CHAPTER FOURTH.

Of Abstraction.

SECTION I.

General Obfervations on this Faculty of the Mind.

THE origin of appellatives, or, in other words, the origin of those claffes of objects which, in the schools, are called genera, and species, has been confidered by fome philofophers as one of the moft difficult problems in metaphyfics. The account of it which is given by Mr. Smith, in his Differtation on the Origin of Languages, appears to me to be equally fimple and fatisfactory.

"The affignation" (fays he)" of particular names, "to denote particular objects; that is, the inftitu"tion of nouns fubftantive; would probably be one "of the first steps towards the formation of Language. "The particular cave, whofe covering fheltered the "favage from the weather; the particular tree, whofe "fruit relieved his hunger; the particular fountain, “whose water allayed his thirst; would first be de"nominated by the words, cave, tree, fountain; or "by whatever other appellations he might think proper, in that primitive jargon, to mark them.

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Afterwards, when the more enlarged experience of

"this favage had led him to observe, and his neceffary "occafions obliged him to make mention of, other

caves, and other trees, and other fountains; he "would naturally bestow upon each of those new objects, the fame name by which he had been ac"customed to exprefs the fimilar object he was first "acquainted with. And thus, those words, which "were originally the proper names of individuals, "would each of them infenfibly become the common "name name of a multitude *.

"It is this application" (he continues)" of the name of an individual to a great number of objects, "whose resemblance naturally recalls the idea of that "individual, and of the name which expreffes it, "that feems originally to have given occafion to the "formation of thofe claffes, and affortments, which, " in the schools, are called genera and Species; and of "which the ingenious and eloquent Rouffeau finds "himself fo much at a lofs to account for the origin. "What conftitutes a fpecics, is merely a number of "objects, bearing a certain degree of resemblance to "one another; and, on that account, denominated by a fingle appellation, which may be applied to exprefs any one of them †."

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* The fame account of the progrefs of the mind in the formation of genera, is given by the Abbé de Condillac.

"Un enfant appelle du nom d'Arbre le premier arbre que nous "lui montrons. Un fecond arbre qu'il voit enfuite lui rapelle la "même idée; il lui donne le même nom; de même à un troifième, " à un quatrième, et voilà le mot d'Arbre donné d'abord à un "individu, qui devient pour lui un nom de claffe ou de genre, une ide: abftraite qui comprend tous les arbres en général."

+ Differtation on the Origin of Languages, annexed to Mr. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.

This view of the natural progress of the mind, in forming claffifications of external objects, receives fome illuftration from a fact mentioned by Captain Cook in his account of a fmall island called Wateeoo, which he vifited in failing from New Zealand to the Friendly Islands. "The inhabitants," fays he, "were afraid to come near our cows and horses, nor "did they form the leaft conception of their nature. "But the sheep and goats did not furpafs the limits of their ideas; for they gave us to understand that they knew them to be birds. It will appear," he adds, "rather incredible, that human ignorance could ever make so strange a mistake, there not being the moft diftant fimilitude between a fheep or goat, "and any winged animal. But these people feemed "to know nothing of the existence of any other land

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animals, befides hogs, dogs, and birds. Our sheep and goats, they could fee, were very different creatures from the two firft, and therefore they in"ferred that they must belong to the latter clafs, in "which they knew that there is a confiderable variety "of fpecies."-I would add to Cook's very judicious remarks, that the miftake of these islanders probably did not arife from their confidering a fheep or a goat as bearing a more ftriking refemblance to a bird, than to the two claffes of quadrupeds with which they were acquainted; but to the want of a generic word, fuch as quadruped. comprehending these two fpecies; which men in their fituation would no more be led to forin, than a perfon who had only feen one individual of each fpecies, would think of an appellative to exprifs both, inftead of applying a proper name to each.

In confequence of the variety of birds, it appears, that they had a generic name comprehending all of them, to which it was not unnatural for them to refer any new animal they met with.

The claffification of different objects supposes a power of attending to fome of their qualities or attributes, without attending to the reft; for no two objects are to be found without fome specific difference; and no affortment or arrangement can be formed among things not perfectly alike, but by lofing fight of their diftinguishing peculiarities, and limiting the attention to those attributes which belong to them in common. Indeed, without this power of attending separately to things which our fenfes present to us in a state of union, we never could have had any idea of number; for, before we can confider different objects as forming a multitude, it is neceffary that we should be able to apply to all of them one common name; or, in other words, that we should reduce them all to the fame genus. The various objects, for example, animate and inanimate, which are, at this moment, before me, I may clafs and number in a variety of different ways, according to the view of them that I chufe to take. I may reckon fucceffively the number of fheep, of cows, of horses, of elms, of oaks, of beeches; or I may first reckon the number of animals, and then the number of trees; or I may at once reckon the number of all the organised fubftances which my fenfes prefent to But whatever be the principle on which my claffification proceeds, it is evident, that the objects numbered together, must be confidered in those re

me.

spects

spects only in which they agree with each other; and that, if I had no power of feparating the combinations of fenfe, I never could have conceived them as forming a plurality.

This power of confidering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the reft; or, as I would rather chufe to define it, the power which the understanding has, of feparating the combinations which are presented to it, is diftinguifhed by logicians by the name of abstraction. It has been fuppofed, by fome philofophers, (with what probability I fhall not now inquire,) to form the characteristical attribute of a rational nature. That it is one of the most important of all our faculties, and very intimately connected with the exercife of our reafoning powers, is beyond difpute. And, I flatter myfelf, it will appear from the fequel of this chapter, how much the proper management of it conduces, to the fuccefs of our philofophical purfuits, and of our general conduct in life.

The fubferviency of Abftraction to the power of Reasoning, and alfo, its fubferviency to the exertions of a Poetical or Creative Imagination, shall be afterwards fully illuftrated. At prefent, it is fufficient for my purpose to remark, that as abftraction is the ground-work of claflification, without this faculty of the mind we should have been perfectly incapable of general fpeculation, and all our knowledge must neceffarily have been limited to individuals; and that fome of the most useful branches of fcience, particularly the different branches of mathematics, in which the very fubjects of our reafoning are abftractions of the understanding, could never have possibly had an

existence.