ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND. INTRODUCTION. PART FIRST. Of the Nature and Object of the Philofophy of the Human Mind. THE prejudice which is commonly entertained against metaphyfical fpeculations, feems to arise chiefly from two causes: First, from an apprehension that the subjects about which they are employed, are placed beyond the reach of the human faculties; and, fecondly, from a belief that these subjects have no relation to the business of life. The frivolous and abfurd difcuffions which abound in the writings of moft Metaphyfical authors, afford but too many arguments in justification of these opinions; and if fuch difcuffions were to be admitted as a fair specimen of what the human mind is able to accomplish in this department of science, the contempt, into which it has fallen of late, might with justice be regarded, B regarded, as no inconfiderable evidence of the progrefs which true philofophy has made in the prefent age. Among the various fubjects of inquiry, however,. which, in confequence of the vague ufe of language, are comprehended under the general title of Metaphyfics, there are fome, which are effentially distinguished from the reft, both by the degree of evidence which accompanies their principles, and by the relation which they bear to the useful sciences and arts: and it has unfortunately happened, that these have shared in that general difcredit, into which the other branches of metaphyfics have justly fallen. To this circumstance is probably to be afcribed, the little progrefs which has hitherto been made in the PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND; a fcience, fo interefting in its nature, and so important in its applications, that it could fcarcely have failed, in these inquifitive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general attention, if it had not accidentally been claffed, in the public opinion, with the vain and unprofitable difquifitions of the fchool-men. In order to obviate these misapprehenfions with refpect to the subject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, firft, to explain the Nature of the truths which I propofe to inveftigate; and, fecondly, to point out fome of the more important Applications of which they are fufceptible. In ftating thefe preliminary obfervations, I may perhaps appear to fome to be minute and tedious; but this fault, I am confident, will be readily pardoned by thofe, who have studied with care the principles of that fcience of which I am to treat; and who are anxious to to remove the prejudices which have, in a great meafure, excluded it from the modern fyftems of education. In the progrefs of my work, I flatter myself that I fhall not often have occafion to folicit the indulgence of my readers, for an unneceffary diffuseness. The notions we annex to the words, Matter, and Mind, as is well remarked by Dr. Reid *, are merely relative. If I am asked, what I mean by Matter? I can only explain myfelf by faying, it is that which is extended, figured, coloured, moveable, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold;-that is, I can define it in no other way, than by enumerating its fenfible qualities. It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by my fenfes; but only extenfion, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to fomething, which is extended, figured, and coloured. The cafe is precisely fimilar with respect to Mind. We are not immediately confcious of its existence, but we are conscious of fensation, thought, and volition; operations, which imply the existence of fomething which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man too is impreffed with an irresistible conviction, that all these fenfations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the fame being; to that being, which he calls himself; a being, which he is led, by the conftitution of his nature, to confider as fomething diftinct from his body, and as not liable to be impaired by the lofs or mutilation of any of his organs. From these confiderations, it appears, that we have the fame evidence for the existence of mind, that we Effays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 8, have have for the existence of body; nay, if there be any difference between the two cafes, that we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch as the one is fuggefted to us by the fubjects of our own consciousness, and the other merely by the objects of our perceptions: and in this light, undoubtedly, the fact would appear to every person, were it not, that, from our earliest years, the attention is engroffed with the qualities and laws of matter, an acquaintance with which is abfolutely neceffary for the preservation of our animal existence. Hence it is, that these phenomena occupy our thoughts more than those of mind; that we are perpetually tempted to explain the latter by the analogy of the former, and even to endeavour to refer them to the fame general laws; and that we acquire habits of inattention to the subjects of our consciousness, too ftrong to be afterwards furmounted, without the most persevering industry. If the foregoing obfervations be well founded, they establish the diftinction between mind and matter, without any long process of metaphyfical reasoning *: for if our notions of both are merely relative; if we know the one, only by fuch fenfible qualities as extenfion, figure, and folidity; and the other, by fuch operations as fenfation, thought, and volition; we are certainly entitled to fay, that matter and mind, confidered as objects of human study, are effentially different; the science of the former refting ultimately on the phenomena exhibited to our fenfes ; that of the latter, on the phenomena of which we are confcious. Inftead, therefore, of objecting to the scheme of mate * See Note [A], at the end of the volume. rialism, It rialism, that its conclufions are false, it would be more accurate to say, that its aim is unphilofophical. proceeds on a misapprehenfion of the proper object of fcience; the difficulty which it profeffes to remove being manifeftly placed beyond the reach of our faculties. Surely, when we attempt to explain the nature of that principle which feels and thinks and wills, by faying, that it is a material fubftance, or that it is the refult of material organization, we impose on ourselves by words; forgetting, that matter as well as mind is known to us by its qualities and attributes alone, and that we are totally ignorant of the effence of either *. As all our knowledge of the material world is derived from the information of our fenfes, Natural philofophers have, in modern times, wifely abandoned to Metaphyficians, all fpeculations concerning the nature of that substance of which it is compofed; concerning the poffibility or impoffibility of its being created; concerning the efficient causes of the changes which take place in it; and even concerning the reality of its existence, independent of that of percipient beings: and have confined themselves to the humbler province of observing the phenomena it exhibits, and of afcer * Some Metaphyficians, who appear to admit the truth of the foregoing reafoning, have farther urged, that for any thing we can prove to the contrary, it is poffible, that the unknown fubftance which has the qualities of extenfion, figure, and colour, may be the fame with the unknown substance which has the attributes of feeling, thinking, and willing. But befides that this is only an hypothefis, which amounts to nothing more than a mere poffibility, even if it were true, it would no more be proper to say of mind, that it is material, than to say of body, that it is fpiritual. B 3 taining |