The power of State legislation must, therefore, an-provisions, is totally distinct from the right t pretecedently exist, or else the congressional power scribe a rule, and regulate the mode of procould not be subjoined thereto. The State power cedure, or dictate the substance to be inserted. must first take position before the Congress power The action of a body may be independent, alcan be placed further-beyond it. If, then, it has been though its acts may be subject to revisal and clearly established that the duty enjoined on the le-alteration by another tribunal. The exertion of gislature of each is to be performed primarily, ante- a power may be free and uncontrolled, and yet the cedently, and independently; and that the power of results may be changed or modified by some other Congress is secondary in character, and ultimate department. The President may nominate for in exercise, it would seem to follow conclusively office, but can only appoint by and with the advice that Congress cannot, by way of anticipation, and and consent of the Senate. The power of nomiin advance, prescribe a preliminary rule to all the nating may be independently exercised by the execStates-to each, or to any of them. Congress must utive without consultation with the Senate. The come after the States, and supply omissions or va- power of the Senate to withhold its advice and concancies-where the States have failed, refused, or sent cannot affect the right to nominate--it can been prevented--by making such regulations as ought only arrest the appointment after the nomination to have been prescribed in the State by the legisla- has been made. The right of the Senate to control ture thereof. Or where the regulations have already an appointment by giving or refusing its advice and been prescribed, they may be altered by Congress. consent, includes no right to prescribe the mode of Mr. D. would invite the attention of the House to nomination, or dictate the individual to be nomithe third volume of the Madison Papers, page 1282;nated. The acts of Congress are to be presented tonot for the purpose of citing the speech or opinion the President for his approval, which he may qual of any one, but on account of the fact there re-ifiedly arrest, and forbid to become law. Such corded.

He begged leave to read from the volume and page just cited:

“On motion of Mr. Read, the word 'their was struck out, and 'regulations in such cases' inserted in place of provisions concerning them." The clause then reading-but regulations in each of the foregoing cases may, at any time, be made or altered by the legislature of the United States."

"This was meant [says Mr. Madison] to give the national legislature a power, not only to alter the provisions of the States, but to make regulations in case the States shoul fail or refuse altogether.

This is the positive statement of a fact. It is the highest evidence of the true meaning, intent, and purpose of the power given to Congress, and accords precisely with what is maintained to be its fair interpretation, by a strict grammatical construction of the whole sentence. The section, as amended, on motion of Mr. Read, subsequently underwent mere verbal alterations and change of phraseology, without altering or changing, or intending so to do, its meaning and object-only in the particular of exempting the places of choosing senators from all congressional interference. Before the constitution was finally voted by the convention, signed by the members, and recommended to the States for ratification, it was referred to a committee of "style and arrangement." In this committee its parts were arranged, and expressed in appropriate style and language. This was the duty of the committee, and they had no authority to change the meaning or purport of the instrument. It was principally performed by Governeur Morris, deemed peculiarly competent from his literary taste and scholarship.

It may be contended, however, (said Mr. D.,) that because the acts of the legislatures may be supervised and altered by Congress, their action is not, therefore, independent and exempt from all obligation to conform to the rules prescribed by the supervising power. A moment's reflection will expose the fallacy of such a deduction. The power of one body to supervise an act, and alter it, after it has been completed by another having original jurisdiction over the subject, embraces no authority to control the conduct of the body primarily enacting. The power to supervise an enactment, and to alter its

qualified interposition and partial negative, secured to the President by the constitution, carry no right to that high functionary to prescribe a rule of legiscontained in their enactments. lation to Congress, or dictate the provisions to be Even the duty enjoined on the President, from time to time, to give to Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, does not, in the least, affect their legislative indeconstitution are vested in Congress to be exercised. pendence. All legislative powers granted in the independently. An honorable gentleman from Ohio [Mr. VINTON] maintained that it was not unusual in legislation to prescribe general rules--to declare general principles, preparatory to more detailed enactments; and that their power to pass laws it would seem involved the right on the part of the legislature to lay down, in advance, mandatory declarations to guide and control future proceedings. An instance is supposed of a general declaratory statute of some rule or. direction as to the course of descents, without a detail of the minutia necessary to fill up and perfect the system in conformity with the declared rule. In the supposed case, the subsequent legislation necessary to complete the intention of the legislature is to flow from the same source from which the rule has emanated, and does not depend upon the auxiliary enactments of a different body possessing only secondary and ultimate authority, independent in its sphere of action, and having the discretionary power of forbearing to act. It is not necessary to controvert the position that a legislature, having ample and exelusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may prescribe general rules and declare leading principles to govern the details of their own enactments. But surely such a case could have no application to the point now in issue. Can any precedent be produced, where one body having the right to make, if none be previously made, or to alter, if necessary, such regulations as have been made, has claimed and exerted the right to prescribe a rule or command to another body having the independent and unqualified power of originating them? The search for a precedent will be fruitless.

He (Mr. D.) said that, as it had been shown that the State legislatures had the primary and antecedent power to prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections; that they were, in the exer

-cise of this power, independent of Congress; and, as Ization of the House, unless elected from single disthe power of Congress was secondary, and its action tricts. This effort, as has been shown, failed. ultimate, it followed conclusively that the latter The Congress, then, in the passage of this second could not prescribe a rule or issue an order or com- section, has not, by law, accomplished in fact any mand obligatory on the former. If, then, the dec-alteration of the provisions of the States. They have laration contained in the second section-that the failed to alter them by law. They have adopted members to which each State shall be entitled, shall no legislation adequate to the object. The neces be elected by districts-is a rule prescribed, or a com- sary auxiliary legislation is expected of the States mand directed to State legislatures, it has no founda- it is turned over to their respective legislatures. tion, sanction, or authority in the constitution. It Mr. DROMGCOLE said, he took it to be a clear prinis an attempted encroachment upon the freedom and ciple, that when the constitution permitted or independence of State legislation, by the assumption required the Congress to do an act by law, it could of authority no where granted. It is irreconcilable not turn over or transfer the enactment of that law with the relations of mutual independence existing to another body; that it could not direct or command between the respective legislatures. And finally, the requisite legislation to be performed by the legis being unauthorized by the constitution, the State legislatures are under no obligation to observe it, but may disregard it. It is, therefore, null and

void.

latures of the States. When the Congress is intrusted with the power of doing an act, and the quo modo expressly stated to be by law, it must accom plish its purpose by its own direct and efficient legis Mr. D. next adverted to the argument that this lation. To do an act by law, obviously and indispu second section made or altered such regulations as tably means to pass a law, which will unequivocalhad been prescribed in each State by the legislature ly, directly, and certainly effect the desired object. thereof. But the Congress may at any time, by The legislative power granted in the constitution, law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the and by it vested in Congress, is not, and cannot, in places of choosing senators." And, (said he,) for its very nature, be transferable. It cannot, in any greater accuracy in ascertaining the true meaning of degree, or to any extent, be exercised by proxy. this phrase, it may be well to resort to the dictiona- The legal maxim qui facit per alium, facit per se, ry, upon which the learned and honorable gentle- cannot be made to apply to the business of legisla man from Ohio [Mr. SCHENCK] So confidently stands. tion, especially under governments of limited powTo make, he thought meant to create, to produce; to al-ers: it cannot apply to the execution of constitutional ter, meant to change, to vary. As all the State legisla- powers expressly vested in the legislative departtures had prescribed the times, places, and manner of ment, and required to be performed by law. holding elections, there was no room for Congress to step in and exercise a creating power. Such regulations were already made; they were already in existence; and thus Congress had no opportunity of creating of bringing into being, that which before did not exist. The regulations prescribed in each State had Let us (said Mr. D.) still further advert to the proved to be vital and operative in securing the elec- precise language of this notorious second section; tion of representatives, and therefore the Congress and, by fair construction, ascertain its character and was literally prevented by the States from produc-import. It enacts "That, in every case where a ing, drawing out, and generating such regulations. State is entitled to more than one representative, And this construction is in strict accordance with the number to which each State shall be entitled, unthe statement of Mr. Madison, which has been here- der this apportionment, shall be elected by districts, tofore cited-that it was meant to give the national composed of contiguous territory, equal in number legislature a power not only to alter the provisions to the number of representatives to which said State of the States, but to make regulations, in case the States may be entitled-no one district electing more than should fail or refuse altogether. one representative.'

This second section, then, so far as it declares a generality, and attempts to transfer the details-the efficient, auxiliary, and perfecting legislation—to the constitution, and is simply a ridiculous nullity. various State legislatures, is unauthorized by the

It

This second section (said he) is a loose and careThe Congress may, however, at any time, by less composition; it is bunglingly constructed. law, alter the regulations of the States. And the says that where a State is entitled to more than one, advocates of this second section ought to demonstrate the number to which each shall be entitled, shall be that it is a law, which alters the regulations which elected, and so on; and then says the number of had been prescribed in the States. What regulations districts is to equal the number of representatives of what State does it alter? Is it a good and suffi- to which said State may be entitled. Now, all this cient exercise of the ultimate right to alter in the variety of phraseology-is entitled, shall be entitled, mode required by the constitution--by law? Does may be entitled; a State, each State, said Stateit, in fact, virtually operate to accomplish the in- means nothing more nor less than that the number of tended purpose? representatives, apportioned to the several States by It is a vague generality, which, per se, accomplishes the first section of the act, shall be elected by disnothing. It is an expansive declaration or assertion tricts composed of contiguous territory. that the members shall be elected by districts; but no mode of forming these districts is prescribed, no tenses only prove that the great purpose of the The circumlocution of phrase and confusion of future perfecting legislation is specifically or dis- framers of the section engrossed all their thoughts, tinctly indicated. The second section is of itself and made them forgetful and regardless of the inoperative, and cannot effect the desired alteration plainest rules of composition and construction. It without additional legislation making it effectual for that purpose.

The 27th Congress seemed to be aware of this, and attempted to frighten or coerce the States by declaring that their members should not be enrolled, should not take their seats and assist in the organi

is not, however, meant, by adverting to such faults, to intimate that they, in the slightest degree, affect the validity of the enactment. My purpose (said he) was to remove all perplexity and embarrassment in approaching the real, vital, substantive design of the provision-that the representatives of the sev

eral States shall be elected by districts. Shall is of the future tense; and being used in the third person, may convey a threat or command, and imply compulsion. Although not expressed, it is well understood; and in this sense has been argued, that this imperative language commanding a future act-the division of the States into single districts of contiguous territory—is addressed to the legislatures of the several States by Congress, which latter body thereby implies its power to enforce obedience. Now let the validity of this command be tested. If the right to issue the mandate existed, the power to en-indisputable, that without the section under discus force it—the command of the necessary and proper mnans, would be unquestionable. If there be no practicable mode of compelling obedience; if there be no compulsatory process which may attend or follow this measure, then it becomes a vain and nugatory thing, wherefore there could have been no rightful authority to speak in the language of command.

less, by their legislatures, be divided into of contiguous territory, equal in number to the nume ber of representatives to be elected. This division into districts might be prompted by a spirit of submission to federal authority. The formal enactment might profess, on its face, to be made in pursuance and under the authority of the act of Congress; and yet, in point of fact, in reference to the very legislation professing crouching obedience to the act, the act would only be a shadow or pretext, and will not have exerted any substantial power or authority. It is sion, the States might, voluntarily, rightfully adopt the district system. If the district system would be valid without this section, then it does not, cannot, in the nature of things, owe its validity to the existence or authority of it, or of any such provision. The district system must be traced up to a higher and more salubrious source. It is the exercise of an original, primary power, resident in the States. The law speaks to command; it does not conde-In those twenty-two States to which reference has scend to parley or to persuade. Where is the sanc-been made in debate, with a confident air of triumph, tion? where is the penalty of disobedience? What as having sanctioned and acknowledged the authori is the mode? where are the means of securing obe-ty of the act, it has been void and inoperative from dience and compliance? Can a State legislature, as a its first promulgation. Their legislation rests not upon. body, or the members individually who compose it, its command or authority for its origin, its efficien for refusing to execute the mandate, be placed in cy, or its continuance in full force and effect. durance as recusants? Can they be made liable to Those twenty-two States, or nearly all of them, punishment for the crime of contumacy? None had adopted the district system before the passage have had the boldness to maintain such doctrine. of this act of Congress, in virtue of their antecedent Viewed in the light of a command directed to the right to legislate independent of Congress. State legislatures, directing the adoption of the dis- [Here Mr. BARNARD, of New York, inquired if trict system, and prohibiting the general-ticket sys-that State was included in the statement, and denied. tem, it is the veriest brutum fulmen; absolutely a that New York had adopted the system before the flat nullity. It being impotent as a command, rest-passage of the act. ing on no basis of constitutional authority, not prac- Mr. DROMGOOEE. Does the gentleman deny that ticably susceptive of enforcement-the total disregard the district system had been adopted before the pasof it, the entire want of observance, will not impair sage of the act of Congress? or nullify the validity of State laws. If such laws would be constitutional and valid, in the absence of this second section, then they are constitutional and valid notwithstanding the space it occupies in the volume of congressional statutes; because a nullity can neither control their interpretation, or impede their operation. In the absence of all interference, or attempted exercise of control by Congress, the right of the States to provide for the election of all its representatives by a general vote of the electors has never been disputed. The general-ticket system, therefore, of the four States, is good and sufficient, and must so remain, not to be set aside for aught that Congress has yet done.

Mr. BARNARD. The single district system had not been adopted before; for some of the districts were double.]

Mr. D. continued, he would have no controversy with the gentleman about the districts being single or double. He reiterated that New York had introduced the district system before the act of Congress was passed, and had continued it, as other States had done, of her own will, in virtue of her right to legis late on the subject, independent of any intimation, direction, or command of Congress. The system of elections, by districts, in the several States, rests upon no such unsubstantial basis as an idle mandate of Congress. This position becomes still more evThus far (said Mr. D.) he had conducted his ar-ident and conclusive from the fact, that if the act of gument upon the admission that the expression, Congress was unconditionally repealed, the district "manner of holding elections," included, in its system would still remain, in the several States, in meaning, the mode of choosing all the repre- full operation, deriving its obligatory character from sentatives for the State at large by the general their rightful power to enact it. Blot out this second voice of the electors, and the mode of choosing, by section-expunge it from the statute-book,--and the districts, representatives severally for the districts district system, as now in force in twenty-two States by the qualified voters within the same. With this of this Union, would remain undisturbed, unimadmission, still, for the sake of argument only, it paired, quietly, peacefully, but successfully perform may be demonstrated further, that this second sec-ing its functions. The second section cannot be the tion was inert, without effective operation in the very true, real basis of this plan of electing from single States whose legislatures cherished a compliant tem- districts; it cannot be the rightful authority which per, and apparently yielded obedience to this pre-sustains the State legislation; for, if so, the repeal of sumptuous dictation. It has been shown that this it would be a removal of the foundation, and the section, as a rule prescribed, is unauthorized and void; whole superstructure would necessarily topple. as a transfer of the details of legislation by Con- This second section has gone along with the appor gress to State legislatures, is without authority in tionment of representatives, made under the sixth the constitution, and nugatory; as a command, can- census; it has seen twenty-two States laid off into not be enforced, rests on no proper authority, and is districts by their respective legislatures, and would vain and powerless. The States might, neverthe-actually persuade us that its potency had produced

all these legislative movements. The fly on the to elections, when Congress acts, the purpose is to chariot-wheel vainly persuaded itself that it exer-alter what has already been done; or to make and cised an important agency in raising the dust; but supply such regulations as the States have failed alremove the self-conceited insect, and there would be together to prescribe. It cannot seize original jurisno diminution of the effect produced by the tramp-diction, and propose or dictate the form or substance ing of the steeds and the revolution of the wheels. of enactment to the State legislatures, which have a So, remove this officious, intermeddling companion prior antecedent right of independent action. The of the apportionment act, and it is at once perceived distinction between the cases put for elucidation, that, in reality, it has had no substantial efficacy in and the case awaiting our decision, is too glaringly the business of State legislation, and that its preten-perceptible to admit of comment, or to require demsion to power and authority was an empty show. onstration. But the cases cited will prove directly Admit, (said Mr. D.,) again, merely for the sake the reverse of that which they were designed to susof argument, that the "manner of holding elections" tain. applies to the district, and to the general-ticket sys- With respect to the power of Congress to provide tem; and that Congress may at any time, by law, for organizing and arming the militia of the several alter, or change the latter into the former; yet, the States. If by organization, is, understood the arenactment does not effect, does not make the altera-rangement of the militia into divisions, brigades, tion; and failing to do so, leaves the primary regu- regiments, battalions, and companies, and the prelations of the States untouched and in unimpaired scribing the numbers of which they shall respectivevigor. ly consist, both officers and privates,then the act Suppose that the act in question might be right- of Congress, so far as it depended upon the voluntafully made, and that, dispensing with a rigid con-ry action of the State legislatures, would be inoperastruction of phrase, Congress, in declaring that the tive and null, should those legislatures refuse or fail representatives "shall be elected" by districts, in- to supply the auxiliary legislation. If the legistended only a general direction, induced by the con- latures of the several States should fail altogether to fident expectation that the States would willingly direct such organization as Congress had prescribed, adopt it, without questioning the authority by which it is palpable that, in such a condition of things, the it was made: in this aspect of the case, the provi-act would be ineffectual and nugatory. It would so sion still looks to the future, and becomes contingent, remain, and would be unexecuted. But no forfeit dependent, and conditional. As the requisite subse-ure of right would ensue-no punishment could quent legislation is to proceed from the will of the be inflicted for recusancy-none would be contemStates, and not from the will of Congress, the States plated or attempted. The act would simply remain may conform, or decline compliance; and thus the inoperative and void; it would be a defective and enactment is not positive and certain, but hangs on impotent exercise of a granted power, and the true a contingency. Unless adequate State legislation and efficient exertion of the power would await come to its support, and infuse life and activity into further perfecting legislation at the hands of Conit, it must remain, as it came from the hands of gress or the State legislatures. Congress, a mere inchoation. It is, then, in a com- So, also, with respect to arming the militia. If plete state of dependence, powerless and inopera- Congress should direct the purchase of so many tive. Standing alone, it accomplishes nothing; to stand of arms as would be sufficient for the purpose, fulfil the purpose of its authors, it must attach and and direct them to be carried and deposited at the connect itself with the subsequent legislation of the capitol in each State, to be distributed in such mode States. Without this intimate and auxiliary con- as the legislature might direct, it is evident that the nexion, it is in a helpless situation. Necessarily, provision for distribution of the arms would be of therefore, it must have passed upon the condition no avail, would be unexecuted, and powerless until that, to be effectual, it must become so by virtue of the States should infuse vigor into it, and assist its State laws. consummation. Should the States perseveringly deThis act being originally incomplete, and insuf-cline altogether, and should Congress adopt no adficient for its object, in every instance where its pur-ditional legislation, the act must continue indefinitely pose has not been consummated by the efficient ac- unfilled, and wholly unproductive of any effect. So tion of the States, it must remain inoperative and it is with the apportionment bill: the State legislation Impotent as to any effect upon their regulations. upon which it relied to give efficacy to the second Mr. D. said, it had been attempted by several gentlemen, during the progress of this discussion, to justify and sustain this mode of legislation by precedents. He had no veneration for legislative precedents; and he denied that they had any binding and conclusive authority. Cases have been cited wherein Congress has expressly provided for additional and perfecting legislation on the part of the States. The cases produced for the exemplification of the authority claimed, do not belong to the same category of powers with that of the subject in controversy. The examples, upon which reliance is placed, are drawn from the exercise of powers expressly enumerated, and vested exclusively in Congress. That body having original and exclusive jurisdiction, may initiate legislation without conflicting with any powers belonging to the States. The power over elections, confided to Congress, is disjunctively connected with the right of legislstion on the part of the States respectively. In reference

section, in the several States, has been wholly refused in four States. In those States the provisions of the second section have been wholly inoperative and void. The difference between the cases cited for illustration and the one actually involved, consists in the consequences attempted to be deduced from the fact that four States have wholly disregarded the latter. In the supposed exemplifications, (as has been remarked,) no forfeiture, no penalty, no punishment of any kind, attaches for the failure of the States to comply; but a failure to do in this case what Congress desired or prescribed, is to be visited upon the heads of the freemen and sovereign people composing the States, with degradation, with a forfeiture of the right of representation, and humiliating subjection to laws in the passage of which they have been denied all voice and all agency.

Mr. D. further remarked that the regulation by Congress of the value of United States and foreign coin, and fixing the standard of weights and meas

and measurement.

A

The

ures, had not the reinotest analogy to the second the day in the village for himself. Could his colsection of the apportionment act. Congress having league (said Mr. D.) have the benefit of an ample regulated the value of these coins by laws duly political mirror, in which he could behold himself published and made known, has fully exerted the as he now is, after all his various transmutations, and power confided to it by the constitution. Nothing retain a distinct and vivid recollection of what he but gold and silver can be made a tender in pay-appeared to be in the commencement of his public ment of debts. Every citizen may demand, of career, he would not recognise himself as the same right, of his fellow-citizen, the payment of a debt individual; like my old friend, who went wooing in gold and silver, to be received at its regulated in a new dress, he would not know himself. Whenvalue. This right all the courts, both State and ever his colleague (said he) desired hereafter to confederal, will enforce. State laws cannot vary this jure up a ghost for the puropose of illustrating poregulated value, nor is it at all dependent upon them litical inconsistency, it might be most appropriate for efficacy. State laws are not required to to raise the ghost of his own departed political opinstrengthen and uphold this constitutional right of ions. the citizen, nor can they infringe or impair it. Congress, having fixed the standard of weights and deavored to prove that the statute was good as for Another of his colleagues [Mr. SUMMERS] had enmeasures, has perfectly exerted that power; and the validity of their standard is not dependent on make or alter the regulations prescribed by the as it goes; that Congress having full power to State legislation, nor can State legislation interfere with the universal obligation to observe this fixed States, as to the manner of holding elections, might, standard in all transactions connected with weight covering the whole ground; that other acts may nevertheless, exercise the power, in part, without Mr. Speaker, (said Mr. D.,) my honorable col-be subsequently passed in aid of this partial exerleague, [Mr. NEWTON,] an old friend and school-cise of the power, and thus make the legislation mate, who spoke first on this subject, having vainly in pari materia, must be construed in connexion complete and effectual; that several statutes, endeavored to discover some similitude between with each other, and taken as a whole. previous legislation of Congress, and this unprece-rule of construction had doubtless been correctdented claim to prescribe the form of State enactments, and dictate the substance or matter to be in-ly laid down by his colleague; but, unfortu serted, he has resorted to the extraordinary expedi-nately there is no opportunity for its application. ent of conjuring up a ghost to guard his defenceless Where, so far as the four States are concerned, positions, and give security and apparent triumph the auxiliary legislation, State or federal, which in are the several statutes in pari materia? Where is to his desperate cause, by intimidating the assailants with a supposed hideous spectre. His ghost is not in the second section only as a lofty generality. vigorates and perfects the district system, announced that of any former congressional enactment, or of The act of Congress proclaims that members of the any once living and efficient statute of like class House of Representatives shall be elected from sin with the present case. No; it is the ghost of agle districts; but fails to secure the division of the still-born recommendation of a Secretary. In reference to Mr. Poinsett's army bill, (said he,) the will of Congress-prepares no details for the States into districts-provides no means of enforcing my colleague has thought proper to single me out, execution of the plan. The four States, on the con and to make a direct and emphatic personal appeal trary, provide for the election of all their members to me, intimating some inconsistency between my by the general voice of the qualified electors, and present and former positions. My colleague, (said prescribe sufficient regulations for the complete exMr. D.) will pardon me, but my mind cannot per-ecution of their general-ticket system. Here, then, ceive any connexion between the subject under discussion, and the question of my individual consistency. He would not suffer himself to be drawn aside from the consideration of the subject before the House into a controversy concerning his own political consistency, or that of the party with which he cordially acted. Mr. D. said he was rather too old to be caught by such a contrivance.

It

are statutes, State and federal, in pari materia, on the subject of electing members of Congress. Can these into one consistent whole? The act of Congress, be construed in harmonious connexion, and blended proclaiming or prescribing the district system, was its lips; and it has stood still ever since in gaping hastily ushered into being, with its purpose only on He, however, took no exception to the appeal which defies both usurpation and dictation. astonishment at the bold spirit of independence made to him by his old friend, [Mr. NEWTON.] He stands alone, an instance of weakness and novelty; deemed it no imputation upon his moral courage, deriving no aid from the charitable assistance of the or reflection on his mental sanity, to be challenged to State legislatures; and receiving no succor from ad meet a ghost. It required more firmness of pur-ditional, federal legislation. Of itself, it can effect pose, more intrepidity of soul, to combat a ghost, nothing; it is, as has been heretofore demonstrated, than any argument his colleague had advanced. a nullity. It can take no efficient step, so as to be His colleague might perhaps be as usefully employed in examining his own consistency as in question-good as far as it goes. It cannot expand into effective authority, so as to cover any part of the ground. ing that of others. Mr. D. related an anecdote of an old friend of his, in Brunswick, a widower, who was Mr. D. said, his colleague had attempted some desirous of repairing his loss, by a second marriage.illustration of his argument by a supposed case of He decked himself in new apparel, and exerted him- letting several tenements, with the reserved right of self to improve his personal appearance. Having entry into some part of them. He (Mr. D.) did not completed his toilette, being desirous to form some comprehend the doctrine of landlord and tenant, estimate of the probable favorable impression which his improved person might produce, he surveyed himself at large in a mirror, and, wonderful to relate, so complete was the metaphorsis, that he did not know himself, and made frequent inquiries during

lessor and lessee, with the laws regulating their mutual relations, as applied to the provisions of the constitution of the United States. Not perceiving the bearing or application of such an illustration, he would not undertake to examine or criticise it for