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AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF THE

ACT OF CONGRESS,

PASSED IN 1793,

RESPECTING

FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CINCINNATI.

OCTOBER TERM, 1851.

Ex parte WILLIAM CHILDS.

HABEAS CORPUS.

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THIS was a writ of habeas corpus very large amount, and now propose directed to the Sheriff of Hamilton to pay not over forty cents on the dolCounty, and issued upon the affidavit lar. Various letters after this passed of William Childs, that he was un- from time to time between the parties; lawfully restrained of his liberty by all those written by Loney, Townsend Edward M. Wise and John Zell. In & Loney containing assurances of their obedience to the command of the writ, continued confidence in the other firm, Wise and Zell disclosed the cause of notwithstanding the failure. their detention of Childs, claiming to hold him as a fugitive from the justice of the State of Maryland. Of the return made by them, and the testimony, the following may be considered a fair abstract:

So stood matters on the 20th of September, 1851, when Mr. Townsend, of the Baltimore firm, went before a magistrate in Baltimore, and made an affidavit, charging Childs with having obtained these goods upChilds is a citizen of Ohio, a mem-on false pretences. A requisition was ber of the'firm of J. Childs & Bros'. In obtained from the Governor of MaryJuly, 1850, he proceeded to Baltimore, land on the Governor of Ohio, and and there succeeded, by representing his firm as having a capital of eighty six thousand dollars invested in their business, in obtaining goods from Loney, Townsend & Loney, of that city, on a credit of eight months, to the amount of about four thousand dollars. Having made all the pur chases he wished in Baltimore, he went to New York City, made other purchases, and then returned leisurely homewards. In September, 1850, the firm of J. Childs & Bros' failed for a

Wise and Zell were deputed by the former to receive the prisoner. They obtained from Gov. Wood a warrant directed to "the Sheriff of Hamilton County," commanding him to arrest Childs and deliver him to them for transportation to Maryland. Armed with this warrant, they came to Cincinnati accompanied by Mr. B. S. Loney, and procured the services of one Dalzell, who represented himself to be a constable, and who procured what he claimed to be an authority

from the Sheriff to make the arrest. Ex parte Partington, 13 Meeson & WelsMr. Loney then sent a note request- | by,678. ing Childs to call on him at the Bur

So, too, in Pennsylvania, the rule net House, as he was there sick. Childs has been declared to be, that it is a did so, and found Mr. Loney perfectly question of expediency whether the well. Loney then told him that the Court will grant the second writ; but officers were in an adjacent room, and that they are not concluded from so unless the debt was paid in full he doing. must go to Maryland; but that if he would pay, the prosecution should be dropped. Childs declined, saying that he could make no preferences among his creditors; whereupon Loney knocked on the partition wall, and Dalzell, Zell and Wise came in, and the arrest was made.

A habeas corpus was at once issued by Judge Key, of the Commercial. Court, and upon it Chi ds was discharged on the ground of a want of power in Dalzell to act as the Sheriff's deputy. Immediately after this decision, the Sheriff arrested Childs under the warrant. A second writ of habeas corpus was then issued by the same Judge, which resulted after an elaborate argument, in an able decision remanding Childs to the custody of the Sheriff. The Sheriff then delivered him to Zell and Wise, and at this stage of the proceedings, the present writ was issued.

Several days were occupied in the argument of the case by Messrs. W Y. Gholson, Caleb B. Smith, and S. P. Chase, for the applicant; and Messrs. T. C. Ware, R. D. Handy,

and A. Taft, for Zell and Wise.

After some days' consideration, JUDGE HOADLY pronounced his opinion as follows:

As it is claimed that this Court is concluded by the decision of the Commercial Court upon every question which might have been presented upon the return and testimony in the case in that Court, it becomes necessary first to examine the doctrine of res judicata. Does it apply to proceedings in cases of this kind?

Ex parte Lawrence, 5 Binney, 304. Commonwealth vs. Hambright, 4 Serg.

& R. 149.

And in Vermont. the Supreme Court having refused to discharge one Holmes afterwards issued another writ, reheard the case, and discharged him. Holmes vs. Jennison, et al, 14 Peters, 540, and note.

George Holmes, ex parte, 12 Vermont,

631.

And that the practice has been such in Ohio, is shown by a similar decision made by Judge Johnson, in this Court, in the case of Ball vs. Hand, in 1847.

The principle which applies here is the same that controls all cases of

summary proceedings. The judgment is final, but not conclusive beyond the case in which it is pronounced. ( (See opinion of Chief Justice Taney, 14 Feters, 561.) And in actions of ejectment, which only regard possession,

the rule is the same.

The only case to the contrary is that 64, where the Court for the correction of Mercein vs. The People, 25 Wend, of errors in New York, reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court, pronounced the principle of res judicata applicable to controversies between parents for the custody of their children. That this decision, though obeyed, did not command the assent of the Supreme Court appears from their decision in the subsequent case of The People vs. Mercern, 3 Hill, 399.

And although the proceedings there are under a habeas corpus, yet they That it does not, has been decided rather resemble ordinary controversies by the Court of Exchequer, in Eng- in their character, being between two land. That Court, Baron Parke pro- parties litigant for the custody of a nouncing the opinion, held that a pris- child. Even under such circumstanoner has a right to the opinion of eve ces though, Judge Johnson, in the ry one of the Courts upon the legali-case referred to, held that the rule did ty of his detention. not apply in Ohio.

Under the act of Ohio, the reasons which are urged in favor of the application of the rule of res judicata to proceedings of this kind, do not seem to apply as forcibly as they would elsewhere. The duty of allowing the writ, upon a proper affidavit being presented, is peremptory. The party holding the custody must set out the cause of detention. The Court must examine into the cause, and discharge or remand, according as the same is legal or illegal. No room is given for the exercise of discretion. And to make the case stronger against the application of the rule, the Legislature have provided that there shall be no second arrest for the same cause after a discharge, thus admitting the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and raising the presumption that had they intended that the party remanded should not have a second investigation, they would have so expressed themselves. That the rule of res judicata does not apply to proceedings of this kind, may then be taken as the law of this

case.

The first and most important proposition presented, and upon which the prisoner asks his discharge, consists in a denial of the constitutionality of the Act of 1793, under the first section of which his extradition is sought.

It would be idle for me to attempt to express my sense of the weight of the responsibility which devolves upon me in deciding this question. I am called upon to construe the Constitution of the United States; to define the province of the highest court in the land, and the extent to which its decisions carry me, and bind me contrary to my own judgment carefully made up, and to examine my duty in the light of my oath to support that oath to support that Constitution. From that responsibility, however, in the hope to contribute something towards a final and correct decision of the proposition in question, I do not shrink.

The first and most obvious observa tion is, that all agreements for the return of fugitives from justice, are, in their nature and essential character, treaties. No nation is bound to deliver fugitives. The instance of Kossuth, is a recent illustration, which

suggests itself at once. Only from comity, will a sovereign State, in case of high crimes, deliver up to another State refugees from the latter. And, at the time the Articles of Confederation were adopted, the several States, being sovereign and independent, were 'bound by nothing but comity, to effect extraditions of this character.

So situated, in July, 177, the States adopted those Articles; and in them we find the following stipulations, composing the fourth Article.

ARTICLE IV. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different each of these States, paupers, vagabonds States in this Union, the free inhabitants of and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions, as ded that such restriction shall not extend so the inhabitants thereof, respectively, provifar as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, to State, of which the owner is an inhabitant; strictions shall be laid by any State, on the provided also that no imposition, duties or reproperty of the U. States, or either of them.

any other

If any person guilty of, or charged with treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor found in any of the United States, he shall in any State, shall flee from justice, and be

upon demand of the Governor or Executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, and be removed to the State having jurisdiction of his offence.

Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States, to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.

Thus, and in connexion with the other clauses quoted, the provision in question was first agreed upon by the several States; and, as in its nature, it is a treaty or compact, so it remained in the Articles of Confederation, for no power was given to the Congress to legislate it into operation. True, in case of a dispute between the States, on this and every other subject, they might arrange a sort of arbitration under the 9th Article, but they possessed no power to enforce this provision, and it is a historical fact, that the power was never claimed to exist.

Has that power which was wanting to the Congress of the Confederation, been granted to the Congress of the

Constitution? If so, in what part of as a separate section? They are alike that instrument is this grant of power? in their nature, kindred subjects, and It is adopted from the Articles of even in the Constitution, form sections Confederation with a slight change of language, thus:

"A person charged in any State, with treason, felony, or any other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the Executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." It stands in the second section of Article 4, the first clause of which provides that

"Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

The third and last clause provides for the extradition of fugitives from labor, while this stands between them. Why were these three provisions thrown into one section?

of the same Article. Why, unless for the reason that inasmuch as to one, which was an article of compact before, a legislative power in Congress has been added, it is properly separatThe former is ed from the others.

now no longer a mere compact between States, it includes a grant of power to the United States-the latter remain as they were.

And this view is strengthened by the fact that the 3d Section of this Article contains the grant of two powers to Congress, viz: to admit new States, and to regulate and dispose of the Territory of the United States. And the 4th Section enjoins a duty upon the United States to guarantee to each Was it not, because be- State a republican form of governing articles of compact, they naturally ment, and protect each against invaassociate together? sion. Why this separation? If there But he who compares the Articles of is a power in Congress to legislate for Confederation with the Constitution, is the extradition of fugitives, &c., why at once struck with another fact. not unite Sections 2 and 3--if a duty What has become of the last clause of is enjoined upon Congress, or the the 4th Article of Confederation, which National Government, to supervise this there immediately succeeded the clause extradition, why are not Sections 2 in question? Where, and how changed and 4 joined together? do we find it in the Constitution? The answer is to be found by reading section 1, of the 4th Article of the Constitution.

"Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other StateAnd the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."

Now, why this addition, if without it the power in Congress to legislate is implied? It was not affixed, we may conclude, by men so able as those who framed this instrument, without just cause, and the result is-we cannot avoid it-that, in their opinion, without this specific grant of power, Congress would have been powerless

in this matter.

The inevitable conclusion is, that each of these Sections differ from the others. The first contains what was originally a compact, and still retains that character, with a clause, however, giving power to Congress to provide for the manner of its execution. The second contains provisions which are mere compacts --were so in the instrument from which they were taken, and are substantially unchanged in letter, or spirit, depending for their execution upon the good faith of the States, unless from the fact that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, as well as a compact between sovereignties, they have acquired a self-executing quality. The third is a mere grant of power to Congress, and the fourth enjoins upon the General Government a positive duty.

And why is this last cited Section removed from the juxtaposition in It now becomes proper in the train which it stood in the Articles of Con- of argument, to renew a suggestion federation, and thus made a Section made a short time since. This extraby itself? And those other provi- dition clause gave no legislative power sions, its neighbors for nine long years to the Congress of the Confederation of the Confederation, thrown together --it is unchanged substantially in the

Constitution--whence then does our National Government, or any depart

present Congress derive its claim of power?

The tenth Article of the amendment to the Constitution provides that

"The powers not delegated to the United States, &c. are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

And to understand the force and effect of these amendments, it may be well to recur to the preamble of the resolution of the Congress of 1789, which submitted them for adoption to the States. It is this:

ment or officer thereof. The demand is to be made by the State whence the flight took place, and the natural conclusion is, though the particular officer is not pointed out, that it is to be upon the State where he has taken refuge. No governmental action is called for whatever. No power then to legislate it into execution, can be implied in Congress.

Judging this clause, then, by its history, its position in the Constitution, the history and position of other "The Convention of a number of the provisions, the specific grants of power States, having at the time of their adopting to Congress, and the general grant the Constitution, expressed a desire, in or- of implied power, there cannot be a der to prevent misconstruction, or abuse of doubt, that in legislating it into exits powers, that further declaratory and re-ecution, Congress has exceeded its

strictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government, will best insure the bencficent ends of its institution; Resolved," &c. The clause in question delegates no power in terms, and in its nature, it is a matter of State duty. Such it was considered for years before the Constitution was formed. How is this incident annexed?

The first section of the first Article of the Constitution provides that" All legislative power herein granted, shall be vested in a Congress," &c. The eighth section commences thus. "The Congress shall have power:-to lay and collect taxes,&c., &c., &c., through a long list of specifically granted powers, closing with this general clause:

“To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

proper powers.

What are the decisions of the highest tribunal in the land, the Supreme Court of the United States, upon the clause in question, and how far do they bind this Court to withhold action upon an opinion, which seems to be as well sustained as the one just expressed?

The only cases decided by that Court upon the subject of extradition, regard the second and third sections of the act of 1793, and not the one in question at all. The Supreme Court have never decided that Congress has the constitutional power to legislate for the extradition of fugitives from justice. But in two cases, they have affirmed the constitutionality of legislation by Congress upon the subject of fugitives

from labor. And it becomes necessary, therefore, now to examine those decisions, and ascertain how far they bear upon the questions involved in this case.

And this is the extent of the implied powers of Congress. There The first is the celebrated case of must be a power vested in the General Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, Government, or in some department 539. The State of Pennsylvania had or officer thereof, and then Congress passed a law, among the provisions of may pass all laws necessary and proper to carry it, as well as the specific powers given in this Section, into ex

ecution.

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which was one against kidnapping. Prigg was a slaveholder, residing in Maryland; slaves had escaped from him and taken refuge in Pennsylva nia, whereupon, he came into that State, seized the fugitives, and returned with them to his residence. And the question was whether the act of Pennsylvania, which proposed to punish him for this as for kidnapping,

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