commence the war with Francis Joseph sooner than let slip the chance of maintaining his ground in Italy.

The time is drawing near when the struggle will recommence, but, before it arrives, we should be glad to see England carrying out the policy to which we have referred. We grant that there are grave obstacles in the way our people would regard with intense dislike any approximation to Austria, while, on the other hand, there is a very strong party in Prussia which adheres to an alliance with Russia in preference to England. That this is a mistake requires hardly any comment; for Germany, strong enough in land forces, requires a powerful naval ally to hold its own against France, and England is the only country which can supply that. Nothing will ever persuade the Prussians that they are not menaced by France, and they are naturally anxious to realise their position and reckon up their friends. If England steps boldly forward, and at once, a continental war may be avoided; if not, Prussia must throw herself into the arms of Russia, and be brought to the verge of despair ere that slowlymoving power can come to the rescue.

It may be urged, however, as it has been urged repeatedly, that these are matters which do not concern England; that Germany is strong enough to hold her own against France, and that it will be the fault of the two great powers if they allow their territory to be overcome. At the first cry of alarm we raised a magnificent body of volunteers, and our country rang with the shout of "Come if you dare!" we have performed marvels in raising our fleet to a proper position, and we can do without allies. We are prepared to grant all this, and if we feel convinced that England were unassailable, we should possibly endorse this selfish policy. Believing as we do, however, that the internecine war between Rome and Carthage will find a parallel in this generation if a Bonaparte remain on the throne of France, we consider that it would be a grand error to allow the continental powers to be crushed one after the other ere our turn arrived. We fought France for many years, and finally compelled her to succumb; but should that be a reason for doing it again, when we have it in our power to prevent the possibility of a war? England, Austria, and Prussia united honestly, would compel the Emperor of the French to remain within his own frontiers. If either of the powers were attacked, we should produce a most advantageous diversion by sea; while, on the other hand, if he menaced us with invasion, the Germans would cross his frontier and compel him to withdraw.

In writing thus we do not commend hostilities for the mere sake of fighting, and we are aware that many persons argue that such a coalition as we propose would have the immediate effect of hurrying on the catastrophe, and that the French would at once fly to arms. We do not believe this, for the great national armament that distinguished England in 1860, was equally regarded as a menace, though the purest precautionary measure. Louis Napoleon is perfectly well aware that if he will but keep the peace, the other European powers will be only too glad to do the same; but the question is, whether he can keep his enormous army in subordination unless he indulge them with a periodical outbreak, in which glory and booty can be reaped? If his motives be peace, he cannot feel offended by a coalition solely intended to prevent the outbreak of hostilities; if, on the other hand, he desire, as his enemies say

he does, to humiliate all the continental powers in turn, he will know what he has to expect.

On the other hand, should hostilities break out again in Italy with the spring, as they in all probability will, Austria would not call on her allies to aid her so long as the Italians were left to their own devices and to run their heads against the stone walls of the Quadrilateral. Francis Joseph is fully prepared for all contingencies, and will hold the united power of Italy at bay, but he has a right to call on the other European nations to assist him should Louis Napoleon deem it advisable to aid Garibaldi in seizing the Venetese, for that is really a European question, quite as much as the occupation of the Rhine by Prussia. We have shown how deeply England is interested in the retention of that bulwark, and we sincerely trust that when the House assembles, this will be one of the first questions settled.

It will, doubtless, be urged that such remarks as these come with peculiar ill grace at a moment when England and France are apparently more closely allied than ever by the settlement of the new commercial treaty, but we cannot forget that its first announcement was almost simultaneous with the uprising of the British nation, justly alarmed at its precarious position. The armament of our coasts and our people was not considered incompatible with increased commercial relations, and all we ask is, that our government should go a step further, and by a timely coalition put a stop to those constant agitations which render commerce insecure, and keep the English nation in a constant flurry. There is hardly a man in Britain, we hope, who would desire hostilities with France, and few who would not be glad to witness a pacific solution of the questions that threaten to disturb the peace of Europe, and we hold that the only sure way of preventing a war, which may embrace the whole Continent, is by offering so bold a front to the martial sons of France, that they may see the utter folly of irritating their neighbours, and the impossibility of rendering France greater by war than she has become during peace.

It is the misfortune of our continental policy that our ministers consider that "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," and they will not look ahead. Everything proves that a struggle is imminent for the possession of Turkey; for that wretched country, convulsed by internal revolution, may at any moment collapse, and the race will be to the swiftest. So long as Austria remains mistress of Venetia, as we have shown, England will maintain her supremacy in the eastern portion of the Mediterranean, and were we firmly allied with that country, the Austrian troops, when the decisive moment arrived, could be poured into the Principalities, while our fleet took possession of the Dardanelles. In such a way an equitable settlement could be arrived at; but if a French squadron were permitted to concentrate at Venice when that city was part of the new Italian kingdom, it might outstrip us, and then hostilities would be inevitable. At the same time, if the Venetese were lost to Austria, that nation would be at once paralysed by a French army marching on the route to Vienna, as it did before, and we should be left single-handed to contend with France and Russia, who would only too gladly combine to wrest so important a territory from us.

It is quite certain, however, that England cannot resign the direct route to India without a struggle; and though the Isthmus of Suez Canal has been ridiculed, there is more in that project than meets the eye. Nor has the new French loan to Turkey been granted without a motive. Louis Napoleon's combinations look far ahead, and though they may appear to us vacillating, they bear a strong resemblance to the plan of action of the chess-player, who sees his way to the desired result, although he is compelled to parry the adverse moves of his opponent, and thus defer for a time the victory. If we allow the spring to pass away without decided action on our part, we may feel assured that the Venetese will be wrested from Austria, and the French will have taken a tremendous step in the direction of Constantinople.

But, apart from these considerations of the future, we should like to know when these progressive armaments are to stop, and who is to blame for them. England is bristling with bayonets, and to that we do not object, as a purely defensive measure, nor do we begrudge the twelve millions to be spent in placing our coast in a decent state, but there are rumours flying about of enormous sums to be still expended in cuirassed frigates and other luxuries of which Louis Napoleon has set the fashion. In a word, although people strive to hide the truth even from themselves, we are preparing for the great struggle, for even were English and French the best friends in the world, they could not go on for any length of time in this state of armament without feeling a wish to try the metal of their weapons. Surely, if such be the case, it is very foolish on our part to throw away the alliance offered us by two great continental powers, whose support would enable us to sit down at our ease, secure that Louis Napoleon would not attack one of the three so long as the alliances were honestly maintained.

That Prussia is anxious for such a defensive and offensive alliance with England does not admit of a doubt, for the nation has been in a sad state of alarm ever since the treaty of Villafranca, and has been timorously waiting till its turn should come. Were Prussia, however, guaranteed the support of England, the smaller German states, relying on so powerful a protector, would decide on energetic action, and it would thus be rendered impossible for Louis Napoleon, however much he might desire it, to cross the Rhine. But, till England speak out boldly and say that she is prepared to prevent the renewal of a war, the Germans can place no faith in Prussia, standing alone and menaced on both fronts, for Austria would be powerless to help her so long as she was obliged to occupy the Venetese with an enormous force, which could only be released by the appearance of our fleet in the Adriatic waters. Had we interposed

resolutely prior to the last Italian war, matters would now be very different, and a coalition must have compelled Louis Napoleon to refrain; as it was, we allowed him to act as he pleased, and the result has been a naval and military expenditure, during the last year, as large as if we were engaged in actual hostilities, leaving out of sight the enormous sum the volunteers have spent in providing their accoutrements and outfit. And, unfortunately, there seems no prospect of any reduction of expenditure, for we have no settled policy; blinded by the popular cry of Italian liberation, we allowed ourselves to be deluded into the idea that Louis

Napoleon was a disinterested friend of oppressed nationalities, and did not awake from our dream till we saw the price he demanded for his assistance.

We think, then, we have shown plainly enough what dangers loom in the future for England, in the event of Venetia being torn from Austria and allowed to fall into the hands of France, under the convenient cloak of an Italian kingdom. We are aware that our ministers are strongly in favour of such a step, and we are of opinion that Louis Napoleon would go any lengths, short of freeing Italy from his influence, in order to gain so important a stronghold as Venice. We hope that it may not be so, and there is yet time to place matters on a satisfactory basis; but if we allow it to slip, the way will be open for incessant hostilities. Louis Napoleon has a settled object in view, and, to attain it, he will spare no sacrifices, and care not what friendships he may forfeit. He is well aware that he has lost the good will of the English nation, who would not let themselves be blinded by the bait of a commercial treaty; he knows that the Germans regard him with a loathing mixed with a strong dose of terror; and he knows also that he has hitherto succeeded in all his schemes by an utterly unscrupulous policy, which must bring about its own punishment in the end. But for that he cares little-a man who has a star of fatalism disregards the opinions of his fellow-men, and he treads his allotted path with all the stoicism which is the distinguishing mark of the elect of destiny.

Before all, we would urge on our readers not to let themselves be deluded by the shreds of liberty which Louis Napoleon has recently thrown to his people. He is preparing for the struggle with the priestparty, the only one that still offers him any control, and for that end needs the support of the truly enlightened of his nation. He hopes to draw back to France the celebrities who rendered her glorious during the preceding reign, and to effect this he must make a show of liberal concessions, which he may recal when his purposes are served. It is from no love of publicity that the Emperor of the French has permitted the proceedings of his senate to be openly discussed, and, indeed, such a measure will show the nullity of the men whom he has collected round him. We trust that England will not allow her efforts to relax until she has acquired a secure position, and to do so she must draw more closely the bonds connecting her with the élite of the French nation. There are many men left in France who appreciate us, and it should be their purpose to take advantage of the offered publicity in removing those prejudices which keep two great people aloof. More especially does England owe a debt of gratitude to the writers in the Revue des Deux Mondes, who have laboured honestly and perseveringly to make the two nations truly allied. If it be the result of Louis Napoleon's concessions that this band of brothers be augmented, he will have effected a good deed, and the consequences may go far beyond his anticipations.

GRANVILLE DE VIGNE.

A TALE OF THE DAY.

A young man married is a man that's marred.-SHAKSPEARE.

PART THE FIRST.

I.

THE SENIOR PUPIL OF THE CHANCERY TRIES THE SAUCE PIQUANTE OF
UNCERTAIN FATE.

THE water rushed beneath the keel, our oars dipped with regular harmony, the river-waves rippled and split, and the alders and willows tossed and waved in the sunshine, while we-private pupils, as our tutor called us, young men, as we called ourselves-used to pull up the Kennet as though we were some of a University Eight, and lunch at our favourite hostelry off raw chops and half-and-half, making, faute de mieux, rough, schoolboy-love to its big-boned, red-haired Hebe, happy as kings in those glorious summer days in the dead years long past and gone.

What a royal time it was-(what man amongst us does not say so with a sigh?) when our hearts owned no heavier cares than a vulgus and a theorem, and no arrière-pensée mingled with our healthy boyish sports; when old Horace and Euripides were the only bores we knew, and the Galatea at the pastrycook's seemed fairer than titled Helens now; when gallops on hired shying hacks were doubly dear by prohibition, and filthy bird's-eye, smoked in barns, sweeter to our senses then than purest Cubas smoked to-day on the steps of Arthur's or the U. S.

Those were my

happiest days, Heaven knows, though I've seen life as agreeably as any man could, and am not even yet as utterly blasé as one might expect. But just as, some twenty years hence, when I am gone down before the gout, and Purdey has grown too heavy, and my favourite entremets are interdicted, shall I look back to the present day with an envious sigh; so do I now often glance with a fond lingering regret to those merry boyish days when, with a handsome tip from the dear old governor, and a parting injunction respecting the unspeakable blessings and advantages of flannel from my mother, I was sent off to be a private pupil under the Rev. Josiah Primrose, D.D., F.R.S., F.R.G.S., and all the letters of the alphabet besides, I dare say, if I could but remember them.

Our modern Gamaliel was an immaculate and insignificant little man, who, on the strength of a double first, good connexions, and M.B. waistcoats, offered to train up the sons of noblemen and gentlemen in the way they should go, drill Greek and instil religious principles into them, for the trifling consideration of 3007. per annum. He lived in a quiet little borough in the south of Berkshire, at a long, low, ivy-clad house called the Chancery, that had stupendous pretensions to the picturesque and the mediæval; and, what was of much more consequence to us, a capital little trout stream at the bottom of its grounds. Here he dwelt with a fat old housekeeper, a very good cook, a quasi-juvenile niece-who went in for the kitten line, and did it very badly, too-and four, or, when times were good, six hot-brained, wild-spirited, incipient men, worse to Jan.-VOL. CXXI. NO. CCCCLXXXI.

C