The doctrine of the Stoics concerning univerfals, differed widely from those both of Plato and Aristotle, and seems to have approached to a fpeculation which is commonly supposed to be of a more recent origin, and which an eminent philofopher of the present age has ranked among the discoveries which do the greateft honour to modern genius *.

Whether this doctrine of the Stoics coincided entirely with that of the Nominalists, (whofe opinions I fhall afterwards endeavour to explain,) or whether it did not resemble more, a doctrine maintained by another fect of schoolmen called Conceptualifts, I fhall not inquire. The determination of this question is interefting only to men of erudition; for the know. ledge we poffefs of this part of the Stoical philosophy, is too imperfect to affift us in the farther profecution of the argument, or even to diminish the merit of those

A very different account of Aristotle's doctrine, in those particulars in which it is commonly fuppofed to differ from that of Plato, is given by two modern writers of great learning, whose opinions are justly entitled to much refpect, from their familiar acquaintance with Ariftotle's latter Commentators of the Alexandrian School. See Origin and Progrefs of Language, vol. i., and HARRIS'S Hermes.

It is of no confequence, for any of the purposes which I have" at prefent in view, what opinion we form on this much contro-, verted point of philofophical hiftory. In fo far as the ideal theory was an attempt to explain the manner in which our general specu-. lations are carried on, it is agreed on all hands, that the doctrines of Plato and Ariftotle were effentially the fame; and accordingly, what I have faid on that fubject, coincides entirely with a paffage which the reader will find in "Origin and Progrefs of Language," vol. i. p. 38. 2d edit.

* Treatife of Human Nature, book i. part i. fect. 7.

philofophers who have, in modern times, been led to fimilar conclufions *.

As it is not my object, in this work, to enter into hiftorical details, any farther than is neceffary for illustrating the subjects of which I treat, I fhall pass over the various attempts which were made by the Eclectic philofophers, (a fect which arose at Alexandria about the beginning of the third century,) to reconcile the doctrines of Plato and Ariftotle concerning ideas. The endless difficulties, it would appear, to which their fpeculations led, induced, at laft, the more cautious and modeft inquirers to banish them entirely from Dialectics, and to content themselves with studying the arrangements or claffifications of univerfals, which the antient philofophers had made, without engaging in any metaphyfical difquifitions concerning their nature. Porphyry, in particular, although he tells us, that he has fpeculated much on this fubject; yet, in his Introduction to Ariftotle's Categories, waves the confideration of it as obfcure and intricate. On fuch questions as these;" Whether genera and species exist "in nature, or are only conceptions of the Human "Mind; and (on the fuppofition that they exist in "nature) whether they are inherent in the objects of "fenfe, or disjoined from them?" he declines giving any determination.

This paffage in Porphyry's Introduction is an object of curiofity; as, by a fingular concurrence of circumstances, it served to perpetuate the memory of a controversy from which it was the author's intention to divert the inquiries of his readers. Amidst the

disorders produced by the irruptions of the Barbarians, the knowledge of the Greek tongue was almost entirely loft; and the studies of philofophers were confined to Latin verfions of Ariftotle's Dialectics, and of Porphyry's Introduction concerning the Categories. With men who had a relish for such disquifitions, it is probable that the paffage already quoted from Porphyry, would have a tendency rather to excite than to damp curiofity; and accordingly, we have reafon to believe, that the controversy to which it relates continued, during the dark ages, to form a favourite fubject of difcuffion. The opinion which was prevalent was, (to use the fcholaftic language of the times,) that univerfals do not exist before things, nor after things, but in things; that is, (if I may be allowed to attempt a commentary upon expreffions to which I do not pretend to be able to annex very precise notions,) universal ideas have not (as Plato thought) an existence feparable from individual objects; and, therefore, they could not have exifted prior to them in the order of time; nor yet, (according to the doctrine of the Stoics,) are they mere conceptions of the mind, formed in confequence of an examination and com. parison of particulars; but these ideas or forms are from eternity united infeparably with that matter of which things confift; or, as the Ariftotelians fometimes express themselves, the forms of things are from eternity immersed in matter.-The reader will, I hope, forgive me for entering into these details, not only on account of their connexion with the obfervations which are to follow; but as they relate to a controverfy which, for many ages, employed all the

ingenuity

ingenuity and learning in Europe; and which, therefore, however frivolous in itself, deferves the attention of philofophers, as one of the most curious events which occurs in the history of the Human Mind,

Such appears to have been the prevailing opinion concerning the nature of univerfals, till the eleventh century; when a new doctrine, or (as fome authors think) a doctrine borrowed from the school of Zeno, was propofed by Rofcelinus*; and foon after very widely propagated over Europe by the abilities and eloquence of one of his scholars, the celebrated Peter Abelard. According to these philofophers, there are no existences in nature corresponding to general terms; and the objects of our attention in all our general speculations are not ideas, but words.

In confequence of this new doctrine, the schoolmen gradually formed themselves into two fects: one of which attached itself to the opinions of Rofcelinus and Abelard; while the other adhered to the principles of Ariftotle. Of thefe fects, the former are known in literary history by the name of the Nomi. nalifts; the latter by that of the Realifts.

As it is with the doctrine of the Nominalists that my own opinion on this fubject coincides; and as I propofe to deduce from it fome confequences, which appear to me important, I fhall endeavour to state it. as clearly and precisely as I am able, pursuing, however, rather the train of my own thoughts, than guided by the reasonings of any particular author.

I formerly explained in what manner the words,, which, in the infancy of language, were proper names, *See Note [H].

became

became gradually appellatives; in confequence of which extension of their fignification, they would exprefs, when applied to individuals, thofe qualities only which are common to the whole genus. Now, it is evident, that, with respect to individuals of the fame genus, there are two claffes of truths; the one, particular truths relating to each individual apart, and deduced from a confideration of its peculiar and distinguishing properties; the other, general truths, deduced from a confideration of their common qualities; and equally applicable to all of them. Such truths may be conveniently expreffed, by means of general terms; fo as to form propofitions, comprehending under them as many particular truths, as there are individuals comprehended under the general terms. It is farther evident, that there are two ways in which fuch general truths may be obtained; either by fixing the attention on one individual, in such a manner that our reafoning may involve no circumftances but thofe which are common to the whole genus; or, (laying afide entirely the confideration of things,) by means of the general terms with which language fupplies us. In either of these cafes, our investigations must neceffarily lead us to general conclufions. In the firft cafe; our attention being li mited to thofe circumftances, in which the fubject of our reasoning resembles all other individuals of the fame genus, whatever we demonftrate with refpect to this fubject must be true of every other to which the fame attributes belong. In the fecond cafe; the fubject of our reafoning being expreffed by a generic word, which applies in common to a number of in