In the very flight sketch which I have given of the controverfy between the Nominalists and the Realists about the existence of univerfals, I have taken no notice of an intermediate fect called Conceptualists; whose distinguishing tenet is faid to have been, that the mind has a power of forming general conceptions. From the indiftin&tnefs and inaccuracy of their language on the fubject, it is not a very easy matter to ascertain precisely what was their opinion on the point in question; but, on the whole, I am inclined to think, that it amounted to the two following propofitions: first, that we have no reason to believe the existence of any effences, or universal ideas, corresponding to general terms; and fecondly, that the mind has the power of reafoning concerning genera, or classes of individuals, without the mediation of language. Indeed, I cannot think of any other hypothefis which it is poffible to form on the subject, distinct

"Nominales, deferta paulo Abelardi hypothefi, universalia in "notionibus atque conceptibus mentis ex rebus fingularibus ab“stractione formatis confiftere ftatuebant, unde conceptuales dicti “funt.”—BRUCKER, vol. iii. p. 908. (Lipf. 1766.)

"Nominalium tres erant familiæ. Aliqui ut Rocelinus, univer"falia meras effe voces docuerunt. Alii iterum in folo intellectu “ posuerunt, atque meros animi conceptus effe autumarunt, quos "conceptuales aliqui vocant, et a nominalibus diftinguunt, quan

quam alii etiam confundant. Alii fuerunt, qui universalia quæ"fiverunt, non tam in vocibus, quam in fermonibus integris, quod "Joh. Sarifberienfis adfcribit Pet. Abelardo; quo quid intelligat "ille, mihi non fatis liquet."-MORHOF. Polyhiftor. Tom. Sec. lib. i. cap. xiii. § 2.

I have taken no notice of the laft clafs of Nominalifts here mentioned; as I find myfelf unable to comprehend their doctrine.

from those of the two celebrated fects already mentioned. In denying the existence of universals; we know that the Conceptualists agreed with the No. minalists. what, then, can we fuppofe that they differed from them, but about the neceffity of language as an inftrument of thought, in carrying on our general speculations?

With this fect of Conceptualifts, Dr. Reid is difposed to rank Mr. Locke; and I agree with him fo far as to think, that, if Locke had any decided opinion on the point in difpute, it did not differ materially from what I have endeavoured to express in the two general propofitions which I have just now stated. The apparent inconsistencies which occur in that part of his Effay in which the question is difcuffed, have, led fubfequent authors to represent his fentiments in different lights; but as thefe inconfiftencies plainly fhew, that he was neither fatisfied with the fyftem of the Realifts, nor with that of the Nominalists; they appear to me to demonftrate that he leaned to the intermediate hypothefis already mentioned, notwithstanding the inaccurate and paradoxical manner in which he has expressed it *.

May I take the liberty of adding, that Dr. Reid's own opinion feems to me alfo to coincide nearly with that of the Conceptualists; or, at least, to coincide with the two propofitions which I have already supposed to contain a fummary of their doctrine? The absurdity of the antient opinion concerning univerfals, as maintained both by Plato and Aristotle, he has exposed

* See Note [K].

standing the meaning of propofitions involving general terms. But the observations he has made (admitting them in their full extent) do not in the least affect the question about the neceffity of figns, to enable us to fpeculate about fuch propofitions. The vague use which metaphysical writers have made of the word conception, (of which I had occafion to take notice in a former chapter,) has contributed in part to embarrass this fubject. That we cannot conceive univerfals in a way at all analogous to that in which we conceive an absent object of sense, is granted on both fides. Why then should we employ the fame word conception, to express two operations of the mind which are effentially different? When we speak of conceiving or understanding a general propofition, we mean nothing more than that we have a conviction, (founded on our previous use of the words in which it is expreffed,) that we have it in our power, at pleasure, to substitute, instead of the general terms, fome one of the individuals comprehended under them. When we hear a propofition announced, of which the terms are not familiar to us; we naturally defire to have it exempli fied, or illuftrated, by means of fome particular instance; and when we are once fatisfied by fuch an application, that we have the interpretation of the propofition at all times in our power, we make no fcruple to say, that we conceive or understand its meaning; although we should not extend our views beyond the words in which it is announced, or even although no particular exemplification of it fhould occur to us at the moment. It is in this fenfe only, that the terms of any general propofition can poffibly be understood:

and

and therefore Dr. Reid's argument does not, in the leaft, invalidate the doctrine of the Nominalists, that, without the use of language, (under which term I comprehend every species of figns,) we should never have been able to extend our fpeculations beyond individuals.

That, in many cafes, we may safely employ in our reasonings, general terms, the meaning of which we are not even able to interpret in this way, and confequently, which are to us wholly infignificant, I had occafion already to demonstrate, in a former part of this fection.

SECTION IV.

Continuation of the fame Subject.-Inferences with respect to the Ufe of Language as an Inftrument of Thought, and the Errors in Reafoning to which it occafionally gives rife.

IN

N the last Section, I mentioned Dr. Campbell, as an ingenious defender of the fyftem of the Nominalists; and I alluded to a particular application which he has made of their doctrine. The reafonings which I had then in view, are to be found in the seventh chapter of the second book of his Philofophy of Rhe torick; in which chapter he proposes to explain how it happens," that nonsense so often escapes being detected, both by the writer and the reader." The title is fomewhat ludicrous in a grave philofophical work; but the difquifition to which it is prefixed, contains many acute and profound remarks

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on the nature and power of figns, both as a medium of communication, and as an inftrument of thought.

cr

Dr. Campbell's fpeculations with refpect to language as an inftrument of thought, feem to have been fuggefted by the following paffage in Mr. Hume's Treatife of Human Nature. "I believe, every one "who examines the fituation of his mind in reafoning, will agree with me, that we do not annex dif"tinct and complete ideas to every term we make use "of; and that in talking of Government, Church, "Negotiation, Conqueft, we feldom fpread out in our "minds all the fimple ideas of which thefe complex "ones are compofed. It is, however, obfervable, that

notwithstanding this imperfection, we may avoid "talking nonsense on thefe fubjects; and may per "ceive any repugnance among the ideas, as well as "if we had a full comprehenfion of them. Thus if, "inftead of faying, that, in war, the weaker have "always recourfe to negotiation, we should fay, that "they have always recourfe to conqueft; the custom "which we have acquired, of attributing certain "relations to ideas, ftill follows the words, and makes "us immediately perceive the abfurdity of that pro"pofition."

In the remarks which Dr. Campbell has made on this paffage, he has endeavoured to explain in what manner our habits of thinking and speaking, gradually establish in the mind fuch relations among the words we employ, as enable us to carry on proceffes of reafoning by means of them, without attending in every inftance to their particular fignification. With most

of