ther to prepare us for the latter. Expert men," fays lord Bacon, "can execute and judge of par"ticulars one by one; but the general counfels,

and the plots, and the marshalling of affairs, "come best from thofe that are learned."

SECTION VIII.

Continuation of the fame Subje.-Ufe and Abufe of general Principles in Politics*.

THE foregoing remarks, on the dangers to be apprehended from a rash application of general principles, hold equally with refpect to most of the practical arts. Among thefe, however, there is one of far fuperior dignity to the reft; which, partly on

* The events which have happened fince the publication of the first edition of this Volume in 1792, might have enabled me to confirm many of the obfervations in this Section, by an appeal to facts ftill fresh in the recollection of my Readers; and, in one or two inftances, by flight verbal corrections, to guard againft the poffibility of uncandid misinterpretation: but, for various reasons, which it is unneceffary to state at prefent, I feel it to be a duty which I owe to myself, to fend the whole difcuffion again to the press in its original form. That the doctrine it inculcates is favourable to the good order and tranquillity of fociety, cannot be difputed; and, as far as I myself am perfonally interested, I have no wish to vitiate the record which it exhibits of my opinions.

On fome points which are touched upon very flightly here, I have explained myfelf more fully, in the fourth Section of my Biographical Account of Mr. SMITH, read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1793, and publifhed in the third Volume of their Tranfactions.-(Second Edition, 1802.)

account

account of its importance, and partly on account of fome peculiarities in its nature, feems to be entitled to a more particular confideration. The art I allude to, is that of Legiflation; an art which differs from all others in fome very effential respects, and to which, the reasonings in the last Section must be applied with many restrictions.

Before proceeding farther, it is neceffary for me to premise, that it is chiefly in compliance with common language and common prejudices, that I am fometimes led, in the following obfervations, to contrast theory with experience. In the proper

fense of the word Theory, it is fo far from ftanding in oppofition to Experience, that it implies a knowledge of principles, of which the moft extenfive experience alone could put us in poffeffion. Prior to the time of Lord Bacon, indeed, an acquaintance with facts was not confidered as effential to the formation of theories; and from these ages, has defcended to us, an indifcriminate prejudice against general principles, even in thofe cafes in which they have been fairly obtained in the way of induction.

But not to difpute about words: there are plainly two fets of political reafoners; one of which confider the actual inftitutions of mankind as the only fafe foundation for our conclufions, and think every plan of legiflation chimerical, which is not copied from one which has already been realifed; while the other apprehend that, in many cafes, we may reafon fafely a priori from the known principles of human nature, combined

with the particular circumftances of the times. The former are commonly understood as contending for experience in oppofition to theory; the latter are accused of trusting to theory unfupported by experience: but it ought to be remembered, that the political theorift, if he proceeds cautiously and philofophically, founds his conclufions ultimately on experience, no less than the political empiric; as the aftronomer, who predicts an eclipfe from his knowledge of the principles of the science, rests his expectation of the event, on facts which have been previously afcertained by obfervation, no lefs than if he inferred it, without any reasoning, from his knowledge of a cycle.

There is, indeed, a certain degree of practical skill which habits of bufinefs alone can give, and without which the most enlightened politician muft always appear to disadvantage when he attempts to carry his plans into execution. And as this skill is often (in confequence of the ambiguity of language) denoted by the word Experience; while it is feldom poffeffed by thofe men, who have most carefully ftudied the theory of legislation; it has been very generally concluded, that politics is merely a matter of routine. in which philofophy is rather an obftacle to fuccefs. The ftatefman who has been formed among official details, is compared to the practical engineer; the fpeculative legiflator, to the theoretical mechanician who has paffed his life among books and diagrams. In order to afcertain how far this opinion is juft, it may be of ufe to compare the art of legiflation with those practical applications of mecha

nical principles, by which the oppofers of political theories have fo often endeavoured to illuftrate their reasonings.

I. In the first place, then, it may be remarked, that the errors to which we are liable, in the use of general mechanical principles, are owing, in most instances, to the effect which habits of abftraction are apt to have, in withdrawing the attention from those applications of our knowledge, by which alone we can learn to correct the imperfections of theory. Such errors, therefore, are, in a peculiar degree, incident to men who have been led by natural tafte, or by early habits, to prefer the speculations of the closet, to the bustle of active life, and to the fatigue of minute and circumftantial obfervation.

In politics, too, one fpecies of principles is often mifapplied from an inattention to circumstances; those which are deduced from a few examples of particular governments, and which are occafionally quoted as univerfal political axioms, which every wife legiflator ought to affume as the ground-work of his reasonings. But this abuse of general principles fhould by no means be ascribed, like the abfurdities of the fpeculative mechanician, to overrefinement, and the love of theory; for it arifes from weakneffes, which philofophy alone can remedy; an unenlightened veneration for maxims which are supposed to have the fanction of time in their favour, and a paffive acquiefcence in received opinions.

There is another clafs of principles, from which political conclufions have fometimes been deduced;

and

and which, notwithstanding the common prejudice against them, are a much furer foundation for our reasonings: I allude, at present, to those principles which we obtain from an examination of the human constitution, and of the general laws which regulate the course of human affairs; principles, which are certanly the refult of a much more extenfive induction, than any of the inferences that can be drawn from the history of actual establishments.

In applying, indeed, fuch principles to practice, it is neceffary (as well as in mechanics) to pay attention to the peculiarities of the cafe; but it is by no means neceffary to pay the fame fcrupulous attention to minute circumstances, which is effential in the mechanical arts, or in the management of private bufiness. There is even a danger of dwelling too much on details, and of rendering the mind incapable of those abstract and comprehenfive views of human affairs, which can alone furnish the statesman with fixed and certain maxims for the regulation of his conduct. "When a man (fays Mr. Hume) de"liberates concerning his conduct in any particular "affair, and forms schemes in politics, trade, œconomy, "or any business in life, he never ought to draw his "arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of "confequences together. Something is fure to hap 66 pen, that will difconcert his reafoning, and produce "an event different from what he expected. But "when we reafon upon general fubjects, one may

justly affirm, that our fpeculations can fcarce ever "be too fine, provided they are juft; and that the "difference betwixt a common man and a man of

"genius,