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to myself, that here ftood Speufippus; there Xeno"crates, and here, on this bench, fat his difciple Po"lemo. To me, our antient fenate-house seems peo"pled with the like vifionary forms; for, often, when "I enter it, the fhades of Scipio, of Cato, and of . Lælius, and, in particular, of my venerable grandfather, rife to my imagination. In fhort, fuch is "the effect of local fituation in recalling affociated "ideas to the mind, that it is not without reason, some "philofophers have founded on this principle a species "of artificial memory.'

This influence of perceptible objects, in awakening affociated thoughts and affociated feelings, seems to arife, in a great meafure, from their permanent operation as exciting or fuggefting causes. When a train of thought takes its rife from an idea or conception, the first idea foon disappears, and a series of others fucceeds, which are gradually lefs and lefs related to that with which the train commenced; but, in the cafe of perception, the exciting caufe remains fteadily before us; and all the thoughts and feelings which have any relation to it, crowd into the mind in rapid fucceffion; ftrengthening each other's effects, and all confpiring in the fame general impreffion.

I already obferved, that the connexions which exist among our thoughts, have been long familiarly known to the vulgar, as well as to philofophers. It is, indeed, only of late, that we have been poffeffed of an appropriated phrase to exprefs them; but that the general fact is not a recent difcovery, may be inferred from many of the common maxims of pru. dence and of propriety, which have plainly been fug.

gefted

gefted by an attention to this part of our conftitution. When we lay it down, for example, as a general rule, to avoid in converfation all expreffions, and all topics of discourse, which have any relation, however remote, to ideas of an unpleasant nature, we plainly proceed on the fuppofition that there are certain connexions among our thoughts, which have an influence over the order of their fucceffion. It is unneceffary to remark, how much of the comfort and good-humour of focial life depends on an attention to this confideration. Such attentions are more particularly effential in our intercourfe with men of the world; for the commerce of fociety has a wonderful effect in increasing the quickness and the facility with which we afsociate all ideas which have any reference to life and manners; and, of confequence, it must render the fenfibility alive to many circumstances which, from the remotenefs of their relation to the fituation and hiftory of the parties, would otherwise have paffed unnoticed.

When an idea, however, is thus fuggefted by affociation, it produces a flighter impreffion, or, at least, it produces its impreffion more gradually, than if it were presented more directly and immediately to the

*The fuperiority which the man of the world poffeffes over the recluse student, in his knowledge of mankind, is partly the result of this quickness and facility of affociation. Thofe trifling cir cumftances in converfation and behaviour, which, to the latter, convey only their most obvious and avowed meaning, lay open to the former, many of the trains of thought which are connected with them, and frequently give him a distinct view of a character, on that very fide where it is fuppofed to be moft concealed from his obfervation.

mind. And hence, when we are under a neceflity of communicating any difagreeable information to another, delicacy leads us, inftead of mentioning the thing itself, to mention fomething else from which our meaning may be understood. In this manner, we prepare our hearers for the unwelcome intelligence.

The distinction between grofs and delicate flattery, is founded upon the fame principle. As nothing is more offensive than flattery which is direct and pointed, praise is confidered as happy and elegant, in proportion to the flightness of the affociations by which it is conveyed.

To this tendency which one thought has to introduce another, philofophers have given the name of the Affociation of Ideas; and, as I would not wish, excepting in a cafe of neceffity, to depart from common language, or to expofe myself to the charge of delivering old doctrines in a new form, I fhall continue to make use of the fame expreffion. I am fenfible, indeed, that the expreffion is by no means unexceptionable; and that, if it be ufed (as it frequently has been) to comprehend thofe laws by which the fuc. ceffion of all our thoughts and of all our mental operations is regulated, the word idea must be understood in a fenfe much more extenfive than it is commonly employed in. It is very juftly remarked by Dr. Reid, that "memory, judgment, reasoning, paffions, affec"tions, and purposes; in a word, every operation of "the mind, excepting thofe of fenfe, is excited oc"cafionally in the train of our thoughts: fo that, if "we make the train of our thoughts to be only a "train of ideas, the word idea must be understood

"to denote all thefe operations." In continuing, therefore, to employ, upon this fubject, that language, which has been confecrated by the practice of our best philofophical writers in England, I would not be understood to difpute the advantages which might be derived from the introduction of a new phrase, more precise and more applicable to the fact.

The ingenious author whom I laft quoted, feems to think that the affociation of ideas has no claim to be confidered as an original principle, or as an ultimate fact in our nature. "I believe," (fays he,)" that the "original principles of the mind, of which we can cc give no account, but that fuch is our constitution, 66 are more in number than is commonly thought. "But we ought not to multiply them without neceffity. That trains of thinking, which by frequent "repetition have become familiar, fhould spontaneously "offer themselves to our fancy, feems to require no "other original quality but the power of habit."

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With this obfervation I cannot agree; because I think it more philofophical to refolve the power of habit into the affociation of ideas, than to refolve the affociation of ideas into habit.

The word habit, in the sense in which it is commonly employed, expreffes that facility which the mind acquires, in all its exertions, both animal and intellectual, in confequence of practice. We apply it to the dexterity of the workman; to the extemporary fluency of the orator; to the rapidity of the arithmetical accountant. That this facility is the effect of practice, we know from experience to be a fact: but

it does not seem to be an ultimate fact, nor incapable of analyfis.

In the Effay on Attention, I fhewed that the effects of practice are produced partly on the body, and partly on the mind. The mufcles which we employ in mechanical operations, become ftronger, and become more obedient to the will. This is a fact, of which it is probable that philofophy will never be able to give any explanation.

But even in mechanical operations, the effects of practice are produced partly on the mind; and, as far as this is the cafe, they are resolvable into what philofophers call, the affociation of ideas; or into that general fact, which Dr. Reid himself has stated, "that "trains of thinking, which, by frequent repetition, "have become familiar, fpontaneously offer themselves "to the mind." In the cafe of habits which are purely intellectual, the effects of practice refolve themselves completely into this principle: and it appears to me more precife and more fatisfactory, to ftate the principle itself as a law of our conftitution, than to flur it over under the concife appellation of habit, which we apply in common to mind and to body.

The tendency in the human mind to affociate or connect its thoughts together, is fometimes called (but very improperly) the imagination. Between thefe two parts of our conftitution, there is indeed a very intimate relation; and it is probably owing to this relation, that they have been fo generally confounded under the fame name. When the mind is occupied about abfent objects of fenfe, (which, I believe, it is habitually in the great majority of man.