NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

THE VENETIAN QUESTION.

A LULL has necessarily followed the fierce excitement which prevailed in Italy during the past year: Louis Napoleon has cried "Halt!" to the revolution so far as Rome is concerned, while Francis Joseph has massed his troops in Venetia as a quiet reply to Garibaldi's menaces of what he intends to do with the coming spring. The future of Italy is left for the present in the hands of the journalists, and every writer on public affairs ventilates his favourite theory as to the mode in which the pacification of Europe can be secured. On one point they are unanimous, whatever differences of opinion may prevail on ancillary matters: the Austrians must surrender Venetia either by fair means or foul, and most paternal is the advice offered the emperor, that he should give up his stubborn opposition, and gracefully make a concession which must eventually be forced from him. In thus arguing, we believe that the journalists to whom we allude write conscientiously: they are anxious to save an effusion of blood, but they omit from their calculations the probable effect such a cession would produce, not only on Germany, but pre-eminently on England. Be it ours, then, to draw our readers' attention to the facts which render it absolutely necessary that England should support the Austrian retention of Venetia, even at all hazards.

It has for some months past been the favourite theory that England, thanks to her insular position, need not trouble herself about the maintenance of that balance of power for which our fathers shed their blood. But this is a decided error, for, with the alarming authority France has already attained on the Continent, and the great future looming for Russia both in Europe and Asia, we must not forget that our tenure of the sea is in itself nothing, and that it is only valuable in connexion with the coasts to which they afford access. A continental blockade could now be far more effectually carried out than was the case under the first Napoleon; and even if our fleets kept the enemy's merchant vessels in port, they would not suffer so greatly from the want of imports as they did in the old war, because the land communications have been so enormously extended.

Until the extension of the use of steam to war vessels, England, trusting in the development she had given her navy, and the incomparable skill of her sailors, held an almost unassailable position, and could defy the Continent in arms against her. At present, however, naval operations can be perfectly combined with military movements, while, at the same time, victory is less dependent on the bravery and resolution of the seamen. During the old war these qualities won our naval engagements, Jan.-VOL. CXXI. NO. CCCCLXXXI.

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and gave us the decided supremacy of ocean, but in all future trials of strength at sea, machinery and improved artillery will become the great factors. The most important result emanating from these changes is, that England has to a certain extent lost her inviolability as regards France, as the volunteer movement sufficiently proves; and though our fleet still affords a guarantee against peril, that security only reaches to a certain point. The main stipulations are, that the British sea force must remain concentrated, because only on such terms can it prove superior to the growing French navy, and that the latter must not be augmented by those states, de facto, dependent on France, or Spain and Italy. From these considerations we can easily arrive at the following data, which ought to regulate the policy of England in the Italian question.

The European continent is most valuable to England, as the nearest point to her insular basis, and because the two great powers, France and Russia, which are most likely to imperil her interests, have their main strength on that continent. France is incomparably the more dangerous power to England, as able to attack her directly in her insular position. A war between England and Russia, or America, would long be carried on at a distance, while a quarrel with France would be one of life and death. Russia, on the other hand, is the power that stands nearest to our Asiatic possessions, and would be soonest able to exert an indirect influence upon them. With France, then, menacing us immediately, and Russia waiting for future opportunities, the state of affairs on the Continent and their treatment becomes a very difficult matter for England to regulate; for while she is constantly compelled to keep the two powers that threaten her in check to each other, she loses that rapidity of action which is all in all under present circumstances. The only security for England, in our opinion, therefore, is a central European alliance with Prussia and Austria; for though such an alliance does not offer the glittering bait of one formed with either of the two threatening powers, it practically produces more than an alliance with either of them separately would, for its great advantage is, that it enables us to set a bold front both against France and Russia. On the one hand, such an alliance prevents all future designs Russia may form in the Scandinavian North, or the Osmanli empire; while, on the other, the encroaching French policy is held in check.

There are two positions on which France has fixed her attention as securing her that European supremacy for which she is striving so persistently-namely, the RHINE, held by Prussia, and VENETIA, which is still in the possession of Austria. By seizing the former, the French would gain Holland, Belgium, the most industrial portions of Germany, and a very important line of operations along the German Ocean, which would lengthen their maritime basis as regards England. At the same time, they would hold a commanding position towards Central Europe, have it in their power to combine Scandinavia against England and Northern Germany, and eventually become masters of the continent up to the Baltic. By the occupation of Venetia, on the other side, France would obtain the southern outlet she has long desired. She would, for the first time, again, after a lengthened period, set her foot firmly on SouthWestern Europe, and Austria would be exposed to an invasion at any moment. Lastly, by the incorporation of Illyria and Dalmatia, she

would acquire a direct basis against the Turkish empire. Under such circumstances, it would be a matter of indifference whether France took possession of Venetia, or it were held by her vassal-state, Italy; for, in either case, the effect would be identical and most alarming. The French influence in the East would grow with unexampled rapidity, while she would attain a permanent footing in those countries which are most important objects to us for the purpose of retaining a direct communication with our Indian possessions.

The French supremacy in Europe will be paralysed, then, so long as Prussia holds the Rhine and Austria the Venetese. The success of this opposition, however, is only certain and perfectly guaranteed if England joins them. Owing to her constitution, England, we grant, is drawn more closely to Prussia, and held aloof from Austria, whose absolutistic tendencies must estrange her, were not interest in this case far more predominant than principles. English policy would confine itself to the Prussian alliance if the latter power were able to effect anything alone, but as that is not the case, Austria is accepted as the necessary complement of the alliance. We may, then, arrive at the following result from the above considerations: that the existence of Austria is an indispensable condition of the European balance of power; and that, if Prussia protect Northern Europe from French or Russian domination, Austria equally covers the south. Lastly, we may assert that, if Prussia, owing to her Rhenish position, is the state which can offer England the most direct assistance in the event of a war with France by producing a diversion, Austria, by the occupation of Venetia, will be in the position to defend Turkey as well as the East, with the British interests in that quarter, from a French attack. The latter is a point which we shall now discuss more fully.

The sea is England's field of action; her supremacy upon it is an indispensable condition not only of her authority and position, but even of her security and existence. This condition is so strongly laid down, that England will not so much as allow any state to command even a remote sea. Russia, after the creation of the Pontic fleet, had a decided influence in the Black Sea, but England did not rest till she had broken this maritime sceptre. But the Mediterranean is of far greater importance, and England has no other question of more paramount maritime consideration to settle than the future supremacy over that sea. The constant development of the French fleet only renders this question the more serious, for it shows that the present relations of authority over the Mediterranean, through which England's flag now rules that sea, are merely provisional, and that a definite arrangement can only be arrived at, after France has completed her preparations for the great contest which the English await with growing certainty, the French with ever-increasing confidence.

It is characteristic of the present state of affairs, and the calculations for the future, that France is making her greatest preparations in the extremest western port she holds in the Mediterranean. The war port of Toulon has become by far the most considerable naval arsenal in Southern Europe, and offers the chief basis in a contest between England and France for the possession of the west basin of the Mediterranean. A similar basis of operations has also been obtained by France on the African

shore, by the completion of the enormous works of the port of Algiers. In Toulon and Algiers France possesses two points which render her position in that portion of the Mediterranean most consolidated and diffi cult to alter, while half way between these two lies the valuable Port Mahon, in Minorca, which the Emperor of the French visited during his late trip to Africa, ostensibly to pay his respects to the Queen of Spain, supposed to be there, but probably to have a look and judge for himself of certain projects of fortification. It has since been asserted that the Spanish government intends protecting Port Mahon by an extensive system of forts, and give it a defensive value equal to that which it already possesses through its favourable position. If, lastly, in consequence of the close alliance between the French and Italian courts, Genoa and Spezzia may be regarded as at the disposition of France, and the whole western coast of Italy form a third basis of the Toulon fleet, we cannot but come to the conclusion that the Emperor of the French has already completed his arrangements in the west basin of the Mediterranean. This western basin, however, is the entrance to the eastern, and commands it strategically, especially with reference to England and the northern marine states. France, however, has long regarded it as an evil that she possesses no port in the eastern Mediterranean, and this she hopes to acquire by her close connexion with the new kingdom of Italy. Owing to the material superiority of the British naval force over the French, even a victory in the western Mediterranean on the part of the latter navy would lead to no decisive result. The struggle would last for a long time, as England would bring all her energy to bear, and the conclusion would be most undecided, and be confined, after all, to the western part. But, from the moment the fight was transferred to the eastern Mediterranean, the French would be infallibly beaten, unless they had some place of refuge in those waters, and they would be unable to derive from the Suez Canal those advantages they are already building on, even before that gigantic work is in progress.

Of all the points France could select in the eastern waters as a basis, Venice is by far the most valuable. It is notorious that the entire eastern coast of the Italian peninsula possesses no harbour at all comparable with it. That of Taranto has been sanded for centuries, and possesses no value, and it is much the same with Brindisi, while the port of Ancona is limited in size, and can scarce afford shelter to a frigate. If it be objected to this that Sicily has many excellent harbours on its eastern coast, we will remark that they only offer the basis of an island, or a territory where communication with the continent depends on circumstances. In addition, Malta, which must always be regarded as England's main arsenal in the Mediterranean, is near to it, which would facilitate a British blockade, and form an excellent basis for an attack on Sicily. Nor, must we leave out of sight that, judging from the course of events, French influence in Lower Italy, in other words, her indirect supremacy, will not be so secure as in Central, and especially Upper, Italy, and hence Sicily would not offer a secure terrain. All these considerations point infallibly to Venice, and although the harbour is not so deep as might be desired, French engineering skill would soon form a passage for vessels drawing less water than a screw three-decker, of which class of vessel France only possesses one, the Bretagne, and has apparently formed the resolution to

build no more. If this harbour can be improved, as we fully believe it can, France would thus have, if Venice were taken from Austria, the very port she desires in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. The British position of Malta, which only possesses a value because an English fleet lying in its secure harbour can oppose speedily any French fleet steering through the straits between Cape Bone and Sicily, or through the Faro into the eastern basin, would lose much of its importance as commanding the central passage of the Mediterranean. If, however, a French fleet were stationed at Venice, it could slip in and out of the Adriatic as it pleased, and to observe it we should require another naval force at Corfu, and naturally a large increase in our navy estimates.

The reasons can be deduced, from the above line of argument, why France has hitherto treated England so cautiously and tenderly in the East. The riddle why the policy of the Tuileries, which so unscrupulously regards treaties usually, and after concentrating two hundred thousand men round Sebastopol, ended the war without demanding any territorial aggrandisement for France, is solved by the consideration that France was most cautious not to engage herself deeply in the Levant, so long as her maritime rival held the only direct sea-line between the East and France. From the moment, however, that the French emperor possessed a second line of communication starting from Venice, his policy in the East would entirely change, and we should require our utmost energy to maintain the balance of power in those waters.

The whole value which the occupation of Venice by a power standing under French influence would produce for the latter country, is evident when we realise the terms on which the two rival sea powers would stand to each other in the event of a Mediterranean war. Up to the present, France has had a limited field there, extending, as we have shown, to the Faro de Messina and Cape Bone, and not beyond. Our object has hitherto been to obtain such influence over the councils of Turkey, as, in the event of a war, to exclude the French flag from the Turkish ports, and prevent her fleet seeking shelter in them; and if this object has not been gained in Egypt, which is more accessible to French influences, it is not of such consequence, because that country only possesses the harbour of Alexandria, which is hardly deep enough for French men-of-war, and is exposed to bombardment since the introduction of rifled cannon. In order to remain master of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, we have, up to the present, only required to station our ships behind the island of Magdalena, near the Straits of Bonifacio, for they were here in the nearest line of communication between Toulon and the eastern basin, and considerably on the flank of any other route, while observing the movements of the Toulon squadron, either towards Gibraltar or Algiers. The establishment of a French Mediterranean fleet on the eastern side would, however, prevent observation from such a central position, force England to divide her strength by sending a second squadron to Corfu, and give the enemy, who has for that object concentrated his strength at Toulon, the chances of a successful foray, by slipping his fleet out of the latter port, joining the squadron at Venice, and falling on the English fleet at Corfu a combination very possible, but which we only offer as one of the many which would result from the surrender of Venice to the Italians. But if such things may be expected so soon as Austria has lost