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founded,) are, in my opinion, indifpenfably neceffary, in order to prepare the way for thofe very general and comprehenfive theories concerning it, which some eminent writers of the prefent age have been ambitious to form?

Concerning the merit of these theories, I fhall not presume to give any judgment. I fhall only remark, that, in all the other sciences, the progress of difcovery has been gradual, from the lefs general to the more general laws of nature; and that it would be fingular, indeed, if, in the Philofophy of the Human Mind, a fcience, which but a few years ago was confeffedly in its infancy, and which certainly labours under many disadvantages peculiar to itself, a step fhould, all at once, be made to a fingle principle comprehending all the particular phenomena which we know.

Suppofing fuch a theory to be completely established, it would still be proper to lead the minds of ftudents to it by gradual steps. One of the moft im. portant uses of theory, is to give the memory a permanent hold, and a prompt command, of the particular facts which we were previously acquainted with; and no theory can be completely understood, unless the mind be led to it nearly in the order of inveftigation.

It is more particularly useful, in conducting the ftudies of others, to familiarife their minds, as completely as poffible, with thofe laws of nature for which we have the direct evidence of fenfe, or of consciousness, before directing their inquiries to the more abstruse and refined generalizations of fpecula

tive curiofity. In natural philofophy, fuppofing the theory of Bofcovich to be true, it would still be proper, or rather indeed absolutely neceffary, to accuftom students, in the first stage of their phyfical education, to dwell on those general physical facts which fall under our actual obfervation, and about which all the practical arts of life are converfant. In like manner, in the philofophy of mind, there are many general facts for which we have the direct evidence of consciousness. The words, Attention, Concep. tion, Memory, Abstraction, Imagination, Curiofity, Ambition, Compaffion, Refentment, express powers and principles of our nature, which every man may ftudy by reflecting on his own internal operations. Words correfponding to thefe, are to be found in all languages, and may be confidered as forming the first attempt towards a philofophical claffification of intellectual and moral phenomena. Such a claffification, however imperfect and indiftin&t, we may be affured, must have fome foundation in nature; and it is at leaft prudent, for a philofopher to keep it in view as the ground-work of his own arrangement. It not only directs our attention to thofe facts in the human con. stitution, on which every folid theory in this branch of science muft be founded; but to the facts, which, in all ages, have appeared, to the common sense of mankind, to be the most striking and im. portant; and of which it ought to be the great object of theorists, not to fuperfede, but to facilitate the study.

There is indeed good reason for believing, that many of the facts which our consciousness would lead us to

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confider, upon a superficial view, as ultimate facts are refolvable into other principles ftill more general.

Long before we are capable of reflection,” (says Dr. Reid,) "the original perceptions and notions of the "mind are fo mixed, compounded, and decompound“ed, by habits, associations, and abstractions, that it "is extremely difficult for the mind to return upon "its own footsteps, and trace back thofe operations "which have employed it fince it first began to think "and to act." The fame author remarks, that, "if "we could obtain a diftinct and full history of all that "hath paffed in the mind of a child, from the begin"ning of life and fenfation, till it grows up to the use "of reafon; how its infant faculties began to work, and "how they brought forth and ripened all the various "notions, opinions, and fentiments, which we find in "ourselves when we come to be capable of reflection; "this would be a treasure of Natural Hiftory, which "would probably give more light into the human "faculties, than all the fyftems of philofophers about "them, fince the beginning of the world." To ac complish an analysis of thefe complicated phenomena into the fimple and original principles of our conftitution, is the great object of this branch of philosophy; but, in order to fucceed, it is neceffary to afcertain facts before we begin to reason, and to avoid generalizing, in any inftance, till we have completely fecured the ground that we have gained. Such a caution, which is neceffary in all the sciences, is, in a more peculiar manner, necessary here, where the very facts from which all our inferences must be drawn, are to be afcertained only by the most patient attention; and,

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where almost all of them are, to a great degree, difguised; partly by the inaccuracies of popular language, and partly by the mistaken theories of philofophers.

I have only to add, that, although I have retained the phrase of the Affociation of Ideas, in compliance with common language, I am far from being completely fatisfied with this mode of expreffion. I have retained it, chiefly that I might not expofe myself to the cenfure of delivering old doctrines in a new form.

As I have endeavoured to employ it with caution, I hope that it has not often misled me in my reasonings. At the fame time, I am more and more convinced of the advantages to be derived from a reformation of the common language, in most of the branches of fcience. How much fuch a reformation has effected in Chemistry is well known; and it is evidently much more neceffary in the Philofophy of Mind, where the prevailing language adds to the common inaccuracies of popular expreffions, the peculiar disadvantage of being all fuggested by the analogy of matter. Often, in the compofition of this work, have I recollected the advice of Bergman to Morveau: "In reforming the "nomenclature of chemistry, fpare no word which "is improper. They who understand the subject already, will fuffer no inconvenience; and they

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* "Le favant Profeffeur d'Upfal, M. Bergman, écrivoit à M. "de Morveau dans les derniers temps de fa vie, ne faites graces ❝ à aucune denomination impropre. Ceux qui favent déja enten"dront toujours; ceux qui ne favent pas encore entendront "plutôt." Methode de Nomenclat. Chèmique, par MM. MORVEAU, LAVOISIER, &c.

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"to whom the fubject is new, will comprehend "it with the greater facility." But it belongs to fuch authors alone, as have extended the boundaries of science by their own discoveries, to introduce innovations in language with any hopes of success.

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