his inquiries, although, perhaps, he may not be at the trouble to ftate them to himself in words; and it would plainly have faved him much expence of time and thought, befide enabling him to conduct his researches on a more regular plan, if he had been taught them systematically at the commencement of his studies. The more varied, abftrufe, and general investigations of the moderns, ftand in need, in a much greater degree, of the guidance of philofophical principles; not only for enabling us to conduct, with fkill, our particular researches, but for directing us to the different methods of reasoning, to which we ought to have recourfe on different occafions. A collection of fuch rules would form, what might be called with propriety, the logic of mathematics; and would probably contribute greatly to the advancement of all those branches of knowledge, to which mathematical learning is fubfervient.

The obfervations which have been now made, on the importance of method in conducting phyfical and mathematical researches, particularly those which relate to the last of these fubjects, will not apply literally to our inquiries in metaphysics, morals, or politics; because, in these fciences, our reafonings always confift of a comparatively fmall number of intermediate steps; and the obstacles which retard our progress, do not, as in mathematics, arife from the difficulty of finding media of comparison among our ideas. Not, that these obstacles are lefs real, or more eafily furmounted on the contrary, it seems to require a still rarer combination of talents to furmount them; for how fmall is the number of individuals, who are

qualified

qualified to think justly on methaphyfical, moral, or political subjects; in comparison of those, who may be trained by practice to follow the longest proceffes of mathematical reasoning. From what these obstacles arife, I fhall not inquire particularly at prefent. Some of the more important of them may be referred to the imperfections of language; to the difficulty of annexing precise and steady ideas to our words; to the dif ficulty, in fome cafes, of conceiving the fubjects of our reafoning; and, in others, of difcovering, and keeping in view, all the various circumstances upon which our judgment ought to proceed; and above all, to the prejudices which early impreffions and affociations create, to warp our opinions. To illuftrate these sources of error, in the different fciences which are liable to be affected by them, and to point out the most effectual means for guarding against them, would form another very interesting article, in a philosophical system of logic.

The method of communicating to others, the principles of the different fciences, has been as much neglected by the writers on logic, as the rules of investigation and discovery; and yet, there is certainly no undertaking whatever, in which their affiftance is more indifpenfably requifite. The first principles of all the sciences are intimately connected with the philofophy of the human mind; and it is the province of the logician, to state these in fuch a manner, as to lay a folid foundation for the fuperftructures which others are to rear. It is in stating such principles, accordingly, that elementary writers are chiefly apt to fail. How unfatisfactory, for example, are the introductory chapters

chapters in most systems of natural philosophy; not in confequence of any defect of physical or of mathematical knowledge in their authors, but in confequence of a want of attention to the laws of human thought, and to the general rules of just reasoning! The fame remark may be extended to the form, in which the elementary principles of many of the other sciences are commonly exhibited; and, if I am not mistaken, this want of order, among the first ideas which they prefent to the mind, is a more powerful obftacle to the progrefs of knowledge, than is generally imagined.

I shall only observe farther, with respect to the utility of the philofophy of mind, that as there are some arts, in which we not only employ the intellectual fa culties as inftruments, but operate on the mind as a fubject; fo, to those individuals who aim at excellence in fuch pursuits, the ftudies I have now been recommending are, in a more peculiar manner, interesting and important. In poetry, in painting, in eloquence, and in all the other fine arts, our fuccefs depends on the skill with which we are able to adapt the efforts of our genius to the human frame; and it is only on a philofophical analysis of the mind, that a folid foundation can be laid for their farther improvement. Man, too, is the fubject on which the practical moralist and the enlightened statesman have to operate. Of the former, it is the profeffed object to engage the attention of individuals to their own beft intereft and to allure them to virtue and happiness, by every confideration that can influence the understanding, the imagination, or the heart. To the latter is affigned the fublimer office of feconding the benevolent inten

59 tions of Providence in the administration of human affairs; to diffufe as widely and equally as poffible, among his fellow-citizens, the advantages of the social union; and, by a careful ftudy of the conftitution of man, and of the circumstances in which he is placed, to modify the political order, in fuch a manner as may allow free scope and operation to those principles of intellectual and moral improvement, which nature has implanted in our fpecies.

In all these cases, I am very fenfible, that the utility of fyftematical rules has been called in question by philofophers of note; and that many plaufible arguments in support of their opinion, may be derived from the fmall number of individuals who have been. regularly trained to eminence in the arts, in comparifon of those who have been guided merely by untutored genius, and the example of their predecessors. I know, too, that it may be urged with truth, that rules have, in fome cafes, done more harm than good; and have mifled, instead of directing, the natural exertions of the mind. But, in all fuch inftances, in which philofophical principles have failed in producing their intended effect, I will venture to affert, that they have done fo, either in confequence of errors, which were accidentally blended with them; or, in confequence of their poffeffing only that flight and partial influence over the genius, which enabled them to derange its previously acquired habits; without regulating its operations, upon a fyftematical plan, with steadiness and efficacy. In all the arts of life, whether trifling or important, there is a certain degree of skill, which may be attained by our untutored powers, aided

by

by imitation; and this skill, instead of being perfected by rules, may, by means of them, be diminished or destroyed, if these rules are partially and imperfectly apprehended; or even if they are not fo familiarized to the understanding, as to influence its exertions uniformly and habitually. In the case of a musical performer, who has learnt his art merely by the ear, the first effects of systematical instruction are, I believe, always unfavourable. The effect is the fame, of the rules of elocution, when first communicated to one who has attained, by his natural taste and good sense, a tolerable propriety in the art of reading. But it does not follow from this, that, in either of these arts, rules are useless. It only follows, that, in order to unite ease and grace with correctness, and to preferve the felicities of original genius, amidst those restraints which may give them an useful direction, it is neceffary that the acquifitions of education fhould, by long and early habits, be rendered, in some measure, a fecond nature. -The fame obfervations will be found to apply, with very flight alterations, to arts of more ferious importance. In the art of legislation, for example, there is a certain degree of fkill, which may be acquired merely from the routine of business; and when once a politician has been formed, in this manner, among the details of office, a partial ftudy of general principles will be much more likely to lead him aftray, than to enlighten his conduct. But there is neverthelefs a science of legislation, which the details of office, and the intrigues of popular affemblies, will never communicate; a fcience, of which the principles must be fought for in the conftitution of human nature, and