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requires a confiderable degree of reflexion, to enable the person himself by whom the transition was made, to ascertain what were the intermediate ideas. A curious inftance of fuch a fudden tranfition is mentioned by Hobbes in his Leviathan. "In a company," (fays he,) "in which the converfation "turned on the civil war, what could be conceived "more impertinent, than for a perfon to ask abruptly, "What was the value of a Roman denarius? On a "little reflexion, however, I was easily able to trace "the train of thought which fuggefted the queftion: "for the original fubject of difcourfe naturally intro"duced the history of the King, and of the treachery "of those who surrendered his person to his enemies; "this again introduced the treachery of Judas Iscariot, "and the fum of money which he received for his "reward. And all this train of ideas," fays Hobbes, "paffed through the mind of the speaker in a twinkling, in confequence of the velocity of thought.' It is by no means improbable, that if the speaker himself had been interrogated about the connexion of ideas, which led him afide from the original topic of discourse, he would have found himself, at first, at a lofs for an answer.

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In the inftances which have been last mentioned, we have alfo a proof, that a perception, or an idea, which paffes through the mind, without leaving any trace in the memory, may yet ferve to introduce other ideas connected with it by the laws of affociation, Other proofs of this important fact shall be mentioned afterwards.

When

When a perception or an idea paffes through the mind, without our being able to recollect it next moment, the vulgar themselves afcribe our want of memory to a want of attention. Thus, in the inftance already mentioned, of the clock, a perfon, upon obferving that the minute hand had juft paffed twelve, would naturally fay, that he did not attend to the clock when it was ftriking. There seems, therefore, to be a certain effort of mind upon which, even in the judgment of the vulgar, memory in fome measure depends; and which they distinguish by the name of attention.

The connexion between attention and memory has been remarked by many authors. "Nec dubium "eft," (fays Quinctilian, speaking of memory,) quin plurimum in hac parte, valeat mentis intentio, "et velut acies luminum a profpectu rerum quas in"tuetur non averfa." The fame obfervation has been made by Locke, and by most of the writers on the fubject of education.

But although the connexion between attention and memory has been frequently remarked in general terms, I do not recollect that the power of attention has been mentioned by any of the writers on pneumatology, in their enumeration of the faculties of the mind; nor has it been confidered by any one, fo

far

"Memory depends much on attention and repetition." Locke's Effay, b. i. chap. x.

+ Some important observations on the subject of attention occur in different parts of Dr. Reid's writings; particularly in his Effays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 62.; and in his Effays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 78, et feq.-To this ingenious

author

far as I know, as of fufficient importance to deserve a particular examination. Helvetius, indeed, in his very ingenious work, De l'Efprit, has intitled one of his chapters, De l'inegale capacitè d'Attention; but what he confiders under this article, is chiefly that capacity of patient inquiry, (or as he calls it, une attention fuivie,) upon which philofophical genius feeins in a great meafure to depend. He has also remarked *, with the writers already mentioned, that the impreffion which any thing makes on the memory, depends much on the degree of attention we give to it; but he has taken no notice of that effort which is abfolutely effential to the lowest degree of memory. It is this effort that I propofe to confider at prefent; not thofe different degrees of attention which imprint things more or lefs deeply on the mind, but that act or effort without which we have no recollection or memory whatever.

author we are indebted for the remark, that attention to things external, is properly called obfervation; and attention to the fubjects of our confcioufnefs, reflexion. He has alfo explained the caufes of the peculiar difficulties which accompany this last exertion of the mind, and which form the chief obftacles to the progress of pneumatology. I fhall have occafion, in another part of this work, to treat of habits of inattention in general, and to suggest fome practical hints with refpect to the culture both of the powers of obfervation and reflexion. The view which I propose to take of attention at prefent, is extremely limited; and is intended merely to comprehend fuch general principles as are neceffary to prepare the reader for the chapters which are to follow.

"C'eft l'attention, plus ou moins grande, qui grave plus ou "moins profondément les objets dans la memoire."

4

With respect to the nature of this effort, it is perhaps impoffible for us to obtain much fatisfaction. We often speak of greater and less degrees of attention; and, I believe, in thefe cafes, conceive the mind (if I may use the expreffion) to exert itself with different degrees of energy. I am doubtful, however, if this expreffion conveys any distinct meaning. For my own part, I am inclined to suppose, (though I would by no means be understood to speak with confidence,) that it is effential to memory, that the perception or the idea that we would wish to remember, fhould remain in the mind for a certain space of time, and should be contemplated by it exclufively of every thing else; and that attention confifts partly (perhaps entirely) in the effort of the mind, to detain the idea or the perception, and to exclude the other objects that folicit its notice.

Notwithstanding, however, the difficulty of afcertaining, in what this act of the mind confifts, every perfon must be fatisfied of its reality from his own consciousness; and of its effential connexion with the power of memory. I have already mentioned feveral inftances of ideas paffing through the mind, without our being able to recollect them next moment. Thefe inftances were produced, merely to illuftrate the meaning I annex to the word attention; and to recall to the recollection of the reader, a few ftriking cafes, in which the poffibility of our carrying on a process of thought, which we are unable to attend to at the time, or to remember afterwards, is acknow. ledged in the received fyftems of philofophy. I fhall now mention fome other phenomena, which appear

to

to me to be very fimilar to these, and to be explicable in the fame manner; although they have commonly been referred to very different principles.

The wonderful effect of practice in the formation of habits, has been often, and justly, taken notice of, as one of the most curious circumftances in the human conftitution. A mechanical operation, for example, which we at firft performed with the utmost difficulty, comes, in time, to be fo familiar to us, that we are able to perform it without the smallest danger of mistake; even while the attention appears to be completely engaged with other fubjects. The truth feems to be, that in confequence of the affociation of ideas, the different fteps of the process present themselves fucceffively to the thoughts, without any recollection on our part, and with a degree of rapidity proportioned to the length of our experience; fo as to fave us entirely the trouble of hesitation and reflexion, by giving us every moment a precise and steady notion of the effect to be produced *.

In the cafe of fome operations which are very familiar to us, we find ourselves unable to attend to, or to recollect, the acts of the will by which they were preceded; and accordingly, fome philofophers of great eminence have called in question the existence

*I do not mean by this obfervation, to call in question the effects which the practice of the mechanical arts has on the muscles of the body. These are as indifputable as its effects on the mind. A man who has been accustomed to write with his right hand, can write better with his left hand, than another who never practised the art at all; but he cannot write fo well with his left hand as with his right. The effects of practice, therefore, it should seem, are produced partly on the mind, and partly on the body.

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