plaufible hint that occurs to us! Hardly a day paffes, when many fuch do not occur to ourselves, or are fuggested by others and detached and infulated, as they may appear at prefent, fome of them may perhaps afterwards, at the diftance of years, furnish the key-stone of an important fyftem.

But it is not only in this point of view that the philofopher derives advantage from the practice of writing. Without its affiftance, he could feldom be able to advance beyond thofe fimple elementary truths which are current in the world, and which form, in the various branches of science, the established creed of the age he lives in. How inconfiderable would have been the progrefs of mathematicians, in their more abftrufe fpeculations, without the aid of the algebraical notation; and to what fublime difcoveries have they been led by this beautiful contrivance, which, by relieving the memory of the effort necef. fary for recollecting the fteps of a long investigation, has enabled them to profecute an infinite variety of inquiries, to which the unaffifted powers of the human mind would have been altogether unequal! In the other sciences, it is true, we have feldom or never occafion to follow out fuch long chains of confequences as in mathematics; but in thefe fciences, if the chain of investigation be fhorter, it is far more difficult to make the tranfition from one link to another; and it is only by dwelling long on our ideas, and rendering them perfectly familiar to us, that fuch transitions can, in most instances, be made with fafety. In morals and politics, when we advance a step beyond those elementary truths which are daily prefented

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fented to us in books or converfation, there is no method of rendering our conclufions familiar to us, but by committing them to writing, and making them frequently the fubjects of our meditation. When we have once done fo, thefe conclufions become elementary truths with refpect to us; and we may advance from them with confidence to others which are more remote, and which are far beyond the reach of vulgar difcovery. By following fuch a plan, we can hardly fail to have our industry rewarded in due time by fome important im. provement; and it is only by fuch a plan that we can reasonably hope to extend confiderably the boun. daries of human knowledge. I do not fay that these habits of study are equally favourable to brilliancy of converfation. On the contrary, I believe that thofe men who poffefs this accomplishment in the highest degree, are fuch as do not advance beyond elementary truths; or rather, perhaps, who advance only a fingle step beyond them; that is, who think a little more deeply than the vulgar, but whose conclufions are not fo far removed from common opinions, as to render it neceffary for them, when called upon to defend them, to exhauft the patience of their hearers, by stating a long train of intermediate ideas. They who have pushed their inquiries much farther than the common systems of their times, and have ren. dered familiar to their own minds the intermediate steps by which they have been led to their conclu. fions, are too apt to conceive other men to be in the fame fituation with themselves; and when they mean to inftruct, are mortified to find that they are only G g regarded

regarded as paradoxical and vifionary. It is but rarely we find a man of very fplendid and various converfation to be poffeffed of a profound judgment, or of great originality of genius.

Nor is it merely to the philofopher, who wishes to diftinguish himself by his discoveries, that writing affords an useful inftrument of study. Important affiftance may be derived from it by all those who wish to imprefs on their minds the investigations which occur to them in the course of their reading; for although writing may weaken (as I already acknowledged it does) a memory for detached obfervations, or for infulated facts, it will be found the only effectual method of fixing in it permanently, thofe acquifitions which involve long processes of reasoning.

When we are employed in inquiries of our own, the conclufions which we form make a much deeper and more lafting impression on the memory, than any knowledge which we imbibe passively from another. This is undoubtedly owing, in part, to the effect which the ardour of discovery has, in roufing the activity of the mind, and in fixing its attention; but I apprehend it is chiefly to be ascribed to this, that when we follow out a train of thinking of our own, our ideas are arranged in that order which is most agreeable to our prevailing habits of affociation. The only method of putting our acquired knowledge on a level, in this refpect, with our original speculations, is, after making. ourfelves acquainted with our author's ideas, to study the subject over again in our own way; to paufe, from time to time, in the course of our reading, in order to confider what we have gained; to recollect what the

propo

451 propofitions are, which the author wishes to establish, and to examine the different proofs which he employs to fupport them. In making fuch an experiment, we commonly find, that the different fteps of the procefs arrange themselves in our minds, in a manner different from that in which the author has ftated them; and that, while his argument feems, in fome places, obfcure, from its contifenefs; it is tedious in others, from being unneceffarily expanded. When we have reduced the reasoning to that form, which appears to ourselves to be the most natural and fatisfactory, we may conclude with certainty, not that this form is better in itself than another, but that it is the best adapted to our memory. Such reasonings, therefore, as we have occafion frequently to apply, either in the bufinefs of life, or in the courfe of our ftudies, it is of importance to us to commit to writing, in a language and in an order of our own; and if, at any time, we find it neceffary to refresh our recollection on the fubject, to have recourse to our own compofition, in preference to that of any other author.

That the plan of reading which is commonly followed is very different from that which I have been recommending, will not be difputed. Moft people read merely to pass an idle hour, or to please them. felves with the idea of employment, while their indolence prevents them from any active exertion; and a confiderable number with a view to the difplay which they are afterwards to make of their literary acquifitions. From whichfoever of these motives a person is led to the perufal of books, it is hardly poffible that he can derive from them any material advantage. If he

reads merely from indolence, the ideas which pass through his mind will probably leave little or no impreffion; and if he reads from vanity, he will be more anxious to select striking particulars in the matter or expreffion, than to feize the spirit and scope of the author's reasoning, or to examine how far he has made any additions to the stock of useful and folid knowledge.

Though it is fcarce poffible," fays Dr. Butler*, "to "avoid judging, in fome way or other, of almost every thing which offers itself to one's thoughts, yet it is "certain, that many persons, from different causes,

never exercise their judgment upon what comes be"fore them, in fuch a manner as to be able to deter"mine how far it be conclufive. They are perhaps "entertained with fome things, not fo with others; they like, and they diflike; but whether that which "is proposed to be made out, be really made out or 66 not; whether a matter be stated according to the "real truth of the cafe, feems, to the generality of "people, a circumftance of little or no importance. "Arguments are often wanted for fome accidental pur

pofe; but proof, as fuch, is what they never want, "for their own fatisfaction of mind, or conduct in "life. Not to mention the multitudes who read mere"ly for the fake of talking, or to qualify themfelves "for the world, or fome fuch kind of reafons; there "are even of the few who read for their own enter"tainment, and have a real curiofity to see what is "faid, feveral, which is aftonishing, who have no fort "of curiofity to fee what is true: I fay curiofity, be

* See the Preface to his Sermons.

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