"the history of these nations had been entirely re❝ verfed."

From these principles, it would seem to be a neceffary confequence, that, in proportion as the circumstances shall operate which I have been endeavouring to illustrate, the whole fyftem of human affairs, including both the domeftic order of society in particular states, and the relations which exist among different communities, in confequence of war and negotiation, will be fubjected to the influence of caufes which are "known and determinate." Those domeftic affairs, which, according to Mr. Hume, are already proper fubjects of reafoning and obfervation, in confequence of their dependence on general interefts and paffions, will become fo, more and more, daily, as prejudices fhall decline, and knowledge fhall be diffused among the lower orders: while the relations among different ftates, which have depended hitherto, in a great measure, on the "whim, folly, and ca"price," of fingle perfons, will be gradually more and more regulated by the general interefts of the individuals who compofe them, and by the popular opinions of more enlightened times. Already, during the very fhort interval which has elapfed fince the publication of Mr. Hume's writings, an astonishing change has taken place in Europe. The myfteries of courts have been laid open; the influence of fecret negotiation on the relative fituation of ftates has declined; and the ftudies of thofe men whofe public fpirit or ambition devotes them to the fervice of their country, have been diverted from the intrigues of cabinets, and the details of the diplomatic code, to the liberal and manly pursuits of political philofophy.!!!

CHAPTER FIFTH.

Of the Affociation of Ideas.

THE fubject HE subject on which I am now to enter, naturally divides itself into two Parts. The First, relates to the influence of Affociation, in regulating the fucceffion of our thoughts; the Second, to its influence on the intellectual powers, and on the moral character, by the more intimate and indiffoluble combinations which it leads us to form in infancy and in early youth. The two inquiries, indeed, run into each other; but it will contribute much to the order of our fpeculations, to keep the foregoing arrangement in view.

PART FIRST.

Of the Influence of Affociation in regulating the Succeffion of our Thoughts.

SECTION I.

General Obfervations on this Part of our Conflitution, and on the Language of Philofophers with refped to it.

THAT

AT one thought is often fuggefted to the mind by another; and that the fight of an external object often recalls former occurrences, and revives former feelings, are facts which are perfectly familiar,

even to those who are the leaft difpofed to fpeculate concerning the principles of their nature. In paffing along a road which we have formerly travelled in the company of a friend, the particulars of the converfation in which we were then engaged, are frequently fuggefted to us by the objects we meet with. In fuch a scene, we recollect that a particular subject was ftarted; and, in paffing the different houses, and plantations, and rivers, the arguments we were difcuffing when we last saw them, recur fpontaneously to the memory. The connexion which is formed in the mind between the words of a language and the ideas they denote; the connexion which is formed between the different words of a difcourfe we have committed to memory; the connexion between the different notes of a piece of music in the mind of the musician, are all obvious inftances of the fame general law of our

nature.

The influence of perceptible objects in reviving former thoughts and former feelings, is more particularly remarkable. After time has, in fome degree, reconciled us to the death of a friend, how wonderfully are we affected the first time we enter the house where he lived! Every thing we fee; the apartment where he studied; the chair upon which he fat, recal to us the happiness we have enjoyed together; and we fhould feel it a fort of violation of that refpect we owe to his memory, to engage in any light or indifferent difcourfe when fuch objects are before us. In the cafe, too, of thofe remarkable fcenes which intereft the curiofity, from the memorable perfons or tranfactions which we have been accustomed to connect with them

279 in the course of our ftudies, the fancy is more awakened by the actual perception of the scene itself, than by the mere conception or imagination of it. Hence the pleasure we enjoy in vifiting claffical ground; in beholding the retreats which infpired the genius of our favourite authors, or the fields which have been dignified by exertions of heroic virtue. How feeble are the emotions produced by the livelieft conception of modern Italy, to what the poet felt, when, amidst the ruins of Rome,

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"He drew th' inspiring breath of antient arts,

-And trod the facred walks

"Where, at each step, imagination burns*!"

The well-known effect of a particular tune on Swiss regiments when at a distance from home, furnishes a very striking illuftration of the peculiar power of a perception, or of an impreffion on the fenfes, to awaken afsociated thoughts and feelings and numberlefs facts of a fimilar nature must have occurred to every person of moderate fenfibility, in the course of his own experience.

"Whilft we were at dinner," (fays Captain King,)" in this miferable hut, on the banks of the "river Awatska; the guests of a people with whose "existence we had before been fcarce acquainted, and "at the extremity of the habitable globe; a folitary, "half-worn pewter fpoon, whofe fhape was familiar

to us, attracted our attention; and, on examina"tion, we found it ftamped on the back with the

"Quacunque ingredimur," (fays Cicero, fpeaking of Athens,) "in aliquam hiftoriam veftigium ponimus." T4

"" word

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"word London. I cannot pafs over this circumftance "in filence, out of gratitude for the many pleasant thoughts, the anxious hopes, and tender remem"brances, it excited in us. Those who have expe"rienced the effects that long abfence, and extreme "distance from their native country, produce on the mind, will readily conceive the pleasure fuch a trifling incident can give."

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The difference between the effect of a perception and an idea, in awakening affociated thoughts and feelings, is finely defcribed in the introduction to the fifth book De finibus.

"We agreed," (fays Cicero,) "that we should "take our afternoon's walk in the academy, as at "that time of the day it was a place where there was "no refort of company. Accordingly, at the hour

appointed, we went to Pifo's. We paffed the time "in converfing on different matters during our fhort "walk from the double gate, till we came to the "academy, that juftly celebrated fpot; which, as we "wished, we found a perfect folitude." "I know not," (faid Pifo,)" whether it be a natural feeling, or an "illufion of the imagination founded on habit, that "we are more powerfully affected by the fight of "those places which have been much frequented by "illuftrious men, than when we either liften to the "recital, or read the detail, of their great actions. "At this moment, I feel ftrongly that emotion which "I fpeak of. I fee before me, the perfect form of "Plato, who was wont to difpute in this very place: "these gardens not only recal him to iny memory, "but present his very person to my fenfes. I fancy