in the general laws which regulate the course of human affairs; and which, if ever, in confequence of the progress of reason, philosophy fhould be enabled to affume that ascendant in the government of the world, which has hitherto been maintained by accident, combined with the paffions and caprices of a few leading individuals, may, perhaps, produce more perfect and happy forms of society, than have yet been realized in the history of mankind. !!!

I have thus endeavoured to point out, and illustrate, a few of the most important purposes to which the philofophy of the human mind is fubfervient. It will not, however, I flatter myself, be supposed by any of my readers, that I mean to attempt a systematical work, on all, or any of the fubjects I have now mentioned; the most limited of which, would furnish matter for many volumes. What I have aimed at, has been, to give, in the first place, as diftinct and complete an analysis as I could, of the principles, both intellectual and active, of our nature; and, in the fecond place, to illuftrate, as I proceed, the application of these general laws of the human conftitution, to the different claffes of phenomena which refult from them. In the selection of these phenomena, although I have sometimes been guided chiefly by the curiofity of the moment, or the accidental courfe of my own studies; yet, I have had it in view, to vary, as far as poffible, the nature of my fpeculations, in order to show how numerous and different the applications are, of which this philofophy is fufceptible. It will not, therefore, I hope, be objected to me, that I have been guilty of a blameable violation of unity in the plan of

my

my work, till it be confidered how far fuch a violation was useful for accomplishing the purposes for which I write. One fpecies of unity, I am willing to believe, an attentive reader will be able to trace in it: I mean, that uniformity of thought and defign, "which" (as Butler well remarks,) "we may always expect to "meet with in the compofitions of the fame author, "when he writes with fimplicity, and in earnest.”

[63]

ELEMENTS

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

HUMAN MIND.

CHAPTER FIRST.

Of the Powers of External Perception.

SECTION I.

Of the Theories which have been formed by Philofophers, to explain the Manner in which the MIND perceives external Objects.

AMONG the various phenomena which the hu

man mind presents to our view, there is none more calculated to excite our curiofity and our wonder, than the communication which is carried on between the fentient, thinking, and active principle within us, and the material objects with which we are furrounded. How little foever the bulk of mankind may be difpofed to attend to fuch inquiries,

there

there is scarcely a perfon to be found, who has not occafionally turned his thoughts to that mysterious influence, which the will poffeffes over the members of the body; and to thofe powers of perception, which seem to inform us, by a fort of infpiration, of the various changes which take place in the external universe. Of those who receive the advantages of a liberal education, there are perhaps few, who pass the period of childhood, without feeling their curiofity excited by this incomprehenfible communication between mind and matter. For my own part, at least, I cannot recollect the date of my earliest speculations on the fubject.

It is to the phenomena of perception alone, that I am to confine myself in the following effay; and even with respect to these, all that I propofe is, to offer a few general remarks on fuch of the common mistakes concerning them, as may be moft likely to mislead us in our future inquiries. Such of my readers as wish to confider them more in detail, will find ample fatisfaction in the writings of Dr. REID.

In confidering the phenomena of perception, it is natural to fuppofe, that the attention of philofophers would be directed, in the first inftance, to the sense of feeing. The variety of information and of enjoy. ment we receive by it; the rapidity with which this information and enjoyment are conveyed to us; and above all, the intercourse it enables us to maintain, with the more diftant part of the universe, cannot fail to give it, even in the apprehenfion of the most careless observer, a pre-eminence over all our other per

ceptive

ceptive faculties. Hence it is, that the various theo. ries, which have been formed to explain the operations of our fenfes, have a more immediate reference to that of feeing; and that the greater part of the metaphyfical language, concerning perception in general, appears evidently, from its etymology, to have been fuggefted by the phenomena of vifion. Even when applied to this sense, indeed, it can at most amuse the fancy, without conveying any precife know. ledge; but, when applied to the other fenfes, it is altogether abfurd and unintelligible.

It would be tedious and useless, to confider particularly, the different hypothefes which have been advanced upon this fubject. To all of them, I apprehend, the two following remarks will be found applicable: First, that, in the formation of them, their authors have been influenced by fome general maxims of philofophifing, borrowed from phyfics; and, fecondly, that they have been influenced by an indiftinct, but deep-rooted, conviction, of the immateriality of the foul; which, although not precife enough to point out to them the abfurdity of attempting to illustrate its operations by the analogy of matter, was yet fufficiently strong, to induce them to keep the abfurdity of their theories as far as poffible out of view, by allufions to those physical facts, in which the distinctive properties of matter are the least grofsly and palpably exposed to our obfervation. To the formerof these circumstances, is to be ascribed, the general principle, upon which all the known theories of perception proceed; that, in order to explain the intercourfe between the mind and diftant objects, it is ne ceffary

F