Venice, it seems evident that in Venetia a position has now to be defended, the maintenance of which is almost as important to England as to the state more immediately concerned.

But we have not yet reached the last point of the interest England must take in this most important question of surrendering Venetia. We must now refer to the relations in which Venice stands on one side to the Austrian, on the other to the Italian, navy. Although Austria possesses far better harbours in Pola and Cattaro, still the possession of these depends entirely on the retention of Venice. So long as the new Italian kingdom possesses no port on the east coast of Italy, that state can make no preparations for joining in an Oriental contest; but, from the moment Venice slips from the grasp of Austria, the navy of the latter power would be held in check in the Adriatic, for the maritime resources of Italy are there as great as those which Istria and Dalmatia can offer. It would be sufficient to station a strong division of the new Italian fleet at Venice, in order to blockade the Austrian navy on the outbreak of the war. England would thus lose the only ally she could count upon, under all the circumstances, in the Mediterranean, where the new Italian empire, so closely connected with France, will soon unfold its haughty banner, and Spain is already making considerable exertions to be represented worthily as the third member of the naval alliance. For the present, we grant that the Austrian fleet is insignificant, and could not effect much, but Francis Joseph has expressed a determination to increase that fleet, and within a few years would possess six to eight screw-ships of the line. When we remember that the Porte has about the same number, the British fleet would be thus increased by sixteen sail of the line, which in itself is by no means a contemptible force.

In order perfectly to understand the importance of the Austrian fleet for England, we will take a glance at the future of that navy, which it has hitherto been the duty of the empire to hold in check. Although the Italian fleet is for the present only in embryo, it will become a very valuable factor in any future struggle for the possession of the Mediterranean. The main advantage which a separation of Lower Italy from the monarchy of Victor Emmanuel, and its simultaneous removal from French influence, would produce for the interests of England, would certainly lie in the fact, that one-half would probably balance the other, and prevent that union which in such a case will prove dangerous strength; but we will leave it an open question for the present whether such a decision is to be hoped for or not. In a masterly document drawn up at St. Helena, the first Napoleon showed, however, what Italy could become at sea, as a united kingdom. He did so for a time which is nearly half a century behind the present, but, although a few of the calculations may be over-estimated by the conqueror, who usually dealt with figures most carelessly, it is, on the other hand, evident that Italy would in no case remain inferior to what was expected from her fifty years The development which trade, prosperity, and navigation have attained on the peninsula, especially during the last thirty years, has generally been very considerable, and Italy can, at the very least, become what France now is, while being exclusively a Mediterranean power, it will not be called on to divide its strength between that sea and the ocean, France is compelled to do. On the contrary, it can keep its entire mari

back.

as

time strength continually concentrated there, and prove a valuable ally to the French, who will no longer require so fully to direct their attention to that quarter. This appears to us an eminently serious consideration, for we are of opinion that the alliance between France and Italy is as threatening to Europe, and more especially to England, by sea as it is by land. The effect of this union of the naval resources of France and Italy will be, that the French navy, which already stands in the respectable proportion of two to three, as compared with the English, will be rendered numerically equal, if not superior, to it. If we assume that France, in the event of a war, only supported the Italian sea forces with one-half of the naval strength she now possesses in the Mediterranean, England would be compelled to send two-thirds of her present strength into that sea, whence it is palpable that, unless she made increased exertions, she would leave her own shores exposed, for, with the one-third of her fleet still kept here, she would have to protect all her outlying possessions over the world. In order to render this position clearer, we will have recourse to figures. At the end of 1860, France will have at her disposal forty screw ships of the line, either equipped or in such a state that they can be got ready for sea in the shortest possible space of time. England, which has now fifty-five at her disposal, and eight building, of which five are in an advanced state, will have at the same period sixty line vessels at her service, and we thus still have the above-mentioned proportion of two to three. In the next years, France can raise her fleet to sixty ships of the line, and Italy have a fleet of thirty. If, on such a supposition, England decided to maintain her relative superiority, or even only to increase her fleet one-half, she would have to build thirty ships of the line, which would entail an enormous expense, although we are of opinion that, in such critical circumstances, England ought to possess not less than a hundred and twenty screw men-of-war, or just the double of what she now has.

In this calculation we have, however, omitted another power, possessing considerable importance for the maritime situation of Englandnamely, Spain. During the last few months this power has taken very decided steps to reassume her old and respected position among the maritime states, which she lost at the beginning of the present century. Her fleet will be speedily augmented by no less than eight ships of the line, and this exertion seems to us to be calculated so that Spain should advance step by step with the already commenced development of the navy of the Italian kingdom. This new Spanish marine force will be equally ready to augment the naval resources of France both at sea and in the Mediterranean, for, owing to the excellent position of Spain, she is enabled to enter into the most varying combinations, and threatens to become a tool in the hands of that French policy which rules Spain, of a very dangerous nature as far as England is concerned. To all this must be added that naval alliances, which England regarded at other times coldly and with indifference (for they really formed part of the very weakest military and political combinations), possess incomparably more importance in our time than they used to have, because the difficulties which, only twenty years ago, impeded the united action of allied naval forces, such as distance, the inequality of personnel and matériel, the dependence of the movements of a fleet on wind and weather, at the

present day either exist no longer, or, at any rate, have lost much of their former significance. Nelson regarded it as a very difficult task to manage a fleet consisting of more than twenty-five ships of the line, but, since his day, steam has been introduced as the motive principle in action, and the squadrons are altogether independent of the wind. Hence there are no peculiar obstacles to the manoeuvring of the most enormous naval force, and such precision and regularity can be given to the movements of screw ships of the line, that the tactics of an army are left far behind, although they were once regarded as an unattainable degree of perfection by sailors. And this certainty of tactical calculation loses nothing in its accuracy when great distances have to be taken into account. Twenty years ago, nothing was more uncertain than the movements of a fleet. A contrary wind brought it to a stand-still, or compelled it to go through a course of time-wasting tacking. A heavy storm dispersed it, and exposed it to destruction for several days in succession. At the present day, on the other hand, nothing is more certain, or can be decided with greater accuracy, than the progress of a large naval force across the waters. Even railways do not afford modern armies this supreme control of time and space which steam has imparted to ships on the other element. Hence, this change of circumstances produces the effect that naval alliances are as efficacious in their sphere as continental alliances, and are equally to be feared.

With such considerations, and regard being had to the advantages which the Hispano-Italian naval alliance will offer France, it is surely a matter of vital interest to England-now that we may assume that the attempt to divide Italy into two separate kingdoms has failed-to prevent at all risks the incorporation of Venetia, and, what must be its inevitable result, that of Istria and Dalmatia, with the Italian kingdom. The sailors of the two last-named Austrian coast provinces are renowned for their seamanship, and are decidedly superior to both Italian and French sailors. Their number may be estimated at about twenty thousand, or nearly onethird of the number of sailors Italy can produce, and one-fifth of the French. We are aware that the French "Inscription Maritime" furnishes a much higher estimate, but it includes river boatmen, and many others not fitted for sea service. If we reckon, as above, the future Italian war navy at thirty ships of the line, the French at the same period at sixty, and the Spanish at twenty, this forms a total of one hundred and ten screw liners, a force which England could not keep under unless she raised her own fleet to at least one hundred and fifty. This would be a development of strength, increasing our naval estimates to thrice as much as they are now, and though the magnitude of our naval resources precludes any doubt but that we could raise such a fleet, on the other hand, the question is justifiable whether, in the long run, the cost of the navy would be compatible with the comfort of the people and its social progression, on which the future of England so materially depends. But when circumstances have attained such an extreme, they hardly endure even the slightest increase, or it is, at any rate, regarded with a certain degree of apprehension. If, however, the above-mentioned twenty thousand Dalmatian and Istrian sailors be placed at the disposal of the Italian kingdom by the incorporation of those two provinces, they would supply the crews of at least twenty ships of the line, and such an increase might possibly give

the allied navies the preponderance for which they are striving in the Mediterranean.

We think we have shown that it would be a most dangerous policy, as far as England is concerned, to allow France to gain possession of Venice by means of Italy. Another question naturally offers itself, whether Italy cannot do without France, and, becoming an independent nation, enter into alliance with England? This is a position which requires to be more fully discussed.

The newly-created kingdom, all will concede, needs a powerful ally to support it, for though not inferior in extent to the great powers, it must for a long time remain inferior to them in the organisation of its strength. Above all, it needs an ally, owing to its weak strategic position, for, if isolated, it would become an easy prey to one of its powerful neighbours. The next question to ask is, where is Italy to look for that ally? and we answer, from among the great powers, for her own history has sadly taught her what reliance is to be placed on small states. Austria may be put out of court at once, for the bitter hatred the Italians feel for that state would prevent such an alliance. Prussia could not hope to be an effectual support of Italy, owing to the countries that lie between them, and the want of a large fleet. On the other hand, an Anglo-Italian alliance has long been meditated, and the eminent politician who now rules affairs in England has sought to carry out the idea at various times, and, indeed, the interest England has taken in Sardinia for the last twelve years emanated exclusively from that idea. For our part, we never shared such views, and yet it is with some reluctance that we prepare to combat them. Not because they have any logical support-and their warmest defenders could not offer such-but because public opinion, not only in England but also in Italy, is so occupied with the thought of this alliance, and it is an awkward matter for the individual, even when he has right and logic on his side, to attack what the masses defend. Still we will not hesitate.

England is not excluded from the fate of all European nations, and cannot labour in the field of active policy without allies. Isolation would expose England, almost as much as it would do any other great power. There are two dangers, above all, with which it would menace England. The first, and most important, is an attempted French invasion; the second, the chance of that power or Russia attacking our Indian and Australian possessions. The most effective way of carrying out the latter plan would be an invasion of the Osmanli territory, or, at any rate, an occupation of the more important parts. This is the reason why England cannot form a real alliance with either of those powers, and why the present Anglo-French alliance is a mere pretext, and does not offer the shadow of a guarantee for the security of England. In fact, it produces no effect, and hardly deceives anybody, not even the general public, who, in England, are animated with a peculiar political instinct, and it only renders stronger the desire for a real, practical, and useful alliance. It is self-evident that such a union must possess the ability to fulfil the two above-mentioned objects: to protect England and the East, and, in case of need, offer a bold front to France or Russia, or both together. Now, it will hardly require a moment's reflection to see that an alliance with a single state would be insufficient for this purpose; but, as we have already shown, an Anglo-Prusso-Austrian alliance would fully

and perfectly carry out the object. To this it may be objected that any triple alliance in which England and two continental great powers joined would be strong, and that if England, Prussia, and Italy combined, the object would be attained. To this, however, Prussia would decidedly object, as weak in a military point of view, while a British continental alliance would require an imposing display of land forces to hold France and Russia in check simultaneously. It is, furthermore, evident that such an alliance would be utterly incompetent to protect the East directly against Russia. If, then, an alliance with Prussia and Italy appear weak, it is hardly to be expected that England will attach itself to the latter country alone.

We have no hesitation in declaring that, in spite of the extraordinary and almost hopeless state of the Austrian finances, and although that imperial state would be as powerless to help England, in the event of a war with France, as Italy would be, we still believe that Austria, even as a single ally, would be more acceptable to England than Italy, because the monarchy of the Habsburgers can effect more, and especially if it remain in possession of Venetia. For, we repeat it again and again, Austria would be able to check both French and Russian aggression in the East, for her interests are closely connected with the Danubian Principalities, and, with the help of our fleet, and the railways now forming in Turkey, she would be enabled to throw a considerable force into the most dangerous portion of the Russian territory in Armenia. When we add that all the advantages resulting from an Anglo-Austrian alliance would be lost if England joined with Italy, we think we have said enough to prove that England will never commit herself to an offensive and defensive alliance with Italy. On the other hand, the newly-formed kingdom would be indisposed to look to us for aid, as it requires a powerful ally to prevent any attempted restoration of the Austrian authority, and for that a powerful military power is needed, and England can offer such assistance least of all the great powers.

The last state to which Italy could look for help is Russia; but, apart from the distance that country is from the peninsula, such an alliance would threaten Italy with the most serious peril, in the shape of a war with France and the loss of Upper Italy. For, after France had crushed Austrian influence in the peninsula, it would hardly tolerate Russian. On the other hand, Russia could gain nothing by such an alliance: on the contrary, she would thus give France the opportunity of extending her dominion to the shores of the Adriatic, and hence materially thwart her own interests and injure her position.

From all these reasons, it is therefore evident that the French alliance with Italy is the only one conceivable, and this brings us back to our first axiom, that if Venetia were handed over to Italy, it would be solely for the interest of France. The emperor has taught us that his disinterestedness does not go to the length of generosity, and his policy in Italy, though it may appear to us shifting, has always kept in view one object— that of rendering Italy dependent on himself, and thus securing an outlet by means of which he can carry out his designs. Unfortunately for him, he has a very astute opponent in Garibaldi; and we believe that if the hero really attempts to carry out his designs on Austria, and has the slightest prospect of success, Louis Napoleon would be prepared to re