of fuch volitions; and have represented our habitual actions as involuntary and mechanical. But furely the circumstance of our inability to recollect our volitions, does not authorise us to difpute their poffibility; any more than our inability to attend to the process of the mind, in eftimating the distance of an object from the eye, authorifes us to affirm that the perception is inftantaneous. Nor does it add any force to the objection to urge, that there are inftances in which we find it difficult, or perhaps impoffible, to check our habitual actions by a contrary volition. For it must be remembered, that this contrary volition does not remain with us fteadily during the whole operation; but is merely a general intention or refolution, which is banished from the mind, as foon as the occafion presents itself, with which the habitual train of our thoughts and volitions is affociated *.

It may indeed be said, that these observations only prove the poffibility that our habitual actions may be

The folution of this difficulty, which is given by Dr. Porterfield, is fomewhat curious.

"Such is the power of custom and habit, that many actions, "which are no doubt voluntary, and proceed from our mind, are "in certain circumftances rendered neceffary, so as to appear alto"gether mechanical, and independent of our wills; but it does not "from thence follow, that our mind is not concerned in fuch mo❝tions, but only that it has imposed upon itself a law, whereby "it regulates and governs them to the greatest advantage. In all this, there is nothing of intrinfical neceffity; the mind is at ab"folute liberty to act as it pleafes; but being a wife agent, it can"not chufe but to act in conformity to this law, by reafon of the "utility and advantage that arifes from this way of acting."TREATISE ON THE EYE, vol. ii. p. 17. voluntary.

voluntary. But if this be admitted, nothing more can well be required; for furely, if these phenomena are clearly explicable from the known and acknowledged laws of the human mind, it would be unphilofophical to devise a new principle, on purpose to account for them. The doctrine, therefore, which I have laid down with respect to the nature of habits, is by no means founded on hypothefis, as has been objected to me by fome of my friends; but, on the contrary, the charge of hypothefis falls on those who attempt to explain them, by faying that they are mechanical or automatic; a doctrine which, if it is at all intelligible, must be understood as implying the existence of fome law of our constitution, which has been hitherto unobferved by philofophers; and to which, I believe, it will be difficult to find any thing analogous in our conftitution.

In the foregoing obfervations, I have had in view a favourite doctrine of Dr. Hartley's; which has been maintained alfo of late by a much higher authority, I mean Dr Reid.

"Habit *" (fays this ingenious author)" differs "from instinct, not in its nature, but in its origin; "the laft being natural, the first acquired. Both

operate without will or intention, without thought, " and therefore may be called mechanical principles.' In another paffage †, he expreffes himself thus: "I "conceive it to be a part of our conftitution, that "what we have been accustomed to do, we acquire "not only a facility but a pronenefs to do on like oc

Effays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 128. + Ibid. p. 130.

"cafions;

"cafions; fo that it requires a particular will or effort "to forbear it, but to do it requires, very often, no "will at all."

The fame doctrine is laid down ftill more explicitly by Dr. Hartley.

66

"Suppofe," (fays he,) "a perfon who has a perfectly voluntary command over his fingers, to begin "to learn to play on the harpsichord. The firft ftep "is to move his fingers from key to key, with a flow "motion, looking at the notes, and exerting an ex

66

press act of volition in every motion. By degrees "the motions cling to one another, and to the im"preffions of the notes, in the way of affociation, so "often mentioned, the acts of volition growing less "and less express all the time, till at last they become ❝ evanefcent and imperceptible. For an expert per"former will play from notes, or ideas laid up in the

memory, and at the fame time carry on a quite "different train of thoughts in his mind; or even "hold a converfation with another. Whence we

may conclude, that there is no intervention of the "idea, or state of mind, called Will *." Cafes of this fort, Hartley calls "tranfitions of voluntary "actions into automatic ones."

I cannot help thinking it more philofophical to fuppose, that those actions which are originally voluntary, always continue fo; although, in the cafe of operations which are become habitual in confequence of long practice, we may not be able to recollect every different volition. Thus, in the cafe of a performer

Vol. i. p. 108, 109.

on

on the harpsichord, I apprehend, that there is an act of the will preceding every motion of every finger, although he may not be able to recollect these volitions afterwards; and although he may, during the time of his performance, be employed in carrying on a feparate train of thought. For, it must be remarked, that the most rapid performer can, when he pleases, play so slowly, as to be able to attend to, and to recollect, every separate act of his will in the various movements of his fingers; and he can gradually accelerate the rate of his execution, till he is unable to recollect thefe acts. Now, in this inftance, one of two fuppofitions must be made; the one is, that the operations in the two cafes are carried on precisely in the fame manner, and differ only in the degree of rapidity; and that when this rapidity exceeds a certain rate, the acts of the will are too momentary to leave any impreffion on the memory.-The other is, that when the rapidity exceeds a certain rate, the operation is taken entirely out of our hands; and is carried on by fome unknown power, of the nature of which we are as ignorant, as of the cause of the circulation of the blood, or of the motion of the intestines. The laft fuppofition feems to

*me

* This feems to have been the opinion of Bishop Berkeley, whofe doctrine concerning the nature of our habitual actions, coincides with that of the two philofophers already quoted. "It must be "owned, we are not confcious of the systole and diastole of the "heart, or the motion of the diaphragm. It may not, neverthe "less, be thence inferred, that unknowing nature can act regularly as well as ourfelves. The true inference is, that the felfI

46

"thinking

me to be fomewhat fimilar to that of a man who fhould maintain, that, although a body projected with a moderate velocity, is feen to pafs through all the intermediate fpaces in moving from one place to another, yet we are not intitled to conclude, that this happens when the body moves fo quickly as to become invisible to the eye. The former fuppofition is supported by the analogy of many other facts in our conftitution. Of fome of thefe, I have already taken notice; and it would be easy to add to the number.

An expert accountant, for example, can fum up, almoft with a fingle glance of his eye, a long column of figures. He can tell the fum, with unerring certainty; while, at the fame time, he is unable to recollect any one of the figures of which that fum is compofed; and yet nobody doubts, that each of these figures has paffed through his mind, or supposes, that when the rapidity of the process becomes fo great that he is unable to recollect the various steps of it, he obtains the refult by a fort of infpiration. This

"thinking individual, or human perfon, is not the real author of "thofe natural motions. And, in fact, no man blames himself, if "they are wrong, or values himself, if they are right. The fame

may be faid of the fingers of a muficlan, which fome object to "be moved by habit, which understands not; it being evident that what is done by rule, muft proceed from fomething that un"derstands the rule; therefore, if not from the musician himfelf "from fome other active intelligence; the fame, perhaps, which "governs bees and fpiders, and moves the limbs of those who "walk in their fleep.”—See a Treatife, entitled, Siris, p. 123. 2d edit.

laft