of the same, shall be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission: * * * * SEC. 9. [The section relates to the judicial system of the Territory.] . . Writs of error, and appeals from the final decisions of said Supreme Court [of the Territory], shall be allowed, and may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same manner and under the same regulations as from the circuit courts of the United States, where the value of the property, or the amount in controversy, to be ascertained by the oath or affirmation of either party, or other competent witness, shall exceed one thousand dollars; except only that in all cases involving title to slaves, the said writs of error, or appeals shall be allowed and decided by the said Supreme Court, without regard to the value of the matter, property, or title in controversy; . . . Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to apply to or affect the provisions of the [Fugitive Slave acts of 1793 and 1850] . ... SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That the provisions of . [the Fugitive Slave acts of 1793 and 1850] . . . be, and the same are hereby, declared to extend to and be in full force within the limits of said Territory of Nebraska. SEC. 14. And be it further enacted, . . . That the Constitution, and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory of Nebraska as elsewhere within the United States, except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved. . . [March 6, 1820]. . ., which, being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories, as recognized by the legislation of eighteen hundred and fifty, commonly called the Compromise Measures, is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States: Provided, That nothing herein ... contained shall be construed to revive or put in force any law or regulation which may have existed prior to the act of [March 6, 1820]. .., either protecting, establishing, prohibiting, or abolishing slavery. SEC. 19. And be it further enacted, That all that part of the Territory of the United States included within the following limits, except such portions thereof as are hereinafter expressly exempted from the operations of this act, to wit, beginning at a point on the western boundary of the State of Missouri, where the thirty-seventh parallel of north latitude crosses the same; thence west on said parallel to the eastern boundary of New Mexico; thence north on said boundary to latitude thirty-eight; thence following said boundary westward to the east boundary of the Territory of Utah, on the summit of the Rocky Mountains; thence northward on said summit to the fortieth parallel of latitude; thence east on said parallel to the western boundary of the State of Missouri; thence south with the western boundary of said State to the place of beginning, be, and the same is hereby, created into a temporary government by the name of the Territory of Kansas; and when admitted as a State or States, the said Territory, or any portion of the same, shall be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their Constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission: [Sections 27, 28, and 32 apply to the Territory of Kansas the provisions of sections 9, 10, and 14, respectively.] [U. S. Stat. at Large, X., 277-290.] No. 113. Dred Scott Decision March 6, 1857 THE main facts of the Dred Scott case (Dred Scott v. Sandford) are as follows: Dred Scott was a negro slave, the property of Dr. Emerson, a surgeon in the United States army. In 1834 Scott was taken by his owner from Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, Ill., and from thence, in 1836, to Fort Snelling, on the west bank of the Mississippi, within the limits of the territory acquired from France in 1803, and north of 36° 30'. There Scott, with the consent of his owner, married. In 1838 Emerson took Scott and his family back to Missouri. In 1847 Scott brought suit in the circuit court of the State of Missouri to recover his freedom, on the ground of previous resi dence in free territory. Judgment was rendered in his favor, but was reversed in 1848 by the Missouri supreme court, to which the case was carried on writ of error. In the meantime, Scott and his family passed under the control of John F. A. Sandford of New York. In 1853 Scott brought suit for damages against Sandford, in the United States circuit court for the district of Missouri, on the alleged ground of illegal detention of himself and family as slaves. The defendant pleaded that Scott, being a negro, and born of slave parents, could not be a citizen of Missouri, and hence could not be a party to a suit in the United States courts. The plea was overruled, but on other grounds Scott's claim to freedom was denied, and judgment rendered against him. The case was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where it was twice argued, in February and December, 1856. The decision was rendered March 6, 1857. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court, but separate opinions were read by each of the eight associate justices. It has been well said that "to ascertain what the judgment of the court really was, it is necessary to compare the nine opinions and tabulate the results." The legal doctrine of the decision, so far as the question of slavery was concerned, was set aside by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. REFERENCES. Text in 19 Howard, 393-633. For contemporary discussions, see Benton's Historical and Legal Examination of the Dred Scott Case; Gray and Lowell's Legal Review of the Case of Dred Scott; Foot's Examination of the Case of Dred Scott. [Opinion of the Court.] There are two leading questions presented by the record: 1. Had the Circuit Court of the United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between these parties? And, 2. If it had jurisdiction, is the judgment it has given erroneous or not? The plaintiff in error, who was also the plaintiff in the court below, was, with his wife and children, held as slaves by the defendant, in the State of Missouri, and he brought this action in the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, to assert the title of himself and his family to freedom. The declaration is in the form usually adopted in that State to try questions of this description, and contains the averment necessary to give the court jurisdiction; that he and the defendant are citizens of different States; that is, that he is a citizen of Missouri, and the defendant a citizen of New York. The defendant pleaded in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court, that the plaintiff was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, being a negro of African descent, whose ancestors were of pure African blood, and who were brought into this country and sold as slaves. To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joined in demurrer. The court overruled the plea, and gave judgment that the defendant should answer over. And he therefore put in sundry pleas in bar, upon which issues were joined, and at the trial the verdict and judgment were in his favor. Whereupon the plaintiff brought this writ of error. Before we speak of the pleas in bar, it will be proper to dispose of the questions which have arisen on the plea in abatement. That plea denies the right of the plaintiff to sue in a court of the United States, for the reasons therein stated. If the question raised by it is legally before us, and the court should be of opinion that the facts stated in it disqualify the plaintiff from becoming a citizen, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, then the judgment of the Circuit Court is erroneous, and must be reversed. It is suggested, however, that this plea is not before us . . . [But] if the plea and demurrer, and judgment of the court below upon it, are before us upon this record, the question to be decided is, whether the facts stated in the plea are sufficient to show that the plaintiff is not entitled to sue as a citizen in a court of the United States. ... We think they are before us . . . and it becomes, therefore, our duty to decide whether the facts stated in the plea are or are not sufficient to show that the plaintiff is not entitled to sue as a citizen in a court of the United States. This is certainly a very serious question, and one that now for the first time has been brought for decision before this court. But it is brought here by those who have a right to bring it, and it is our duty to meet it and decide it. The question is simply this: can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen. One of these rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution. . . . The court must be understood as speak ing in this opinion of those persons [only] who are the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country and sold as slaves. We proceed to examine the case as presented by the pleadings. The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the "sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can, therefore, claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the government might choose to grant them. . . In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a state may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State. For, previous to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of a citizen, and to endow him with all its rights. But this character, of course, was confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave him no rights or privileges in other States beyond those secured to him by the laws of nations and the comity of States. Nor have the several States surrendered the power of conferring |