The R. E. Lee. very strict upon common carriers, and rendered them liable for the loss of the baggage of passengers conveyed by them; one reason given was, that often there was a conspiracy between the coachman and the robber; but under our recent modes of travel, this rule has been very properly modified, and the carriers are only held responsible for such portion of the passenger's baggage as may have been delivered to them, or to the agent whose business it is to receive and take care of the same. This delivery must be complete. See Blanchard v. Isaacs, 3 Barb. 383; Kent Com. 604; Packard v. Gilman, 6 Cow. 757. In Tower v. Utica, &c. R. R. Co., 7 Hill, 47, it was held by NELSON, Ch. J., that a passenger who retains his overcoat in his seat, cannot recover against the company for its loss. Again, Mr. STORY, in his work on Contracts, § 766, holds that in this country, if a passenger does not surrender his baggage to the carrier, but retains it in his own possession, and it is lost, he cannot recover against the carrier therefor. Other authorities might be referred to, but these are sufficient. I am referred by libelant's proctor to Mississippi R. R. Co. v. Kennedy, as sustaining the adverse proposition, but that is not a case in point. It is true, it holds that jewelry usually worn as part of personal apparel, does constitute a portion of a traveler's baggage, but in that case the trunk in which the articles were placed was delivered to the baggage master. I am also referred for the same purpose to the case of Macklin v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., reported in Am. Law Reg. 237. This case was decided by the court of common pleas, New York. This was a case in which the passenger was given the key of his stateroom, and took his valise with him. The substance of the ruling is, that this was a delivery to the officers of the boat, who, if they did not intend to become liable, should have notified him of the fact. The ruling of the The R. E. Lee. court in that case, from the authorities cited, was based upon the older cases, and is not sustained by reason or the modern cases. room. I am also referred to the case of Epps v. Hinds, 27 Miss. 657. This was a suit against an inn-keeper. The guest requested the inn-keeper to send his trunk to his The guest placed the money given him by his father to pay his traveling expenses and his tuition at the University at Oxford, to which he was going, in the trunk, and locked it. Some time afterward, the innkeeper placed in the same room another guest, who, during the night, broke open the trunk, took the money, and left. The inn-keeper was properly held liable, or he had no right, after having assigned the guest to his room, to intrude another into it without his consent. Again, the trunk had been delivered to the inn-keeper, who was only requested to remove it to another room, and, if he was not willing to take the risk, should have notified the guest. These cases, when properly considered, do not support the claim of the libelants. The baggage for which the carrier is responsible, must be such as can, with propriety, be placed in the baggage room, or must be delivered to the clerk of the boat, or some other officer authorized to receive it, and not such articles as the passenger necessarily keeps in his possession, such as the hand-bag or companion stated in this case. I am satisfied, from a careful examination of authorities, and the agreed state of facts, that the claim of the libelants in this case cannot be sustained. The libel will, therefore, be dismissed, at the cost of libelants. Libel dismissed. United States ex rel. Lansing v. Treasurer of Muscatine County. 1 UNITED STATES ex rel. LANSING v. THE Circuit Court, Eighth Circuit; District of Iowa, 1870. A circuit court has power, in a proper case, to issue a mandamus re- When such a mandamus has, in the lawful exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, been issued, but the officer to whom it is directed will not, or cannot execute the duty commanded, the court may appoint its marshal to execute such duty and collect the tax. Application for an order charging the marshal with the duty of collecting a tax. This was one of several cases in which creditors upon bonds issued some time ago, by various counties in Iowa, in aid of railroad enterprises in that State, but remaining unpaid, had previously applied for and obtained writs of mandamus, requiring the proper county officers to collect taxes sufficient to defray the judgments which they had recovered upon their bonds. But these writs remained unobeyed. The creditors, therefore, now moved the court to appoint the marshal for the district of Iowa to execute the writs and collect the taxes, in place of the county officers. John N. Rogers, Grant & Smith, and Edmonds & Ransom, for the motion. Rush Clark, D. C. Cloud, and Mr. Williams, op posed. United States ex rel. Lansing v. Treasurer of Muscatine County. DILLON, J.-Heretofore judgments have been rendered in this court on what are termed railroad bonds and coupons against the counties of Lee, Washington, Louisa, Muscatine, Johnson, Iowa, and Poweshiek. To enforce the payment, writs of mandamus have at previous terms been ordered to be issued, commanding the proper county officers to levy and collect taxes sufficient to pay those judgments. At a term of this court held one year ago, it was shown that the county officers of most, if not all of these counties, had either neglected or refused to levy and collect the taxes required by the mandates of this court. On being attached for contempt they gave as a reason for their non-action, that the bonds upon which the judgments in this court had been rendered were, in the opinion of the State courts, unconstitutional, and that they had been enjoined by the State courts (in proceedings to which the judgment creditors were not parties), from making the levies which this court had commanded. Following the express decision of the supreme court of the United States on the precise point, this court (Mr. Justice MILLER and Judge LOVE both being present and concurring), then held the State courts had no authority to enjoin or otherwise interfere with the execution of the process of this court; that injunctions issued from the State courts for that purpose were unauthorized, and in law afforded no protection to the county officers for their neglect or refusal to obey the process of this court. But under the circumstances, the officers were discharged from actual arrest under the attachments for contempt, on the payment of costs, and on their promise to return home and levy the taxes required by the writs of mandamus. The returns subsequently made to the court show that they did, as promised, make orders levying the United States ex rel. Lansing v. Treasurer of Muscatine County. taxes; but in respect to some counties, particularly those of Lee, Johnson, and Muscatine, there is a showing made at this term that the taxes thus levied have not to any considerable extent been collected. It has been made to appear to the court, that in Lee county, the efforts of the county treasurer to make the taxes have been practically defeated, and the same remain almost wholly uncollected. This has been brought about, in part, where personal property has been distrained by the county collector, by replevin suits commenced against him by tax-payers in the State courts. It is also shown that there are combinations made to prevent the attendance of bidders at such tax sales, and to deter them from bidding; and in one instance, that an agent of one of the judgment creditors who attended at advertised sales of property was prevented by threats from bidding, and forced to leave by apprehensions of personal danger. It also appears that since the decision of the supreme court of the United States, and also since the decision of the supreme court of the State to the effect that the process or officers of the Federal courts cannot be enjoined or interfered with by State courts, that one or more of the State district judges have issued injunctions against the collectors of Muscatine and Lee counties, undertaking to prohibit them from collecting the taxes which this court has ordered to be made; and that such injunctions have been obeyed, and the collections practically prevented. The county collector of Johnson county, in answer to an information filed against him, admits that he has not collected more than one-fifth of the levy; that he is advised and believes that combinations have been formed to prevent the compulsory collection of such taxes that he finds it impossible, by reason of such combinations, to find responsible deputies to assist in making collections, and in view of these facts, he |