exception to the foregoing obfervation; for although
every such process, the first time we form it, implies
volition; and, in particular, implies a recollection of
the premises, till we arrive at the conclusion; yet
when a number of truths have been often presented to
us as neceffarily connected with each other, this feries
may afterwards pafs through the mind, according to
the laws of affociation, without any more activity on
our part, than in those trains of thought which are the
most loose and incoherent. Nor is this mere theory. I
may venture to appeal to the consciousness of every
man accustomed to dream, whether his reasonings. A
during fleep do not seem to be carried on without any
exertion of his will; and with a degree of facility, of
which he was never confcious while awake. Mr.
Addison, in one of his Spectators, has made this ob-
fervation; and his teftimony, in the present inftance, is
of the greater weight, that he had no particular theory
on the fubject to fupport. "There is not," (fays he,)
"a more painful action of the mind than invention,
"yet in dreams, it works with that eafe and activity,
"that we are not fenfible when the faculty is employ-
"ed. For inftance, I believe every one, fome time or
"other, dreams that he is reading papers, books,
"or letters; in which cafe the invention prompts
"fo readily, that the mind is impofed on, and
"mistakes its own fuggeftions for the compofition of

"another *."

2. If the influence of the will during fleep be fufpended, the mind will remain as paffive, while its thoughts change from one fubject to another, as it does

during our waking ours, while different perceptible objects are prefented to our fenfes.

Of this paffive state of the mind in our dreams, it is unneceffary to multiply proofs; as it has always been confidered as one of the moft extraordinary circumstances with which they are accompanied. If our dreams, as well as our waking thoughts, were fubje&t to the will, is it not natural to conclude, that in the one cafe, as well as in the other, we would endeavour to banifh, as much as we could, every idea which had a tendency to disturb us; and detain those only which we found to be agreeable? So far, however, is this power over our thoughts from being exercised, that we are frequently oppreffed, in fpite of all our efforts to the contrary, with dreams which affect us with the most painful emotions. And, indeed, it is matter of vulgar remark, that our dreams are, in every cafe, involuntary on our part; and that they appear to be obtruded on us by fome external caufe. This fact appeared fo unaccountable to the late Mr. Baxter, that it gave rise to his very whimsical theory, in which he afcribes dreams to the immediate influence of separate spirits on the mind.

3. If the influence of the will be fufpended during fleep, the conceptions which we then form of fenfible objects, will be attended with a belief of their real exiftence, as much as the perception of the fame objects

is while we are awake.

In treating of the power of Conception, I formerly obferved, that our belief of the feparate and indepen dent existence of the objects of our perceptions, is the refult of experience; which teaches us that these per

ceptions

ceptions do not depend on our will. If I open my eyes, I cannot prevent myself from seeing the prospect before me. The cafe is different with refpect to our conceptions. While they occupy the mind, to the exclusion of every thing else, I endeavoured to fhew, that they are always accompanied with belief; but as we can banish them from the mind, during our waking hours, at pleasure; and as the momentary belief which they produce, is continually checked by the furrounding objects of our perceptions, we learn to confider them as fictions of our own creation; and, excepting in fome accidental cafes, pay no regard to them in the conduct of life. If the doctrine, however, formerly stated with respect to conception be juft, and if, at the fame time, it be allowed, that fleep fufpends the influence of the will over the train of our thoughts, we should naturally be led to expect, that the fame belief which accompanies perception while we are awake, fhould accompany the conceptions which occur to us in our dreams. It is fcarcely neceffary for me to remark, how ftrikingly this conclufion coincides with acknowledged facts.

May it not be confidered as fome confirmation of the foregoing doctrine, that when opium fails in producing complete fleep, it commonly produces one of the effects of fleep, by fufpending the activity of the mind, and throwing it into a reverie; and that while we are in this state, our conceptions frequently affect us nearly in the fame manner, as if the objects conceived were present to our senses * ?

* See the Baron de Torr's Account of the Opium-takers at Conftantinople.

Another circumftance with refpect to our concep tions during fleep, deferves our notice. As the fubjects which we then think upon, occupy the mind exclu fively; and as the attention is not diverted by the ob jects of our external fenfes, our conceptions must be proportionably lively and fteady. Every perfon knows how faint the conception is which we form of any thing, with our eyes open, in comparison of what we can form with our eyes fhut: and that in proportion as we can fufpend the exercife of all our other senses, the liveliness of our conception increases. To this cause is to be afcribed, in part, the effect which the dread of fpirits in the dark, has on fome perfons, who are fully convinced in fpeculation, that their apprehen. fions are groundless; and to this alfo is owing, the effect of any accidental perception in giving them a momentary relief from their terrors, medy which nature points out to us, ourselves overpowered by imagination. If every thing around us be filent, we endeavour to create a noise, by fpeaking aloud, or beating with our feet; that is, we strive to divert the attention from the subjects of our imagination, by prefenting an object to our powers of perception. The conclufion which I draw from these obfervations is, that, as there is no state of the body in which our perceptive powers are fo totally unemployed as in fleep, it is natural to think, that the objects which we conceive or imagine, must then make an impreffion on the mind, beyond comparifon greater, than any thing of which we can have experience while awake.

Hence the re, when we find

From

From these principles may be derived a fimple, and, I think, a fatisfactory explanation of what fome writers have reprefented as the moft myfterious of all the circumstances connected with dreaming; the inaccurate efti mates we are apt to form of Time, while we are thus employed; an inaccuracy which fometimes extends fo far, as to give to a fingle inftant, the appearance of hours, or perhaps of days. A fudden noife, for example, fuggests a dream connected with that percep. tion; and, the moment afterwards, this noife has the effect of awaking us; and yet, during that momentary interval, a long feries of circumftances has paffed before the imagination. The story quoted by Mr. Addifon from the Turkish Tales, of the miracle wrought by a Mahometan Doctor, to convince an infidel Sultan, is, in fuch cafes, nearly verified.

The facts I allude to at prefent are generally ex plained by supposing, that, in our dreams, the rapidity of thought is greater than while we are awake:-but there is no neceffity for having recourfe to fuch a fuppofition. The rapidity of thought is, at all times, fuch, that in the twinkling of an eye, a crowd of ideas may pass before us, to which it would require a long discourse to give utterance; and tranfactions may conceived, which it would require days to realize. But, in fleep, the conceptions of the mind are mis taken for realities; and therefore, our estimates of Time will be formed, not according to our experi, ence of the rapidity of thought, but according to our experience of the time requifite for realizing what

* SPECTATOR, N° 94.

be