At the fame time, I am ready to acknowledge, that what I have now faid, is not ftrictly applicable to thofe more complicated mechanical inventions, in which a variety of powers are made to conspire at once to produce a particular effect. Such contrivances, perhaps, may be found to involve proceffes of the mind which cannot be carried on without figns. But thefe queftions will fall more properly under our confideration when we enter on the fubject of reafoning.

In general, it may be remarked, that, in fo far as our thoughts relate merely to individual objects, or to individual events, which we have actually perceived, and of which we retain a diftinct remembrance *,

* I have thought it proper to add this limitation of the general propofition; because individual objects, and individual events, which have not fallen under the examination of our fenfes, cannot poffibly be made the subjects of our confideration, but by means of language. The manner in which we think of fuch objects and events, is accurately defcribed in the following paffage of Wollafton; however unphilofophical the conclufion may be which he deduces from his reafoning.

"

"A man is not known ever the more to pofterity, because his "name is transmitted to them; he doth not live, because his name does. When it is faid, Julius Cæfar fubdued Gaul, beat "Pompey, changed the Roman commonwealth into a monarchy, "&c. it is the fame thing as to fay the conqueror of Pompey was Cæfar; that is, Cæfar, and the conqueror of Pompey, are "the fame thing; and Cæfar is as much known by the one diftinc❝tion as the other. The amount then is only this: that the "conqueror of Pompey conquered Pompey; or fomebody con"quered Pompey; or rather, fince Pompey is as little known

now as Cæfar, fomebody conquered fomebody. Such a poor "bufinefs is this boafted immortality; and fuch, as has been "here defcribed, is the thing called glory among us!"

P

Religion of NAT. DEL. P. 117.

we

we are not under the neceffity of employing words. It frequently, however, happens, that when the fubjects of our confideration are particular, our reafon. ing with respect to them may involve very general notions; and, in such cases, although we may conceive, without the use of words, the things about which we reason, yet we must neceffarily have recourfe to language in carrying on our speculations concerning them. If the fubjects of our reasoning be general, (under which description I include all our reafonings, whether more or lefs comprehenfive, which do not relate merely to individuals,) words are the fole objects about which our thoughts are employed. According as these words are comprehenfive or limited in their fignification, the conclufions we form will be more or lefs general; but this accidental circumftance does not in the least affect the nature of the intellectual procefs; fo that it may be laid down as a propofition which holds without any exception, that, in every cafe in which we extend our fpecu lations beyond individuals, language is not only an useful auxiliary, but is the fole inftrument by which they are carried on.

These remarks naturally lead me to take notice of what forms the characteristical distinction between the fpeculations of the philofopher and of the vulgar. It is not, that the former is accustomed to carry on his proceffes of reasoning to a greater extent than the latter; but that the conclufions he is accustomed to form, are far more comprehenfive, in confequence of the habitual employment of more comprehensive

Among the most unenlightened of mankind, we often meet with individuals who poffefs the

reasoning

reafoning faculty in a very eminent degree; but as this faculty is employed merely about particulars, it never can conduct them to general truths; and, of confequence, whether their pursuits in life lead them to fpeculation or to action, it can only fit them for diftinguishing themselves in fome very limited and fubordinate sphere. The philofopher, whofe mind has been familiarifed by education, and by his own reflexions, to the correct ufe of more comprehensive terms, is enabled, without perhaps a greater degree of intellectual exertion than is neceffary for managing the details of ordinary business, to arrive at general theorems; which, when illustrated to the lower claffes of men, in their particular applications, seem to indicate a fertility of invention, little short of super

natural *.

The analogy of the algebraical art may be of use in illuftrating these observations. The difference, in fact, between the investigations we carry on by its affiftance, and other proceffes of reafoning, is more inconfiderable than is commonly imagined; and, if I am not mistaken, amounts only to this,

66

"General reafonings feem intricate, merely because they are "general; or is it eafy for the bulk of mankind to distinguish, in a great number of particulars, that common circumstance in "which they all agree, or to extract it, pure and unmixt, from "the other fuperfluous circumstances. Every judgment or "conclufion with them is particular. They cannot enlarge their "view to thofe univerfal propofitions, which comprehend under' "them an infinite number of individuals, and include a whole "fcience in a fingle theorem. Their eye is confounded with fuch an extenfive profpect; and the conclufions derived from it, even though clearly expreffed, feem intricate and obfcure." HUMI's Political Difcourfes

that the former are expreffed in an appropriated language, with which we are not accustomed to affociate particular notions. Hence they exhibit the efficacy of figns as an inftrument of thought in a more diftinct and palpable manner, than the fpeculations we carry on by words, which are continually awakening the power of Conception.

When the celebrated Vieta fhewed algebraifts that, by fubftituting in their investigations letters of the alphabet, instead of known quantities, they might render the folution of every problem fubfervient to the discovery of a general truth, he did not increase the difficulty of algebraical reasonings: he only enlarged the fignification of the terms of which they were expreffed. And if, in teaching that science, it is found expedient to accuftom ftudents to folve problems by means of the particular numbers which are given, before they are made acquainted with literal or fpecious arithmetic, it is not because the former proceffes are lefs intricate than the latter, but because their fcope and utility are more obvious, and because it is more easy to illuftrate, by examples than by words, the difference between a particular conclufion and a general theorem.

The difference between the intellectual proceffes of the vulgar and of the philofopher, is perfectly analogous to that between the two ftates of the algebraical art before and after the time of Vieta; the general terms which are ufed in the various sciences, giving to thofe who can employ them with correctnefs and dexterity, the fame fort of advan

tage

tage over the uncultivated fagacity of the bulk of mankind, which the expert algebraift poffeffes over the arithmetical accomptant.

If the foregoing doctrine be admitted as juft, it exhibits a view of the utility of language, which appears to me to be peculiarly ftriking and beautiful; as it fhews that the fame faculties which, without the use of figns, muft neceffarily have been limited to the confideration of individual objects and particular events, are, by means of figns, fitted to embrace, without effort, thofe comprehenfive theorems, to the discovery of which, in detail, the united efforts of the whole human race would have been unequal. The advantage our animal ftrength acquires by the use of mechanical engines, exhibits but a faint image of that increase of our intellectual capacity which we owe to language.-It is this increase of our natural powers of comprehenfion, which feems to be the principal foundation of the pleasure we receive from the difcovery of general theorems. Such a difcovery gives us at once the command of an infinite variety of particular truths, and communicates to the mind a fentiment of its own power, not unlike to what we feel when we contemplate the magnitude of those phyfical effects, of which we have acquired the command by our mechanical contrivances.

It may perhaps appear, at first, to be a farther confequence of the principles I have been endea vouring to establish, that the difficulty of philofophical discoveries is much less than is commonly imagined; but the truth is, it only follows from