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"difcerning what it has in common with them, and "wherein their disparity consists: and, therefore, our 'knowledge is vaftly greater than the fum of what "all its objects feparately could afford; and when a

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new object comes within our reach, the addition to "our knowledge is the greater, the more we already "know; fo that it increases, not as the new objects "increase, but in a much higher proportion."

5. In the last place, the natural powers of Memory are, in the cafe of the philofopher, greatly aided by his peculiar habits of claffification and ar rangement. As this is by far the most important im provement of which Memory is fufceptible, I fhall confider it more particularly than any of the others I have mentioned.

The advantages which the memory derives from a proper claffification of our ideas, may be best conceived by attending to its effects in enabling us to conduct, with ease, the common business of life. In what in. extricable confufion would the lawyer or the merchant be immediately involved, if he were to depofit, in his cabinet, promifcuoufly, the various written documents which daily and hourly pafs through his hands? Nor could this confufion be prevented by the natural powers of memory, however vigorous they might hap pen to be. By a proper diftribution of thefe documents, and a judicious reference of them to a few ge neral titles, a very ordinary memory is enabled to accomplish more, than the most retentive, unaffifted by method. We know, with certainty, where to find any article we may have occafion for, if it be in our pof. feffion; and the fearch is confined within reasonable

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limits, instead of being allowed to wander at random amidst a chaos of particulars.

Or, to take an instance still more immediately applicable to our purpose: fuppofe that a man of letters were to record, in a common-place book, without any method, all the various ideas and facts which occurred to him in the course of his ftudies; what difficulties would he perpetually experience in applying his acquifitions to use? and how completely and eafily might thefe difficulties be obviated by referring the particulars of his information to certain general heads? It is obvious, too, that, by doing fo, he would not only have his knowledge much more completely under his command, but as the particulars claffed together would all have fome connexion, more or lefs, with each other, he would be enabled to trace, with advantage, those mutual relations among his ideas, which it is the object of philofophy to ascertain.

A common-place book, conducted without any method, is an exact picture of the memory of a man whose inquiries are not directed by philofophy. And the advantages of order in treasuring up our ideas in the mind, are perfectly analogous to its effects when they are recorded in writing.

Nor is this all. In order to retain our knowledge distinctly and permanently, it is neceffary that we fhould frequently recal it to our recollection. But how can this be done without the aid of arrangement? Or fuppofing that it were poffible, how much time and labour would be neceffary for bringing under our review the various particulars of which our information is compofed? In proportion as it is properly systematised,

this time and labour are abridged. The mind dwells habitually, not on detached facts, but on a comparatively small number of general principles; and, by means of these, it can fummon up, as occafions may require, an infinite number of particulars affociated with them; each of which, confidered as a folitary truth, would have been as burthenfome to the memory, as the general principle with which it is connected.

I would not wish it to be understood from these obfervations, that philofophy confifts in claffification alone; and that its only use is to affift the memory. I have often, indeed, heard this afferted in general terms; but it appears to me to be obvious, that although this be one of its most important uses, yet fome. thing more is neceffary to complete the definition of it. Were the case otherwise, it would follow, that all claffifications are equally philofophical, provided they are equally comprehenfive. The very great importance of this fubject will, I hope, be a fufficient apology for me, in taking this opportunity to correct some mistaken opinions which have been formed concerning it.

SECTION IV.

Continuation of the fame Subje&.-Aid which the Memory derives from Philofophical Arrangement.

IT

T was before observed, that the great use of the faculty of Memory, is to enable us to treasure up, for the future regulation of our conduct, the refults of our past experience, and of our past reflexions. But in every

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cafe in which we judge of the future from the paft, we must proceed on the belief, that there is, in the course of events, a certain degree, at least, of uniformity. And, accordingly, this belief is not only justified by experience, but (as Dr. Reid has fhewn, in a very fatisfactory manner) it forms a part of the original conftitution of the human mind. In the general laws of the material world, this uniformity is found to be complete; infomuch that, in the fame combinations of circumstances, we expect, with the moft perfect affurance, that the fame refults will take place. In the moral world, the course of events does not appear to be equally regular; but still it is regular, to fo great a degree, as to afford us many rules of importance in the conduct of life.

A knowledge of Nature, in fo far as it is abfolutely neceffary for the prefervation of our animal existence, is obtruded on us, without any reflexion on our part, from our earliest infancy. It is thus that children learn of themfeves to accommodate their conduct to the established laws of the material world. In doing fo, they are guided merely by memory, and the inftinctive principle of anticipation, which has just been mentioned.

In forming conclufions concerning future events, the philofopher, as well as the infant, can only build with fafety on paft experience; and he, too, as well as the infant, proceeds on an instinctive belief, for which he is unable to account, of the uniformity of the laws of There are, however, two important refpects, which diftinguish the knowledge he poffeffes from that of ordinary men. In the first place, it is far more extenfive,

extensive, in confequence of the affiftance which fcience gives to his natural powers of invention and discovery. Secondly, it is not only more easily retained in the memory, and more conveniently applied to use, in confequence of the manner in which his ideas are arranged; but it enables him to ascertain, by a process of reafon. ing, all those truths which may be fynthetically deduced from his general principles. The illuftration of these particulars will lead to fome useful remarks; and will at the fame time fhew, that, in difcuffing the fubject of this Section, I have not loft fight of the inquiry which occafioned it.

I. 1. It was already remarked, that the natural powers of Memory, together with that inftinctive anticipation of the future from the paft, which forms one of the original principles of the mind, are fufficient to enable infants, after a very fhort experience, to preferve their animal exiftence. The laws of nature, which it is not fo important for us to know, and which are the objects of philofophical curiofity, are not fo obviously exposed to our view, but are, in general, brought to light by means of experiments which are made for the purpose of discovery; or, in other words, by artificial combinations of circumstances, which we have no opportunity of feeing conjoined in the course of our ordinary experience. In this manner, it is evident, that many connexions may be afcertained, which would never have occurred fpontaneously to our obfervation.

2. There are, too, fome inftances, particularly in the cafe of the aftronomical phenomena, in which events, that appear to common obfervers to be alto

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