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we live. To sever and divide has been the policy of past ages; to bind and unite is the tendency of this. All that is singular and individual is becoming scarce. You speak now of the characters of nations rather than of men. Monopolies, individualities, unjust and accidental superiorities-all these things are falling for ever. The race of Superstition, Rancour, and Bigotry is well nigh run, and Truth, Intelligence, and Wisdom have commenced their reign. Commerce is civilizing, Reason is enlightening, Religion is Christianizing the Heathen. Merchants, philosophers, men of science, men of learning, and ministers of religion, are all labouring earnestly in the same great cause; and we at length can clearly see that all things are pointing to, and are producing, that transcendant period when the knowledge of God shall cover the universe, and over the whole world His will shall at length be done.

ON PHRENOLOGY.-No. 1.

BY THE LATE WILLIAM RAINE.

THE UNSATISFACTORY NATURE OF PREVIOUS SYSTEMS OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Ir was thought a startling, if not a flippant remark of a Philosopher of the last century, "that with all its vast store of scientific knowledge-Europe had its philosophy yet to learn." And yet in the enlarged, and all comprehensive sense of the word Philosophy-it had, ere then, illumined the minds of a few gifted men only.

Intuitions of the harmony, beauty, and majesty of the universe had flashed across the mind of our Shakspere; the plastic nature of his genius, which readily moulded itself to whatsoever character or condition he sought to embody, and the subtlety of his reason, no less than the force of his imagination-gave him an unequalled versatility of depth-revealing to him by a kind of inspiration much that was incomprehensible to others, but which the-so calleddiscoveries of every day made more clear. The universality of his mind was limited neither by time nor by change. He was the impersonation of universal humanity. Bacon too, the sagacious and farseeing Bacon--the prophetic Philosopher, pointed out the true path to the temple of truth. Thenceforward analysis and induction took the place of fantastic speculation, and the imaginative gave place to the demonstrable. Men began to reason from nature, up to Nature's God. They did not first frame a theory, and then distort and pervert facts so as to accommodate them to their phantasms; they became humble students of nature; instead of affecting to be the high priests of her mysteries. The jargon of pedantry, and the cabalistic symbols of the schools were at an end. Even Metaphysics became compar atively intelligible. Vast results were achieved in every department of investigation. Mathematics, Mechanics, Chemistry, Natural History, Physical Science in its varied ramifications, Ethical Science, and the new science of Political Economy-all progressed towards perfection. Each became nearly complete in itself, yet still there was something wanting; the most severe analyses had been applied to the human mind-a succession of metaphysicians of stupendous

abilities had devoted themselves to this task, but the united result of their labour was the ascertaining a few phenomena only of mental manifestations; the forms, but not the faculties of the mind. Endless controversies ensued-as to whether certain powers were generical or special, whether primitive or derivative, simple or complex. Vague or overstrained definitions of certain terms which became catch words; the frequent substitution of the terms mind and soul for each other, and the incessant clamour of materialists and immaterialists; necessarians, and the advocates of liberty-of those who contended that men were equal at birth, and that all differences were referable to circumstances and of those who maintained the opposite; but above all the indefinite ideas conveyed by the words power, faculty, function, as applied to mental science, and the anomalous appearance of certain physiological facts rendered the science of the human mind a gloomy spot amid the light of modern philosophy-if not a stumbling block in the path of human advancement. Metaphysics might be the science of that mysterious substance, the mind, but it was not the science of man- -man in his loftiness and in his lowliness, in his weakness and his power, in his thoughts and feelings, his emotions, passions, propensities and capabilities-Oh no! the insufficiency of metaphysical empyricism is apparent at a glance, when viewed thus. The mysterious blending together in one common nature of the animal, the intellectual and the moral-their various modifications and proportions-the laws of their action-their aim, scope, and harmony; this were it good to understand-for as God made of one blood all men upon the earth-as all partake of one common nature, and as all are destined for one common lot whether we term one man a genius and another an idiot-whether one man have the capacity of a Newton, and another be imbecile as an infant; or whether a Howard devote his life to making his fellow beings happy, whilst a Burke forfeits his as the penalty of his crimes-all are but as so many sands on the sea shore, differing a little in form and texture, but all equal in respect to our common nature and our common parent. To understand this complex nature, to ascertain what are the causes of the differences in animal feelings, moral sentiments, and intellectual powers, and what the nature of those feelings, sentiments and powers, in short to know ourselves and our fellow men, by knowing what it is that stirs within us; this should be more important, besides being more philosophical than the mere hard, dry, and barren analysis of some faculty assumed to be a simple one, but which, after all may be compounded of others; or the endless discussion as to whether the Deity has affixed the power of thought to matter at birth, or has consentaneously called an impalpable, immortal, and spiritual entity into existence, destining it to sojourn in its material abode until the organic dissolution of the body which it has so mysteriously influenced, and with which it has been so intimately connected. True we may find scattered through the pages of our poets the lowliest, as well as the greatest-many indications that they looked not at man thus. And in the maxims of the moralist, and the theology of the divine-we may find further proofsthat human actions are prompted by something more than by what the metaphysician enumerates. How then it may be asked would

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set about a more correct examination of the human mind, than that of analysing it metaphysically? There can only be two ways of conducting the inquiry. First, by observing individual actions in ourselves, or in others, and by deducing general laws from these observed phenomena; and classifying them under general heads. Thus if we are conscious of remembering a number of events, we can characterize these as acts of memory, and hence infer that the mind possesses the power of remembering through a faculty, which we term memory; and thus also we generalize the acts of reasoning, and say that they result from the faculty of reason. By this process, we are certainly led one step in the enquiry, but only one; for when we have, from an observation of the actions of our own minds, or of those of others inferred the existence of the generical faculty of memory or of reason, and have pursued the inquiry yet further, we shall be led to consider them not as powers of the mind, but as states of the mind -memory, we shall find referable to association, and reason also. The act of remembering being but the act of associating one object with another, and the process of reasoning being but another modification of the same law, what then is association? Simply the act of associating, nor can the most rigidly severe analysis demonstrate its nature much more clearly. And if an idea be gained by this change of terms at all-it is only this-that the mind has the power of associating one idea with another, sometimes to enable it to recall some previous idea or sensation, and at other times to connect a train together, so as to produce the act of reasoning. There is something so vague and unsatisfactory in this, and there is so much left unaccounted for, that we rise from the perusal of such a work, even as Mill's Elements, impressed with deep respect for the author, even with a feeling of wonder at the subtlety and acuteness of his mind; but demanding, almost involuntarily-what does it prove? In truth, there is this one inference to be drawn from an attentive study of Metaphysical Science, that, with all the care which a writer can take in defining his terms, he is yet liable to fall into error. He may define memory to be a power, and use it in this signification, but if instead of being a power of the mind, it should only be a state of the mind, resulting from some other power, there is a serious confusion of ideas superinduced. If Memory, Reason, Imagination, Abstraction, Generalization, and such other additional faculties, as in the peculiar scheme of each metaphysician are considered necessary to make up the aggregate of the human mind, are shewn to be cases of association under different modifications, they no longer remain powers or faculties, but forms or states of the mind. But even admitting that there were not these discrepancies in Metaphysical Science, granting that any one of the numerous philosophers who have investigated the nature of the human mind, Locke or Des Cartes, Malebranche or Hartley, Helvetius or Reid, Stewart or Mill, Kant or Brown, have furnished a correct account of its constitution and powers, in so far as the intellect is concerned; turn from systems to man, test their value by their capability to explain all the phenomena of human thought, and all the variety of human action; will the dry and abstruse technicalities of Kant-the minute scrutiny of Mill-the common sense of Reid, or the mingled cloquence and force

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of Brown, the speculations of Helvetius, or the reasonings of Locke -will any-or all of these combined, suffice to give us clear. and definite views of the human mind? I affirm the contrary, upon these grounds. First, because there is no criterion afforded, by which we can tell why one man differs from another. Second, if these so called powers of mind exist, either they constitute in their aggregate the simple substance, mind, and therefore are essential to it, or the result from it, and are modified variously in different individuals. If they constitute the mind, then the minds of all men being the same, the powers of all men should also be the same; if they result from the mind, subject to individual differences, then the whole enquiry must be conducted with regard to these modifications. For these will engender combinations so varied, that new terms must be found ad infinitum to represent them. Third, observation teaches us that man has a threefold nature-viz: an Animal, a Moral, and an Intellectual nature—all of which equally appertain to his being, and any analysis must be essentially imperfect, which has relation to one of these divisions only. Fourth, there are certain physiological factse. g., Drunkenness, Dreaming, Insanity, Injuries of the Head, Diseases of the Brain, &c., which always affect the mind, and therefore, there must be a connection between the mind and the brain, and there is a demonstrable connection betwixt the brain and the organs of sense. Fifth, because there are proofs of various kinds that the brain is the seat of the mind.

Sixth, because if the fourth proposition be true-when the brain is diseased, the manifestations of the mind will also be diseased.

Seventh, the brain, therefore, is the organ or instrument through which the mind acts, and must therefore be organised for that end by the Creator, consequently, in proportion to the perfection of its organization will be the perfection of mental manifestation.

It may be remarked that in the animal creation, the more perfectly organized the brain is, the higher the animal rises in the scale of intelligence. It would appear, therefore, that there is so evident and continual a connection betwixt the mind and the brain-that there should be no hesitation in ascribing the difference between man and man, not to a difference in the essence of mind, but in the configuration and texture of the instrument through which it operates, and thus the way is paved for overcoming the first difficulty of metaphysical inquiry; and in regard to the second, we have two ways of investigating the subject.

First, it resolves itself into a question of fact. Second, of inference, and of reasoning.

We have the following facts presented to our notice:-First, during deep sleep, the mind is as though it were not.

Second, during partial sleep, we experience the phenomenon of dreams.

Third, in cases of insanity, a man may be rational on all points save one only.

Fourth, injuries of the brain affect the character, if not the mind. Fifth, Drunkenness deprives us of reason, and we are conscious that this is by the effect it produces upon the brain.

From these, and from a great number of other facts, physiological

and psycological, we infer that the brain is the organ of the mind. We therefore assume it as a fact, inferred and admitted, that the brain is the instrument through which the mind operates.

We have also the facts that mankind exhibits a great diversity of faculties and of character, and that individual men have many faculties, many peculiarities. We further notice that each individual man, and all men, exhibit moral, mental, and animal qualities. These are demonstrable facts, and from them we infer

First, that the nature or constitution of man is threefold, animal, moral, and intellectual.

Second, that individual peculiarities of character, or in other words, differences in any, or all of these characteristics, i. e. animal, moral, or intellectual, either result from education and external circumstances, or from original and innate disposition, or from both combined. Without going into a lengthened discussion upon this topic, we will assume the last hypothesis as the true one. We have endeavoured to show that the brain is the organ of the mind, and as the mind is endowed with a variety of powers-the brain, its organ, must necessarily perform a variety of functions, and further, all that we know of human character must emanate from the brain; but if, as has been asserted, the brain be one homogeneous mass, and, consequently indivisible into distinct compartments, and the mind a simple substance, acting at each separate manifestation through the whole mass, and consequently through all its parts at one and the same moment, then to say that the brain has separate faculties, or powers, would be a contradiction in terms. The faculties, or powers, which perform the various functions of thought, feeling, and sentiment, are either in the mind alone, or in the brain alone, or else the functions emanate from the mind through the brain. If the faculty be in the mind, and there is no function performed by the brain, then the brain cannot be the organ or instrument of the mind; but the brain being the instrument of the mind, either the whole brain performs each individual mental act, or else it is divided into separate organs, each organ performing a distinct function. When we say of man that he walks, eats, digests food, sees, and hears, and tastes, and smells, we do not imagine that the same individual faculty performs all these functions; so is mind in relation to all the phenomena of thought, feeling, sentiment and propensity. If analogy be admissible, we know that no one organ of the body performs several entirely separate and distinct functions; there is a separate apparatus for every separate function. And surely there is not a wider difference betwixt the function of digestion, and that of hearing, than there is betwixt the faculty of reasoning and the love of offspring. Yet digestion and hearing are not more essentially functions of the same body, than are the latter of the same mind. A man may be deaf, or digest his food imperfectly, or he may be careless of offspring, or deficient in reason; but we do not imagine that the whole body is diseased, when he is deaf, nor that every function is disordered when the digestive powers are weak, excepting those which are affected by, because dependant upon them; nor do we believe that every mental function is deranged when he is careless of offspring, nor that he is diseased in his whole mind when his reasoning faculties are limited. We will

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