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mind extends its view to a son more readily than to a servant; and more readily to a neighbor than to one living at a distance. We cannot, however, dissolve the train, though we may vary the order. So far our power extends; and it is sufficient for all useful purposes.
A subject that accords with the tone of the mind is always welcome; thus, in good spirits a cheerful subject will be introduced by the slightest connexion; and one that is melancholy, in low spirits: an interesting subject is recalled from time to time, by any connexion indifferently strong or weak, as in this finely touched relation to a rich cargo at sea:
My wind, cooling my broth,
Would blow me to an ague, when I thought
MERCH. OF VENICE, ACT I. Sc. 1. In the minds of some persons, thoughts and circumstances crowd upon each other by the slightest connexions. I ascribe this to a bluntness in the discerning faculty; and such a person has usually a great flow of ideas, because they are introduced by any relations indifferently. This doctrine is in a lively manner illustrated by Shakspeare.
Falstaff. What is the gross sum that I owe thee?
Hostess. Marry, if thou wert an honest man, thyself and thy money too. Thou didst swear to me on a parcel gilt goblet, sitting in my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a sea-coal fire, on Wednesday in Whitsun-week, when the Prince broke thy head for liking his father to a singing man of Windsor, thou didst swear to me then, as I was washing thy wound, to marry me, and make me my lady, thy wife. Canst thou deny it? Did not Good
wife Keech, the butcher's wife, come in then, and call me Gossip Quickly? coming in to borrow a mess of vinegar; telling us she had a good dish of prawns; whereby thou didst desire to eat some; whereby I told thee they were ill for a green wound. And didst not thou, when she was gone down stairs, desire me to be no more so familiarity with such poor people, saying that ere long they should call me madam? And didst thou not kiss me, and bid me etch thee thirty shillings? I put thee now to thy book oath; deny it if thou canst?
SECOND PART, HEN. IV. ACT II. Sc. 2.
On the other hand, a man of an accurate judgment cannot have a flow of ideas; because the slighter relations, making no figure in his mind, have no power to introduce ideas; thence an accurate judgment is not friendly to eloquence. A comprehensive memory is seldom connected with a good judgment.
Wit and judgment are seldom united. Wit joins things by distant and fanciful relations, that occur only to those who make every relation equally welcome. Hence wit is incompatible with a solid judgment. Memory and wit are often conjoined; solid judgment seldom with either.
There is order as well as connexion in the succession of our ideas. The principle of order governs the arrangement of perceptions, ideas and actions. Sheep in a fold, trees in a field, may be indifferently surveyed, because they are equal in rank. In things of unequal rank, we descend from the principal subject to its accessories; we enter not into a minute consideration of constituent parts till the thing be surveyed as a whole. Our ideas are governed by the same principle.
The principle of order is conspicuous with regard to natural objects, as bodies in motion; the mind falls with a heavy body, descends with a river, rises with. smoke. In tracing a family, we begin with the founder; musing on an oak, we begin at the trunk and mount to the branches. In historical facts we proceed in the order of time, and through the chain of causes and effects.
In science we proceed from effects to causes; from
particular propositions to general ones. In an historical chain every event is particular; there is nothing to bias the mind from the order of nature. In science, many experiments come under one cause; many causes come under one more general. From particular effects to general causes, we feel an expansion of mind, more pleasing than what arises from following the order of nature. These observations furnish materials for instituting a comparison between the synthetic and analytic methods of reasoning. The synthetic, descending from principles to consequences, is more agreeable to the strictness of order; in the analytic we feel the pleasure of mounting upwards, which is very agreeable to the imagination.
We are framed by nature to relish order and connexion; and the influence of order greatly sways the mind of man. Grandeur makes a deep impression, and inclines us to proceed from small to great. But order prevails over that tendency, and affords pleasure as well as facility in passing from a whole to its parts, from a subject to its ornaments. Elevation touches the mind, which, in rising to elevated objects, derives pleasure. The course of nature has a greater influence than elevation; hence the pleasure of falling with rain and descending with a river prevails over that of mounting upward. The beauty of smoke ascending in a calm morning is delightful, because the course of nature is joined with elevation.
Every work of art conformable to the natural course of our ideas is so far agreeable; every work of art that reverses that order is so far disagreeable. In every such work, orderly arrangement and mutual connexion are requisite. As these prevail, the composition pleases us. Homer is defective in order and connexion, and Pindar more remarkably. In Horace there is no fault more conspicuous than want of connexion. Of Virgil's Georgics the parts are ill connected; the transitions are neither sweet nor easy; as, for example, the description of the five zones in Book I.
In the Lutrin, the goddess of Discord is introduced without any connexion. The two prefaces of Sallust will suit any subject as well as history.
Episodes in narrative poems demand some degree of union, as between principal and accessory. The descent of Eneas into Tartarus is neither necessary nor natural, for the principal action is too long suspended. The same objection lies against the elaborate description of Fame in the Æneid.
New objects introduced in description are made more or less welcome in proportion to the degree of their connexion with the principal subject. Relations make no capital figure in the mind, some being transitory, others trivial; they are links that unite perceptions and produce connexion of action. An original propensity provides for the regular order of our actions; and order and connexion introduce method in the management of our affairs. For without them our conduct would be fluctuating and desultory, and we should be constantly at the mercy of chance.
Of what are we conscious while awake?
What are some of the relations, by which things are connected in the mind?
What is regulated by these relations?
What does an external object suggest?
How far does our power over trains of ideas extend?
What sort of subject is always welcome?
What is the course of thoughts and circumstances, crowding upon each other in the mind?
What illustration is given?
Why cannot a man of accurate judgment have a flow of ideas? Why is wit incompatible with solid judgment?
What in the mind does the principle of order govern?
Give examples of this principle with regard to natural objects? With respect to science and history?
How are the synthetic and analytic methods of reasoning compared?
Give examples of the influence of order on the mind?
Give examples of the violation of this rule?
What is the rule concerning episodes?
Emotions and Passions.
We give the names of passion and emotion to those feelings raised in us by external objects, which have addressed the eye or the ear. Hence the connexion of emotions and passions with the fine arts, which give pleasure to the eye and ear, and never once condescend to gratify any of the inferior senses. We shall now delineate that connexion, to ascertain what power the fine arts have to raise emotions and passions. To those who desire to excel in the fine arts, that branch of knowledge is indispensable: without it criticism is abandoned to chance. The principles of the fine arts open a direct avenue to the heart; they disclose its desires, motives, and actions. We shall divide the subject into several sections, for the sake of perspicuity.
Causes unfolded of the Emotions and Passions. • SECTION I-Difference between Emotion and PassionCauses most general and common.-Passion considered as productive of Action.
No emotion or passion springs up in the mind without a cause. If I love a person, it is for good qualities. or good offices; if I have resentment against any one, it must be for an injury he has done me; and I cannot pity one who is under no distress of body or of mind. These circumstances are not indifferent; the good qualities or good offices that attract my love, are an