SECTION V.

of the Purposes to which the Powers of Abstraction and Generalisation are fubfervient.

T has been already fhewn, that, without the use of figns, all our knowledge must neceffarily have. been limited to individuals, and that we fhould have been perfectly incapable both of claffification and general reasoning. Some authors have maintained, that without the power of generalisation, (which I have endeavoured to fhew, means nothing more than the capacity of employing general terms,) it would have been impoffible for us to have carried on any fpecies of reafoning whatever. But I cannot help thinking that this opinion is erroneous; or, at least, that it is very imperfectly ftatel. The truth is, it appears to me to be juft in one sense of the word reasoning, but falfe in another; and I even fufpect it is falfe in that fenfe of the word in which it is most commonly employed. Before, therefore, it is laid down as a general propofition, the meaning we are to annex to this very vague and ambiguous term, fhould be ascertained with precifion.

It has been remarked by feveral writers, that the expectation which we feel of the continuance of the laws of nature, is not founded upon reafoning; and different theories have of late been propofed to account for its origin. Mr. Hume refolves it into the affociation of ideas. Dr. Reid, on the other hand,

maintains,

maintains, that it is an original principle of our conftitution, which does not admit of any explanation; and which, therefore, is to be ranked among those general and ultimate facts, beyond which, philofophy is unable to proceed *. Without this principle of expectation, it would be impoffible for us to accommodate our conduct to the established courfe of nature; and, accordingly, we find that it is a principle coeval with our very existence; and, in fome measure, common to man with the lower animals.

In inquiries of this nature, fo far removed from the common courfe of literary pursuits, it always gives me pleasure to remark a coincidence of opinion among different philofophers; particu larly among men of original genius, and who have been educated in different philofophical fyftems. The following paffage, in which M. de Condorcet gives an account of some of the metaphyfical opinions of the late Mr. Turgot, approaches very nearly to Dr. Reid's doctrines.

"La mémoire de nos fenfations, et la faculté que nous avons "de réfléchir fur ces fenfations paffées et de les combiner, font "le feul principe de nos connoiffances. La fuppofition qu'il "existe des loix conftantes auxquelles tous les phénomenes observés "font affujettis de maniere à reparoitre dans tous les temps, dans "toutes les circonftances, tels qu'ils font déterminés par ces loix, "eft le feul fondement de la certitude de ces connoiffances.

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"Nous avons la confcience d'avoir observé cette constance, et un "fentiment involontaire nous force de croire qu'elle continuera de "fubfifter. La probabilité qui en refulte, quelque grande qu'elle "foit, n'eft pas une certitude. Aucune relation néceffaire ne lie pour nous le paffé à l'avenir, ni la constance de ce que j'ai vu à "celle de ce que j'aurois continué d'obferver fi j'etois resté dans des "circonftances femblables; mais l'impreffion qui me porte à re"garder comme existant, comme réel ce qui m'a présenté ce carac"tere de conftance eft irréfiftible."-Vie de TURGOT, partie ii. p. 56. "Quand un François et un Anglois penfent de même, (fays "Voltaire,) il faut bien qu'ils aient raison.”

It is an obvious confequence of this doctrine, that, although philofophers be accustomed to ftate what are commonly called the laws of nature, in the form of general propofitions, it is by no means neceffary for the practical purposes of life, that we fhould exprefs them in this manner; or even that we fhould exprefs them in words at all. The philofopher, for example, may state it as a law of nature, that "fire fcorches;" or that "heavy bodies, when unfupported, fall downwards:" but, long before the use of artificial figns, and even before the dawn of reafon, a child learns to act upon both of these fuppofitions. In doing fo, it is influenced merely by the inftinctive principle which has now been mentioned, directed in its operation (as is the cafe with many other inftincts) by the experience of the individual. If man, therefore, had been deftined for no other purposes, than to acquire fuch an acquaintance with the courfe of nature, as is neceffary for the preservation of his animal existence; he might have fulfilled all the ends of his being without the ufe of language.

As we are enabled, by our inftinctive anticipation of phyfical events, to accommodate our conduct to what we forefee is to happen, fo we are enabled, in many cafes, to increase our power, by employing phyfical caufes as inftruments for the accomplishment of our purposes; nay, we can employ a feries of fuch causes, so as to accomplish very remote effects. We can employ the agency of air, to increase the heat of a furnace; the furnace, to render iron malleable ; and the iron to all the various purposes of the mecha

nical arts. Now, it appears to me, that all this may be conceived and done without the aid of language: and yet, affuredly, to difcover a feries of means fubfervient to a particular end; or, in other words, an effort of mechanical invention; implies, according to the common doctrines of philofophers, the exercise of our reafoning powers. In this fenfe, therefore, of the word reasoning, I am inclined to think, that it is not effentially connected with the faculty of generalisation, or with the use of figns.

It is fome confirmation of this conclufion, that favages, whofe minds are almoft wholly occupied with particulars, and who have neither inclination nor capacity for general fpeculations, are yet occafionally obferved to employ a long train of means for accomplishing a particular purpofe. Even fomething of this kind, but in a very inferior degree, may, I think, be remarked in the other animals; and that they do not carry it farther, is probably not the effect of their want of generalifation, but of the imperfection of fome of thofe faculties which are common to them with our fpecies; particularly of their powers of attention and recollection. The inftances which are commonly produced, to prove that they are not deftitute of the power of reafoning, are all examples of that fpecies of contrivance which has been mentioned; and are perfectly distinct from those intellectual proceffes to which the use of figns is effentially fubfervient *. Whether

* One of the beft attefted inftances which I have met with, of fagacity in the lower animals, is mentioned by M. Bailly, in his Lettre fur les Animaux, addressed to M. Le Roy.

"Un de mes amis, homme d'efprit et digne de confiance, m'a

raconté

Whether that particular species of mechanical contrivance which has now been mentioned, and which confifts merely in employing a series of phyfical causes to accomplish an effect which we cannot produce immediately, fhould or fhould not be dignified with the name of reasoning, I fhall not now inquire. It is fufficient for my prefent purpose to remark, that it is effentially different from thofe intellectual proceffes to which the use of figns is indifpenfably neceffary.

" raconté deux faits dont il a été témoin. Il avoit un finge très "intelligent; il s'amusoit à lui donner des noix dont l'animal étoit "très friand; mais il les plaçoit affez loin, pour que retenu par sa

chaîne, le finge ne pût pas les atteindre : après bien des efforts inutiles qui ne fervent qu'à préparer l'invention, le finge, voyant "paffer un domestique portant une serviette fous le bras, se saisit "de cette ferviette, et s'en fervit pour atteindre à la noix et « l'amener jusqu' à lui. La maniere de caffer la noix exigea une "nouvelle invention; il en vint à bout, en plaçant la noix à terre, faifant tomber de haut une pierre ou un caillou pour la "brifer. Vous voyez, Monfieur, que fans avoir connu, comme «Gallilée, les loix de la chûte des corps, le finge avoit bien "remarqué la force que ces corps acquierent par la chûte. Ce

en y

moyen cependant fe trouva en défaut. Un jour qu'il avoit plu, la terre étoit molle, la noix enfonçoit, et la pierre n'avoit plus ❝ d'action pour la brifer. Que fit le finge? Il alla chercher un « tuileau, plaça la noix deffus, et en laiffant tomber la pierre il "brifa la noix qui n'enfonçoit plus."-Difcours et memoires par Auteur de l' Hiftoire de l' Aftronomie. A Paris, 1790, tome ii. p. 126, Admitting these facts to be accurately ftated, they ftill leave an effential diftinction between man and brutes; for in none of the contrivances here mentioned, is there any thing analogous to thofe intellectual proceffes which lead the mind to general conclufions, and which (according to the foregoing doctrine) imply the use of general terms. Those powers, therefore, which enable us to claffify objects, and to employ figns as an inftrument of thought, are, as far as we can judge, peculiar to the human species.

At