on, about the explanation given by the ideal theory of the phenomena of perception, the whole difficulty arofe from this, that philofophers had no precife notion of the point they wished to ascertain; and now, that the controverfy has been brought to a conclufion, (as I think all men of candour must confess it to have been by Dr. Reid,) it will be found, that his doctrine on the fubject throws no light whatever, on what was generally understood to be the great object of inquiry; I mean, on the mode of communication between the mind and the material world: and, in truth, amounts only to a precife defcription of the fact, ftripped of all hypothefis, and stated in such a manner as to give us a diftinct view of the infurmountable limits which nature has in this inftance prescribed to our curiosity. The fame obfervation may be made, on the reafonings of this profound and original author, with respect to fome metaphyfical queftions that had been started on the fubject of vifion; in particular, concerning the cause of our feeing objects fingle with two eyes, and our feeing objects erect, by means of inverted images on the retina.

If we were to examine, in like manner, the prefent state of morals, of jurifprudence, of politics, and of philofophical criticifm; I believe, we fhould find, that the principal circumftance which retards their progrefs, is the vague and indistinct idea, which those who apply to the ftudy of them have formed to themfelves of the objects of their researches. Were these objects once clearly defined, and the proper plan of inquiry for attaining them illuftrated by a few unexceptionable models, writers of inferior genius would

be

be enabled to employ their industry to much more advantage; and would be prevented from adding to that rubbish, which, in confequence of the ill-directed ingenuity of our predeceffors, obftructs our progress in the pursuit of truth.

As a philofophical fyftem of logic would affift us in our particular scientific investigations, by keeping steadily in our view the attainable objects of human curiofity; fo, by exhibiting to us the relation in which they all stand to each other, and the relation which they all bear to what ought to be their common aim, the advancement of human happiness, it would have a tendency to confine industry and genius to inquiries which are of real practical utility; and would communicate a dignity to the most fubordinate pursuits, which are in any respect fubfervient to fo important a purpose. When our views are limited to one particular science, to which we have been led to devote ourfelves by taste or by accident, the course of our studies resembles the progress of a traveller through an un. explored country; whofe wanderings, from place to place, are determined merely by the impulfe of occafional curiofity; and whofe opportunities of information must neceffarily be limited to the objects which accidentally present themselves to his notice. It is the philofophy of the mind alone, which, by furnishing us with a general map of the field of human knowledge, can enable us to proceed with steadiness, and in an useful direction; and while it gratifies our curiofity, and animates our exertions, by exhibiting to us all the various bearings of our journey, can conduct us to those eminences from whence the eye may wander

over

over the vast and unexplored regions of fcience. Lord Bacon was the first person who took this comprehenfive view of the different departments of study; and who pointed out, to all the claffes of literary men, the great end to which their labours fhould confpire; the multiplication of the fources of human enjoyment, and the extenfion of man's dominion over nature. this object been kept fteadily in view by his followers, their discoveries, numerous and important as they have been, would have advanced with ftill greater rapidity, and would have had a much more extensive influence on the practical arts of life *.

Had

From such a system of logic, too, important assistance might be expected, for reforming the established plan of public or academical education. It is melancholy to reflect on the manner in which this is carried on, in most, perhaps, I might fay, in all the countries of Europe; and that, in an age of comparative light and liberality, the intellectual and moral characters of youth fhould continue to be formed on a plan devised by men who were not only strangers to the business of the world, but who felt themselves interested in oppofing the progress of useful knowledge..

* Omnium autem graviffimus error in deviatione ab ultimo doctrinarum fine confiftit. Appetunt enim homines fcientiam, alii ex infitâ curiofitate et irrequietà; alii animi caufâ et delectationis, alii exiftimationis gratiâ; alii contentionis ergo, atque ut in differendo fuperiores fint: plerique propter lucrum et victum : paucissimi, ut donum rationis, divinitus datum, in ufus humani generis impendant. -Hoc enim illud eft, quod revera doctrinam atque artes condecoraret, et attolleret, fi contemplatio, et actio, arctiore quam adhuc vinculo copularentur. De Aug. Scient. lib. i.

For

For accomplishing a reformation in the plan of academical study, on rational and fyftematical principles, it is neceffary, in the first place, to confider the relation in which the different branches of literature, and the different arts and fciences, ftand to each other, and to the practical purposes of life: and fecondly, to confider them in relation to the human mind, in order to determine the arrangement, beft fitted for unfolding and maturing its faculties. Many valuable hints towards such a work may be collected from Lord Bacon's writings.

II. Another very important branch of a rational fyftem of logic (as I had occafion already to obferve) ought to be; to lay down the rules of investigation which it is proper to follow in the different fciences. In all of these, the faculties of the understanding are the inftruments with which we operate; and without a previous knowledge of their nature, it is impoffible to employ them to the best advantage. In every exercise of our reafoning and of our inventive powers, there are general laws which regulate the progress of the mind; and when once these laws are ascertained, they enable us to fpeculate and to invent, for the future, with more system, and with a greater certainty of fuccefs. In the mechanical arts, it is well known, how much time and ingenuity are misapplied, by those who acquire their practical skill, by their own trials, undirected by the precepts or example of others. What we call the rules of an art, are merely a collection of general observations, fuggested by long experience, with respect to the most compendious and effectual means of performing every different step of the

proceffes which the art involves. In confequence of fuch rules, the artist is enabled to command the same fuccefs in all his operations, for which the unskilled workman must trust to a happy combination of accidental circumstances; the mifapplications, too, of the labour of one race are faved to the next; and the acquifition of practical address is facilitated, by confining its exertions to one direction.-The analogy is perfect, in those processes which are purely intellectual; and to regulate which, is the great object of logic. In the case of individuals, who have no other guide to direct them in their inquiries than their own natural fagacity, much time and ingenuity must inevitably be thrown away, in every exertion of the inventive

powers. In proportion, however, to the degree of their experience and obfervation, the number of these mifapplications will diminish; and the power of invention will be enabled to proceed with more certainty and steadiness to its object. The misfortune is, that as the aids, which the understanding derives from experience, are feldom recorded in writing, or even described in words, every fucceeding inquirer finds himfelf, at the commencement of his philofophical purfuits, obliged to ftruggle with the fame difadvantages which had retarded the progrefs of his predeceffors. If the more important practical rules, which habits of investigation fuggeft to individuals, were diligently preserved, each generation would be placed in circumstances more favourable to invention than the preceding; and the progrefs of knowledge, instead of cramping original genius, would affift and direct its exertions. In the infancy of literature, indeed, its range

may