540 POLICY OF A NAVY. [CHAP. VII. zealously and unanimously as Madison's resolutions had been opposed by the Federalists. As a means of protecting commerce, it was pronounced to be altogether insufficient. The proposed force was inadequate, and it could not be immediately used. Besides, the object could be effected by other means less expensive. A peace with Algiers might be procured by money, which nations having a much stronger navy we proposed, had not hesitated to pay. Another mode suggested was to purchase the protection of foreign powers. This would be less expensive than a navy, and its effect would be immediate. than But the measure, it was said, might be regarded as laying the foundation for a permanent navy. This policy was utterly inconsistent with the payment of the public debt. To the great extent,of the British navy was ascribed the oppressions under which the English people groaned. By a like cause the French monarehy had been overthrown, and that of Great Britain threatened. It was part of the system of governing by means of debts, which was pronounced the most refined system of tyranny. It had succeeded to the old system of feudal tenures. Its purpose was to devise objects of expense, and to draw as much money as possible from the pockets of the people. Another objection to a navy was, it would prove a hostage for their good behavior, and would thus rather increase than lessen their dependence on other countries. In reply, it was insisted that no peace could be purchased of the Algerines unless the offer was accompanied by some manifestation of naval force. Without this, they had shown that they would sell no peace at a price which we should be willing to give. They would be more likely to take this ground now when her cruisers were no longer confined by a Portuguese squadron, and 1794.] POLICY OF A NAVY. 541 when they saw that we could not incur the expense of a small armament. They said they were willing to negotiate for a peace with Algiers by purchasing it, but that some naval force was necessary to ensure success to the negotiation. To seek the protection of other nations would be dishonorable. Nor was this all. If the nations applied to are at peace with Algiers, they could not be expected to go to war for any indemnity we could offer. If already at war, they would, for their own sakes, check the depredations of their enemies. Such a defence, too, would be precarious, as our protectors might purchase peace at any time, and leave our commerce defenceless. With a navy of their own, the United States might co-operate with a foreign power to great advantage. From the information obtained, the force proposed was sufficient. But if not thought to be so, why, they asked, was not an increase of force recommended? As to the expense of a navy, the saving in insurance, ships, and cargoes, and in the ransom of seamen, was more than enough to outweigh it. But the slavery of our citizens, and the national disgrace it involves, are not to be estimated. Who, after learning the sufferings of the captives, can sit down to cold calculations of the cost of affording them relief? In answer to the objections to a permanent navy, it was urged that the bill provided for the discontinuance of the armament when peace should be concluded with Algiers; and further, that the United States were peculiarly fitted for a navy. They abounded in all the requisite materials, and that the dispositions and habits of a large portion of their citizens made the protection afforded by a navy necessary. It was strange that those who looked to the extension of American navigation as a 542 EMBARGO LAID. [CHAP. VII. means of national defence, and were even willing to engage in a commercial war with Great Britain on this account, should be so opposed to a naval defence under any circumstances. The resolution was carried by a majority of only two votes; but in its progress it gained strength, and finally passed by eleven votes. There was, however, an appropriation of a million of dollars to purchase peace with Algiers, and in the event of success in that purpose, the naval armament was to be suspended. This species of national defence, though then and subsequently so earnestly opposed by the Republican or Democratic party, is decidedly the cheapest and safest, and has since fought its way into popularity with the American people. On the twelfth of March, Mr. Sedgwick, of Massachusetts, a Federalist, moved to raise a military force, and to lay an embargo, to last forty days, at the discretion of the President. Before there was any decision concerning the embargo, Mr. Madison's resolutions were again taken up. Mr. Nicholas, of Virginia, moved an amendment by which the manufactures of Great Britain alone were to be subjected to an increased rate of duties. A decision was postponed by a small majority, on the ground of the increased probability of war, and the importance of united counsels in that event. The embargo, after having been negatived by a majority of two votes, was subsequently laid, to continue for thirty days. A bill was also passed for fortifying certain ports and harbors, and a plan was reported for organizing eighty thousand militia; as well as for raising a corps of artillerists and engineers, and a provisional army of twentyfive thousand men. The belief that Great Britain also 1794. RETALIATORY MEASURES PROPOSED. 543 expected war with the United States was confirmed by the speech of the Governor of Canada, Lord Dorchester, to an Assembly of deputies from numerous Indian tribes, in which he asserted the probability of a war with the United States.' It further appeared that Governor Simcoe had built a fort at the Rapids of the Maumee, within the limits of the United States. On the twenty-seventh of March, Mr. Dayton, of New Jersey, offered a resolution for sequestering all debts due to British subjects, as a fund to indemnify citizens of the United States for the unlawful depredations of British cruisers. This resolution caused a vehement explosion of resentment against Great Britain on the part of the Republicans; but before any vote was taken on the question, Mr. Clarke, of New Jersey, offered a resolution to prohibit all intercourse with Great Britain, until she made full compensation to the citizens of the United States for injuries done by her armed vessels, and until the Western posts were delivered up. While these subjects were pending, the President sent a message to Congress informing it that, by a despatch from Mr. Pinckney, American Minister at London, the order in council of the sixth of November preceding had been revoked in January; and in lieu of it, that another had been issued directing the British cruisers to bring in those vessels which were laden with the produce of French colonies, and were on a voyage from those colonies to Europe. He also stated that the Courts of Vice i 1 Judge Marshall says that the account of this speech was not authentic. In this he was mistaken. It is reported on authority in the Annual Register for 1795, page 251. Its authenticity is expressly admitted by Hammond. II. State Papers, page 60. See correspondence of Randolph and Hammond, II. State Papers, page 59. 544 MISSION TO ENGLAND. [CHAP. VII. admiralty had given to the November order an interpretation that had not been intended. The objects of that order had been to prevent the abuses which might take place in consequence of the whole of the St. Domingo fleet having gone to the United States; and also on account of the meditated attacks upon the French West India Islands. It was expected that no vessel would be condemned under that order, which would not have been liable to condemnation without it." 1 This intelligence restored the Federal party to their original feelings in favor of Great Britain. They thenceforth opposed all measures of an irritating tendencyacquiescing, however, in those which aimed to put the country in a state of defence. Their Republican opponents did not press a decision of their scheme of commercial retaliation, from the hope, probably, that the British Ministry would forbear their maritime aggressions when they saw that war would be the certain alternative. They accordingly made no opposition to the appointment of a special envoy, as was urged by the friends of the administration. A mission to England was then determined on, and Mr. Jay, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was selected for that appointment. This selection, however, furnished a new theme of complaint on the part of the opposition; not merely because it would have a tendency to make politicians of judges—a class of men in whom calm, unbiassed tempers are of the first importance, but because also it was against the spirit of the Constitution, which aimed to make them independent of the other departments, and this object would be but half obtained, if, while they were exempted from all fear of the loss or diminution of their salaries, they were left accessible to 1 II. State Papers, page 7. 1 |