fired throughout its whole duration. The Allied commanders, deeming it prudent to economise their stock of powder, and having little fear of interruption, resolved to rely upon the slow but sure process of sapping. Boufflers, on his part, was disposed to keep in reserve what little ammunition he possessed. The Allied workmen were consequently permitted to make their approaches with little molestation. Boufflers thought that by detaining the Allies in their present position, he would best promote the success of those manœuvres by which the French commanders still expected to shut off the communications of their adversaries and reduce them to starvation.

The French armies, in fact, were masters of the whole course of the Scheldt, with the exception of the town of Oudenarde. From none of the towns of Flanders or Brabant therefore was it possible for the Allies to draw any provisions or ammunition. The capture of Leffinghen had stopped the passage of their convoys from Ostend. But although excluded from the assistance of their friends, the territory of their enemies lay at their mercy. The peasantry of Artois were compelled to furnish such liberal supplies to the markets of Lille, that for a time beef could be bought for three halfpence, and mutton for twopence a pound. In about a month, however, intelligence of an alarming nature forced the Allied commanders into action.

Upon the 2nd of November, Chamillart, whom the anxiety of Louis kept vibrating between Versailles and the camp, summoned all the general officers to a council of war. Vendôme adhered to the policy he had formerly recommended of guarding strictly the course of the Scheldt, and was confident that, if this course were adopted, the Allies would be able to do nothing for want of the munitions of war, and would soon be in danger of starving. Berwick disputed with some warmth the possibility of keeping a watch over fifty miles of river, expatiated upon the dangers to which France was exposed by the totally unprotected condition of its frontiers, and halfmaddened Vendôme by the ill-concealed sneers with which he criticised his plans. Chamillart, who understood nothing about war, but who was nevertheless armed with authority to decide between the professors of the art, determined the dispute in *Lettres Historiques.

favour of Vendôme. That marshal, he knew, now enjoyed the highest credit at Court. Burgundy was so greatly fallen in the royal esteem that his voice went for nothing. He had two devoted friends about his grandfather who were ready at all times to sound his praises, to gloss over his failings, and to throw the blame of miscarriages upon any one rather than him. Yet in spite of all that his charming Duchess and the discreet Maintenon could say, Louis was fast becoming sensible of the error he had committed in sending Burgundy to the army. Vendôme had, of course, employed every means to communicate the deficiencies of the young prince to the King.† Burgundy was, even in the opinion of those who could find every excuse for the faults of royalty, of a very indolent disposition. The tenour of his mind, pious, gentle and timid, was ill suited to the profession of arms. When wanted on urgent business he was either closeted with his confessor, or supping convivially with his friends, or playing at tennis. No representation of the necessity for immediate action could induce him to mount his horse when bedtime came. His natural aversion for Vendôme had been fostered by the wretched counsellors who surrounded him to such a point, that the Marshal could propose nothing to which he would give his assent. The King had

been compelled, from the outset of the campaign, to act as umpire in a succession of disputes, and was now convinced that he had acted unwisely in cramping the movements of an experienced commander. He was reluctant to place such a stigma upon his grandson as to recall him before the conclusion of the campaign. But Berwick, who had added considerably to the difficulties of Vendôme, he determined to remove at once. Soon after this conference an order was despatched to that marshal to go and take command of the army on the Rhine.

Another project, it seems, had now occurred to the King and his council at Versailles. While the Allies were occupied in besieging the citadel of Lille, and while the forces of Burgundy and Vendôme were in such a position as to render very doubtful the possibility of their returning northwards, a good opportunity presented itself for re-conquering those towns of the Nether* Mémoires de Berwick; Campagne de Flandre.

† St. Simon.

lands which had been lost by the battle of Ramilies. The loss of Lille would be amply compensated by the recapture of Brussels, Malines, Antwerp, Louvain. For the accomplishment of this enterprise no person appeared to possess so many qualifications as the Elector of Bavaria. He had great skill, or had at least had great experience in warfare: he had been for a long series of years governor of the Netherlands, and the mildness of his sway had endeared him to the inhabitants of the towns. He was then at Compiègne. During the summer he had been opposed on the Rhine to the Elector of Hanover; but both commanders had soon thrown up their appointments in disgust. The detachments which each had been compelled to make towards the principal theatre of war, had so weakened their armies as to preclude all hope of their startling Europe by their achievements. Chamillart now waited upon the Elector with proposals exactly suited to his inclinations. His Highness repaired to Mons, found assembled there an army of fifteen thousand men, marched straight to Brussels, and upon the 23rd of November sent a threatening message to the commandant of that city. His unexpected approach struck such terror into the partisans of King Charles, that many of them made haste to escape. But the panic was not shared by the Dutch commandant, nor by the garrison of five thousand men, nor by the magistracy who had been carefully selected for their attachment to the Austrian cause. The fortifications of the capital were barely of second-rate order, and the defenders were insufficient in number; but a bold refusal to surrender was returned, and the Elector made his preparations accordingly to carry his threats into execution..

Upon the. Allied generals rested the sole hope of the commandant to preserve the city, and a brief space of time was sufficient to prove that this confidence was not misplaced. Marlborough and Eugene no sooner heard of the Elector's march on Brussels, than they formed the resolution of forcing at any sacrifice the passage of the Scheldt. Upon a superficial examination of the impediments in the way of this enterprise, it might appear impossible to conceive an exploit more daring, more certain to be attended by a fearful sacrifice of life. The Scheldt, broad, deep, and rapid, was guarded on its right bank

by at least eighty thousand men; and as if the river were not in itself a sufficient barrier to a hostile force, fortifications had been erected at two or three points along its bank for the further security of the defenders. But there was one drawback to the advantages enjoyed by the French commanders which Berwick had already pointed out. It was plainly impossible, even with eighty thousand men, to keep up an adequate guard over fifty miles of river-course, against an enemy who could bring his whole force to bear on one particular part. Everything depended upon the commanders of the defending army obtaining prompt and reliable intelligence of the movements of the troops whose passage they wished to oppose. It was through the want of proper information that the Elector of Bavaria and Villeroi failed in 1705 to keep Marlborough out of their lines. Burgundy and Vendôme now found themselves, by similar neglect, forced in a single hour from a position which constituted them, in their imaginations, the gaolers of the Allied army.

The Allied troops not engaged in besieging the citadel of Lille had been dispersed for the convenience of subsisting. This arrangement created an impression in the French camp that Marlborough and Eugene intended to do nothing more that season, and were disposing their men in quarters for the winter. It was under these circumstances that the Allied commanders issued orders for the various divisions to assemble on the Lys, within a few miles of those points on the Scheldt where it was proposed to attempt the passage. Two detachments were sent forward on the 26th, one under the command of the dependible Cadogan, the other under that of Count Lottum, with orders to cross the river at two several places above and below Oudenarde. Marlborough and Eugene followed towards the evening with the main body. Both Lottum and Cadogan contrived to lay their bridges, and to pass their divisions over before daylight. The morning of the 27th broke in a thick fog, which kept the French for many hours in ignorance of what had occurred. At length the sentinels of a force commanded by the Baron de Hautefort, which was stationed in some works near Oudenarde, caught sight of the Allied uniform, and raised an alarm. The dragoons turned

out in hot haste. Their general galloped to an eminence, from whence he could obtain a view, and stood aghast at the spectacle which met his eyes. Not only were the two detachments already across the Scheldt, but troops were still pouring over the bridges, while the roads which led down to those bridges were covered with cavalry and infantry as far as the vision could extend. It was but too evident that the entire army of the Allies was passing the river. Hautefort, already cut off from the main body, could take no better course than to save his men by a rapid retreat. The Allies pursued and inflicted some damage upon his rear-guard before the short day closed in. They saw no more of the French. What had become of the myriads of Burgundy and Vendôme was a marvel to them. With the loss of only sixty men, Marlborough and Eugene had achieved the passage of the Scheldt, had snatched from the French commanders the fruits of three months' labour, had dissipated in an hour all their sanguine hopes of starving the Allied army, and now stood within a day's march of Brussels.*

And what were the French commanders about while these important events were transacting? In perusing military operations it must constantly occur to the unprofessional reader that the blunders and negligence of one party have a greater effect in deciding the fate of a battle or a campaign than the skill and activity of the other. The glory of one commander resolves itself when examined into nothing but the monument of another commander's errors, and the hero would be impossible but for the blockhead. Had Darius charged with his cavalry at the battle of Issus, instead of running away, the world would perhaps have never rung with the fame of Alexander. Hannibal's disposal of his forces at Canna was no doubt ingenious; but the folly and presumption of Varro must have ensured the defeat of the Romans had the Carthaginian been a general of ordinary capacity. The chances are that Cæsar would never have enslaved the world had Pompey possessed sufficient strength of mind to act on his own judgment, and avoid a battle. The bloodless forcing of the passage of the Scheldt added greatly to Marlborough's reputation. The secrecy and promptitude with which he assembled his troops, the celerity of his

* Campagne de Flandre; St. Simon,