"other defires." The only thing that appears to me exceptionable in the foregoing paffage is, that the author claffes the defire of power with that of wealth; whereas I apprehend it to be clear, (for reafons which I fhall state in another part of this work,) that the former is a primary defire, and the latter a fecondary

one.

Our moral judgments, too, may be modified, and even perverted, to a certain degree, in confequence of the operation of the fame principle. In the fame manner in which a perfon who is regarded as a model of taste may introduce, by his example, an absurd or fantastical drefs; fo a man of fplendid virtues may attract fome efteem alfo to his imperfections; and, if placed in a confpicuous fituation, may render his vices and follies objects of general imitation among the multitude.

"In the reign of Charles II.," fays Mr. Smith "a degree of licentioufnefs was deemed the charac"teristic of a liberal education. It was connected, "according to the notions of thofe times, with gene"rofity, fincerity, magnanimity, loyalty; and proved "that the person who acted in this manner, was a "gentleman, and not a puritan. Severity of mancc ners, and regularity of conduct, on the other hand, were altogether unfashionable, and were connected, "in the imagination of that age, with cant, cunning, hypocrify, and low manners. To fuperficial minds, "the vices of the great feem at all times agreeable. They connect them, not only with the splendor of

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fortune, but with many fuperior virtues which they

*Theory of Moral Sentiments.

4

"afcribe

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"ascribe to their fuperiors; with the spirit of free"dom and independency; with franknefs, generosity, humanity, and politenefs. The virtues of the in"ferior ranks of people, on the contrary, their par"fimonious frugality, their painful industry, and rigid "adherence to rules, feem to them mean and disa66 greeable. They connect them both with the mean"nefs of the station to which thefe qualities com"monly belong, and with many great vices which they suppose usually accompany them; fuch as "an abject, cowardly, ill-natured, lying, pilfering difpofition."

The theory which, in the foregoing paffages from Hutchefon and Smith, is employed so justly and philofophically to explain the origin of our fecondary defires, and to account for fome perverfions of our moral judgments, has been thought fufficient, by fome later writers, to account for the origin of all our active principles without exception. The first of these attempts to extend fo very far the application of the doctrine of Affociation was made by the Reverend Mr. Gay, in a differtation" concerning the fun"damental Principle of Virtue," which is prefixed by Dr. Law to his tranflation of Archbishop King's Effay" on the Origin of Evil." In this differtation, the author endeavours to fhew, "that our approba"tion of morality, and all affections whatsoever, are "finally refolvable into reafon, pointing out private

happiness, and are converfant only about things ap"prehended to be means tending to this end; and "that wherever this end is not perceived, they are to "be accounted for from the affociation of ideas, and

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may properly be called habits." The fame principles have been fince pushed to a much greater length by Dr. Hartley, whofe fyftem (as he himself informs us) took rife from his accidentally hearing it mentioned as an opinion of Mr. Gay, "that the affocia❝tion of ideas was fufficient to account for all our "intellectual pleasures and pains *.

It must, I think, in justice, be acknowledged, that this theory, concerning the origin of our affections, and of the moral sense, is a most ingenious refinement upon the selfish fyftem, as it was formerly taught; and that, by means of it, the force of many of the common reasonings against that fyftem is eluded. Among these reafonings, particular ftrefs has always been laid on the inftantaneoufness with which our affections operate, and the moral fenfe approves or condemns; and on our total want of confciousness, in fuch cafes, of any reference to our own happiness. The modern advocates for the felfifh fyftem admit the fact to be as it is ftated by their opponents; and grant, that after the moral fenfe and our various affections are formed, their exercife, in particular cafes, may become completely difinterested; but still they contend, that it is upon a regard to our own happiness that all these principles are originally grafted.

Mr. Hume too, who in my opinion has carried this principle of the Affociation of Ideas a great deal too far, has compared the univerfality of its applications in the philofophy of mind, to that of the principle of attraction in phyfics. "Here," fays he, " is a

kind of attraction, which in the mental world will be found to "have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to fhew itself "in as many and as various forms." Treat. of Hum. Nat. vol. i. P. 30.

The

The analogy of avarice will ferve to illuftrate the scope of this theory. It cannot be doubted that this principle of action is artificial. It is on account of the enjoyments which it enables us to purchase, that money is originally defired; and yet, in procefs of time, by means of the agreeable impreffions which are affociated with it, it comes to be defired for its own fake; and even continues to be an object of our pur. fuit, long after we have loft all relish for those enjoyments which it enables us to command.

Without meaning to engage in any controverfy on the subject, I fhall content myself with obferving, in general, that there must be some limit, beyond which the theory of affociation cannot poffibly be carried; for the explanation which it gives, of the formation of new principles of action, proceeds on the fuppofition that there are other principles previously existing in the mind. The great question then is, when we are arrived at this limit; or, in other words, when we are arrived at the fimple and original laws of our conftitution.

In conducting this enquiry, philofophers have been apt to go into extremes. Lord Kaims, and fome other authors, have been cenfured, and perhaps justly, for a difpofition to multiply original principles to an unneceffary degree. It may be questioned, whe ther Dr. Hartley, and his followers, have not fometimes been misled by too eager a defire of abridging

their number.

Of these two errors, the former is the least common, and the least dangerous. It is the least common, because it is not fo flattering as the other to the vanity of a theorift; and it is the leaft dangerous, becaufe

Cc4

cause it has no tendency, like the other, to give rise to a fuppreffion, or to a misrepresentation of facts; or to retard the progress of the science, by bestowing upon it an appearance of fyftematical perfection, to which, in its present state, it is not entitled.

Abstracting, however, from these inconveniences, which must always refult from a precipitate reference of phenomena to general principles, it does not feem to me, that the theory in question has any tendency to weaken the foundation of morals. It has, indeed, fome tendency, in common with the philosophy of Hobbes and of Mandeville, to degrade the dignity of human nature; but it leads to no fceptical conclufions concerning the rule of life. For, although we were to grant, that all our principles of action are acquired; so striking a difference among them must still be admitted, as is fufficient to diftinguish clearly those univerfal laws which were intended to regulate human conduct, from the local habits which are formed by education and fashion. It must still be admitted, that while fome active principles are confined to particular individuals, or to particular tribes of men; there are others, which, arising from circumstances in which all the fituations of mankind muft agree, are common to the whole fpecies. Such active principles as fall under this laft defcription, at whatever period of life they may appear, are to be regarded as a part of human nature, no less than the instinct of fuction; in the fame manner as the acquired perception of distance by the eye, is to be ranked among the perceptive powers of man, no less than the original perceptions of any of our other fenfes.

Leaving,