial that therefore we conclude it to be governed by a different law to the rest of God's creation? Let us remember that it is as immediately under the eye and under the power of God as matter can be (we have no reason for supposing differently); and when we see that throughout the visible universe one system alone prevails, why should we fancy that the Almighty Ruler acts upon a different plan in what concerns the invisible? We can come to no other conclusion-if we regard the matter calmly and carefully-than that there is a moral law as strict, as stringent, and as universal as the laws that govern the material world,—similar in nature and working in the same manner.

The conclusion which this brings us to-viz. That man is as necessarily accountable to the moral laws as to the physical laws of his being seems to be so feasible, simple, and plain, that it is a wonder it is not universally received. And it certainly would be adopted by all were it not for an error that is often made, and to which I shall now more particularly allude.

God has instituted moral Laws: if those Laws are obeyed, happiness is the result-if they are broken, evil ensues. Thus there is established an inseparable connection between virtue and happiness, and between vice and misery. Peace is the sure fruit of Goodness, Pain the inevitable harvest of Crime.

This great Truth is so fully recognised that men have come to look upon happiness and evil rather as judicial sentences than as necessary results.

Now happiness and evil bear both these characters: they are sentences and consequences too;-but they are, primarily, consequences; and although it is a wise and beautiful arrangement that invests them

with the character of judicial awards-giving the one to the good man, and the other to the evil-still that is only their secondary character, and ought by no means to be regarded as their original and principal one.

The result of this confusion is, that it leads men to forget the accountability which is the great law of their being, and teaches them to say-most absurdly-that they ought not to be responsible, unless they are free. They quite overlook the fact that while they are contending for freedom, they must deny their accountability. To be free is to be independent,—for if we are dependent, we are affected, and if affected we are not free,-and to be independent is to be above all law, and therefore not accountable to law.

Every act of a man's life is produced by a number of necessary and concurrent causes. One of these necessary causes is his will or disposition to do that act. His will consequently is caused and overruled by necessity; and yet he has his will, and he has morcover the satisfaction of using it. He is amenable to the effects of the other concurring means, motives, and circumstances which he employs to effect his plans, and why should an exception be made in favour of his will? Man has no control over his life, and yet he is justly and properly accountable for the acts of it. Why is the theory of man's necessary accountability in a moral sense less philosophical than his accountability to the laws of his physical existence?

I feel I may now say that I have clearly proved

I. That in our physical being we are held liable to the results of circumstances over which we have no control; and are necessarily made responsible for all our actions, whether we perform them voluntarily or under compulsion;

II. That in our moral being, we are held liable to a precisely similar accountability; and,

III. That, therefore, no argument against Philosophical Necessity can be based upon the doctrine that we ought not to be held responsible for what we do not cause.

CHAPTER XVI.

MORAL GOOD AND EVIL CONSISTENT WITH NECESSITY.

It is now my intention to answer the objection-That moral good and evil are inconsistent with the doctrine of Necessity.

It is said, That if man is compelled to act as he does, Virtue is not commendable, nor is Vice blameable.

If those who make use of this argument would only reflect for a moment upon the tremendous consequences which flow from their proposition, they would be a little frightened, I think, and would pause before they insisted upon it.

The Supreme Being is necessarily good-He cannot possibly be evil. By His very nature (to speak with all reverence) He is compelled to be the fountain of purity, the essence of holiness, the source of all good. And yet, is He not voluntarily good? And is He not praiseworthy and to be lauded for His goodness? Are not His purity, His holiness, His virtue, to be revered, admired and adored? To assert the contrary is to assert more than blasphemy.

So then, it is perfectly possible for moral good to consist with

Necessity for a being to be compelled to be virtuous, yet to be praiseworthy for his goodness; and, therefore, so far from there being any argument against Necessity on this score, the doctrine is absolutely and in the completest sense proved by it.

Whilst upon this part of the subject, I will redeem the promise I made in Chapter the Fifth, viz. :-That I would consider the question of the origin of evil. The subject, however, demands close attention, and therefore I will commence it in another chapter.

CHAPTER XVII.

ON THE ORIGIN OF EVIL.

The Free-willer says, If you assert that the Deity is the sole First cause of all things, you say that He is the author of evil. And the Freewiller's doctrine, in opposition to this, is, that although evil exists, the Deity cannot be the author of it-for purity can never originate sin. In discussing this question, I shall treat it philosophically, and avoid all reference to theology.

Now, at starting, I feel bound to point out that it is as incumbent on the Free-willer to account for the origin of evil, as it is on the Necessitarian. Here is Evil-no one denies that; and if it is not originated, it is at all events permitted, and, therefore, (as a means) approved and employed by the Deity. Now the same reason that induces the Free-willer to say that God is too pure to create iniquity, should also cause him to conclude that He is also too pure to employ, to approve or even to behold it; and if he can go so far as to say that God can permit evil, he has admitted all that is demanded in the assertion that God is the Author of Evil. However, I take up the question, because it is closely connected with the subject I have in hand, although unnecessary to the full proof of the doctrine I am maintaining.

What is Evil? The answer to this question will most materially affect our decision.

There is a great mistake in the Free-willer's idea of Evil. He speaks of it as a positive existence, as a thing created, a something that, like the soul, has a real, active, sentient, being. Now it is easy to see that this is a great error, and the source of vast confusion and It is like Darkmistake. EVIL IS A NEGATION, AND NOTHING MORE. ness or Cold. Darkness is not a thing of real existence-it is the absence of light. Cold is nothing more than the absence of heat. So Evil is not a positive existence, but merely the absence or suspension of good. It would be most absurd to speak of Cold or Darkness as involving a Creator, and so, likewise, it is in the highest degree outrageous on all common sense, to speak in a like manner of Evil.

Evil, then, being the suspension of good, and nothing more, there can be no difficulty whatever in answering the question as to who is its author. If Evil were a living principle, an universal law, a Deity, as good is (I say a Deity-for goodness is God), then I would agree with the Free-willer when he says that The Holy One could not be its Creator; but as it is merely the result of the in-operation or suspension of Good, there can be no impiety in asserting that the One First Cause is the author of it. And let those who are tender upon this point, bear in mind that God himself has said "I form the light

this."

it?"

and create darkness-I make peace and create evil-I, THE LORD, do "Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done Thus we see that for some wise purpose, God, by suspending the principle of good which is the sun of the moral system, permits those disastrous results to happen which we call evil. The theory of Necessity, therefore, which asserts this doctrine, is by no means open to any objection upon the ground that it charges the Holy God with being the Creator of Wickedness.

Wickedness is moral evil: of that the Free-willer says the Deity cannot be the author. But unfortunately for the Free-willer's argument there is such a thing as physical evil, and for that he will be puzzled to find any author but the Almighty.

When a tempest sweeps over the earth, and destroys lives and hopes innumerable; when an earthquake happens and buries thousands-when the lightning-cloud glares on the world and consumes whatever it looks upon-there is in existence what men call physical evil. And who is the author of this? Who sends forth the tempest? Who commissions the earthquake? Who arms the cloud? Is it an Evil Being who does this? No, it cannot be! for were it of evil origin, its end would be malevolence: but we find its result to be good: the tempest carries health to sick lands; the earthquake is the valve that saves the world; the thunder-storm destroys the myriads of insects that would blight our vegetation and make our summer barren. The benevolent design therefore has a Benevolent Author-and who is that but the source of all Benevolence-God, the Holy.

And has not moral evil the same origin, think you? May we not compare the passions of the soul with the tempests of the air;-the rockings of the mind with the quaking of the earth-the act of crime with the lightning-flash, and see the same Great Hand at work in them? Moral evil like physical evil always tends to good. By the passions the soul is awoke; by the conception of Crime we see more clearly the form of virtue; by one vicious act the whole community is often reformed. Surely when we are forced to see with the poet in "all partial evil, universal good," we cannot hesitate, for a moinent, in fixing the authorship upon Him who doeth all things well.

But see the absurdity of the Free-willer's theory! He says that there is a principle in existence uncreated by the only Creator! He tells us that God being entirely good, cannot possibly be the author of wickedness; but that Man, a thing created by Him, is the sole originator, First Cause, and possessor of a power which the Omnipotent does not wield a power which causes the Creator great grief, and which he never wished to exist. He further says, that by means of this independent power, the designs of the Giver of all good are opposed, frustrated, and overthrown by his creatures-the work of his hands. How extremely ridiculous! To assert that the All-Powerful can be thwarted that His benevolent intentions can be frustrated-that His Eternal determination can be overthrown-and this too by a creature -a finite thing-a thing that is dying from its birth-is in the highest degree absurd; nay, more, it is blasphemous, for it attempts to dethrone the Almighty, and ascribes superiority of power to man.

And this is what the doctrine of Free-will inevitably leads to!

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE ABSURDITY OF FREE-WILL FURTHER SHOWN.

Necessity says, That all things are inevitable—that is, that they are ordered and must occur; Free-will asserts, That all events are contingent, and may or may not happen; in other words Necessity says, That the world goes by rule; Free-will, that it goes by chance.

We will follow out the Free-willer's theory. It must maintain That what has come to pass, might either not have come to pass at all, or might have come to pass differently; that every event is contingent, that the world is a system of chance, and might go well or ill; and that, therefore, there are no rational and sure grounds for the expectation of man's ultimate and complete happiness.

Eve might not have taken the apple. Adam might not have shared her crime. The Christian scheme, and the Christian religion might never have had existence. Instead of the history of the world presenting a chain of gradual improvement and progression, it might, at the present time, be less enlightened and happy than ever, and instead of it giving us reason to hope for future happiness and perfection, it would leave us in gloom, and doubt, and uncertainty.

In other words, Free-will opposes man's highest hopes, and asserts that although the Deity has ordained a Great End, and made man for a purpose, the end may never come, and the purpose of man's being may never be accomplished: that is, that God made man with a design, but that man, when created, opposed God's design and left its issue to doubt and darkness. These conclusions are so utterly absurd, that it is unnecessary to answer them. It is fortunate that they are so absurd; for were it otherwise, where alas! would be our hopes and beliefs?

I could fain wish that I were here allowed to enter into the theological part of this subject, for it sheds great light upon the questionbut, all things considered, it is better perhaps that I should leave it alone. I beg it to be understood, however, that I refrain, not flinch, from it.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE DOCTRINE VIEWED AS IT IS AFFECTED BY THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD AND BY HUMAN LIFE.

We look into the History of the World, and we see-What? One continued stream of progression and improvement, that had its spring in the first moment of Time, that has never ceased to increase in depth and strength-and that still flows on grandly and mightily towards the illimitable ocean-Infinity. Onwards onwards-onwards-a

tide without an ebb-it sweeps into the shoreless For-Ever.

Every thing speaks of some mighty plan-of some great end-of some magnificent period of perfect happiness that is to come ;-when, we know not, but still, that is to come.

Every day brings fresh discoveries, every hour fresh improvements. Every act of every man's life seems to tend to the amelioration of the race, and to the permanent perfection of intellectual and moral Truth. Every age produces wonderful men who seem just necessary and fitted for the time in which they are born. Thus when the world