few men to be found, among those who have received the advantages of a liberal education, who do not retain, through life, that admiration of the heroic ages of Greece and Rome, with which the claffical authors once inspired them. It is, in truth, a fortunate prepoffeffion, on the whole, and one, of which I should be forry to counteract the influence. But are there not others of equal importance to morality and to happiness, with which the mind might, at the fame period of life, be infpired? If the first conceptions, for example, which an infant formed of the Deity, and its first moral perceptions, were affociated with the early impreffions produced on the heart by the beauties of nature, or the charms of poetical defcrip. tion, those serious thoughts which are reforted to, by most men, merely as a fource of confolation in adverfity; and which, on that very account, are frequently tinctured with fome degree of gloom, would recur fpontaneoufly to the mind, in its beft and happiest hours; and would infenfibly blend themselves with all its pureft and most refined enjoyments.

In those parts of Europe, where the prevailing opinions involve the greatest variety of errors and corrup tions, it is, I believe, a common idea with many respectable and enlightened men, that, in every country, it is most prudent to conduct the religious instruction of youth upon the plan which is prescribed by the national establishment; in order that the pupil, according to the vigour or feebleness of his mind, may either shake off, in future life, the prejudices of the nursery, or die in the popular perfuafion. This idea, I own, appears to me to be equally ill-founded and dangerous.

If religious opinions have, as will not be difputed, a powerful influence on the happiness, and on the conduct of mankind, does not humanity require of us, to refcue as many victims as poffible from the hands of bigotry; and to fave them from the cruel alternative, of remaining under the gloom of a depreffing fuperftition, or of being distracted by a perpetual conflict between the heart and the understanding?It is an enlightened education alone, that, in most countries of Europe, can fave the young philofopher from that anxiety and defpondence, which every man of fenfibility, who, in his childhood, has imbibed the popular opinions, must neceffarily experience, when he first begins to examine their foundation; and, what is of ftill greater importance, which can fave him, during life, from that occafional fcepticism, to which all men are liable, whose systems fluctuate with the inequalities of their spirits, and the variations of the atmofphere.

I fhall conclude this fubject with remarking, that, although in all moral and religious fyftems, there is a great mixture of important truth; and although it is, in confequence of this alliance, that errors and abfurdities are enabled to preferve their hold of the belief, yet it is commonly found, that, in proportion as an established creed is complicated in its dogmas and in its ceremonies, and in proportion to the number of acceffory ideas which it has grafted upon the truth, the more difficult is it, for thofe who have adopted it in childhood, to emancipate themselves completely from its influence; and, in those cafes in which they at last fucceed, the greater is their danger of abandoning, along with their errors, all the truths which they had

been

been taught to connect with them. The Roman ca-zima tholic system is fhaken off with much greater difficulty, than those which are taught in the reformed churches; but when it loses its hold of the mind, it much more frequently prepares the way for unlimited fcepticism. The causes of this I may perhaps have an opportunity of pointing out, in treating of the affociation of ideas.

I have now finished all that I think neceffary to offer, at present, on the application of the philofophy of mind to the fubject of education. To fome readers, I am afraid, that what I have advanced on the subject, will appear to. to.border upon enthusiasm; and I will not attempt to justify myself against the charge. I am well aware of the tendency, which speculative men fometimes have, to magnify the effects of education, as well as to entertain too fanguine views of the improvement of the world; and I am ready to acknowledge, that there are instances of individuals, whose vigour of mind is fufficient to overcome every thing that is pernicious in their early habits: but I am fully perfuaded, that these inftances are rare; and that, by far the greater part of mankind continue, through life, to pursue the fame track into which they have been thrown, by the accidental circumftances of fituation, inftruction, and example.

PART SECOND.

SECTION II.

Continuation of the fame Subject.

HE remarks which have been hitherto made, on the utility of the philosophy of the human mind, are of a very general nature, and apply equally to all descriptions of men. Befides, however, these more obvious advantages of the ftudy, there are others, which, though lefs ftriking, and lefs extenfive in their application, are nevertheless, to fome particular claffes of individuals, of the highest importance. Without pretending to exhaust the fubject, I fhall offer a few detached observations upon it, in this section.

I already took notice, in general terms, of the common relation which all the different branches of our knowledge bear to the philofophy of the human mind. In confequence of this relation, it not only forms an interesting object of curiofity to literary men of every denomination; but, if fuccefsfully profecuted, it can. not fail to furnish ufeful lights for directing their inquiries; whatever the nature of the fubjects may be, which happen to engage their attention.

In order to be fatisfied of the juftness of this obfervation, it is fufficient to recollect, that to the philofophy of the mind are to be referred, all our inquiries concerning the divifions and the claffifications of the objects of human knowledge; and alfo, all the various rules, both for the investigation, and the com

munication,

munication, of truth. These general views of science, and these general rules of method, ought to form the fubjects of a rational and ufeful logic; a ftudy, undoubtedly, in itself of the greatest importance and dignity, but in which lefs progrefs has hitherto been made than is commonly imagined.

I fhall endeavour to illuftrate, very briefly, a few of the advantages which might be expected to refult from fuch a system of logic, if properly executed.

I. And, in the first place, it is evident that it would be of the highest importance in all the fciences, (in fome of them, indeed, much more than in others,) to exhibit a precise and steady idea of the objects which they prefent to our inquiry.- -What was the principal circumstance which contributed to mislead the ancients, in their physical researches? Was it not their confused and wavering notions about the particular class of truths, which it was their business to investigate? It was owing to this, that they were led to neglect the obvious phenomena and laws of moving bodies; and to indulge themselves in conjectures about the efficient causes of motion, and the nature of those minds, by which they conceived the particles of matter to be animated; and that they fo often blended the history of facts, with their metaphysical speculations. In the present state of science, indeed, we are not liable to fuch mistakes in natural philosophy; but it would be difficult to mention any other branch of knowledge, which is entirely exempted from them. In metaphyfics, I might almoft say, they are at the bottom of all our controverfies. In the celebrated difpute, for example, which has been fo long carried

on,