statute as well as upon other grounds is final and conclusive. Of course, if the justice and the court on appeal had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, or of the parties, by reason of the defendant not being summoned or something of that kind, then there is still an appeal to this court, but, if the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties, its decision is final. But in none of those cases or in any others in this state has it ever before been said or suggested that an application can be made to this court for a writ of certiorari directed to the circuit court, when the latter had decided the case on an appeal authorized by the statute. That would simply be an unauthorized method of having this court review a decision of the circuit court, which is made by the statute the appellate court, without further appeal to this court. (115 Md. 658) ZIELIAN v. BALTIMORE PLATE ICE (Court of Appeals of Maryland. April 19, 1. DEPOSITS IN COURT (§ 2*)- DISPOSITION UNDER ORDER OF COURT--JURISDICTION. An order requiring money to be brought into court for disposition is in the nature of a final judgment and should only be passed upon evidence conclusively showing the present liability of the person directed to deposit it. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Deposits in Court, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. § 2.*] 2. RECEIVERS (§ 163*)-DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS RECEIVER'S NOTES-PREFERENCES. An order in receivership proceedings, requiring the receiver to bring a certain sum into court to discharge unauthorized receiver's notes held by a certain creditor, constituted a preference over other creditors holding similar notes. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Receivers, Dec. Dig. § 163.*] 3. RECEIVERS (§ 192*)-CHARGES-DUPLICATE CHARGES. If money, appropriated by a receiver from the assets of a corporation, was charged to his personal account, it was error on an accountre-ing to again charge him with such money. The petitioner in his notes relied on Williamson v. Carnan, 1 Gill & J. 196, and Swann v. Cumberland, 8 Gill, 150, as well as some authorities outside of this state, but there is nothing in them which requires us to further prolong this opinion by a discussion of them. In a number of the other states, as we have seen, it has been held that under their Constitutions and stat utes their highest appellate courts have jurisdiction to issue this writ, but, of course, we must be governed by our own Constitution, statutes, and decisions, and there is nothing in the two Maryland cases mentioned which conflicts with what we have said, especially when considered in connection with later decisions, where such questions as we have been considering have been more directly presented. It follows that the application for the writ of certiorari must be denied. Application for writ of certiorari denied and the petition dismissed, the petitioner to pay the costs. HENDRICK v. STATE. (Court of Appeals of Maryland. April 5, 1911.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Prince George's County. John T. Hendrick was in a justice's court convicted of operating his automobile without having paid the registration fee, and he appealed to the circuit court, where the judgment was affirmed. On application for certiorari to the circuit court. Application denied. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE. PEARCE, BURKE, PATTISON, and URNER, JJ. Ralston, Siddons & Richardson, for appellant. Isaac Lobe Straus, Atty. Gen., for the State. BOYD, C. J. For the reasons given in the case of John T. Hendrick v. State, 81 Atl. 18, being No. 73 on the docket of the January term, 1911, of this court, the application for the writ of certiorari will be denied. Application for writ of certiorari denied and petition dismissed, the petitioner to pay the costs. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Receivers, Dec. Dig. § 192.*] 4. BILLS AND NOTES (§ 340*) - BONA FIDE PURCHASERS-NOTICE. corporation signed, "Z., Receiver," and indorsed Notes, Cent. Dig. § 842; Dec. Dig. § 340.*] 5. RECEIVERS (§ 193*)-ACCOUNTING CREDITS. A receiver was entitled to a credit for money raised by notes executed by him without authority, which went into the corporation's business. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Receivers, Dec. Dig. § 193.*] Appeals from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; Alfred S. Niles, Judge. In the matter of the receivership of the Baltimore Plate Ice Company, for which Edgar Zielian was appointed receiver. From orders requiring the receiver to bring certain funds into court and removing him as receiver, he appeals by four separate appeals. Certain decrees reversed and others affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, THOMAS, PATTISON, and URNER, JJ. George P. Bagby and Edwin G. Baetjer, for appellant. W. Burns Trundle and Leigh Bonsal, for appellee. BRISCOE, J. There are four appeals in the record before us, and they are from separate decrees of circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore City, in equity. The controversy grows out of the liquidation of the affairs of the Baltimore Plate Ice Company, a New Jersey Md.) ZIELIAN v. BALTIMORE PLATE ICE CO. TIMORE corporation, with its place of business in Baltimore City and now in the hands of receivers. While there are four appeals taken from separate decrees or orders of the court below, it is conceded that they practically present but two controversies, and these will be considered as on two appeals. The appeals were entered upon the same day, but the first in number appearing upon the record is an appeal from the decree of July 20, 1910, overruling the exceptions of the appellant to and ratifying the auditor's account stated passed on the petition of the Fairbanks Company, a corporation of the state of New Jersey, requiring the appellant, receiver, to bring into court, within 15 days, the sum of $7,650 with interest, being the amount of certain notes issued by him, as such receiver, to the Fairbanks Company, in excess of his authority, and in default thereof authorizing and permitting the bonds of the receiver to be put in suit for the recovery of the amount of the notes. The second appeal is from a decree, passed on the 5th day of August, 1910, making final the decree of the 20th day of July, 1910, and directing the bonds of the receiver to be put in suit. The two remaining appeals are from decrees of the court below, passed on the 20th day of July, 1910, and on the 5th day of August, 1910, overruling the appellant's exceptions to and ratifying the auditor's account requiring the receiver to bring into court the sum of $3,942.52 with interest, within 15 days, the amount being alleged funds of the Plate Ice Company, stated to have been wrongfully converted by him to his own use, also removing him as such receiver, depriving him of commissions, and directing, in default, the bonds to be put in suit. The decree of August 5, 1910, made final the order of July 20, 1910, also removed the appellant, as receiver, denied him all commissions and compensation, and directed the co-receivers to put the bonds in suit. The facts as they appear from the record relate to both appeals and will be now briefly stated, for a proper understanding of the questions involved on the appeals, and will be disposed of separately. On the 25th day of March, 1908, the appellant upon application of certain creditors was appointed sole receiver of the Baltimore Plate Ice Company and duly qualified as such. The decree did not provide for a dissolution of the corporation nor for the sale of its property, but the power of the receiver seems to have been limited to the preservation of the property of the corporation and to making it a productive and profitable business plant. The assets of the corporation consisted of a leasehold interest in certain property known as Nos. 7, 9, 11, and 13, Frederick street, Baltimore, upon which had been erected an ice factory and a machine building for the manufacture of ice, at a cost of $35,000. There was outstanding and issued at this 23 date $24,000 of bonds, and its unsecured debts amounted to about $9,450. On July 16, 1908, the receiver was authorized by an order of court (all of the bondholders and creditors consenting) to issue receiver's certificates and notes to complete the ice plant. In pursuance of this order receiver's certificates to the amount of $30,000 were issued and sold to complete the building and make the first payment on machinery, and these were made a first lien on the assets of the company. Receiver's notes to the amount of $26,300 were also issued to the manufacturers in payment for machinery, and these notes were made a second lien on the assets. There was also issued by the receiver, in excess of his authority and not covered by the court's order, receiver's notes (to be hereafter designated receiver's notes, not authorized) to the amount of $17,406.66. The notes held by the Fairbanks Company and here in dispute are admitted to be a part of the notes, so issued, in excess. On the 2d day of September, 1909, upon the petition of certain creditors of the ice company, Messrs. John P. O'Ferrall, W. Burns Trundle, and Leigh Bonsal, members of the Baltimore bar, were appointed co-receivers, with the appellant. On the 31st of July, 1909, the appellant receiver filed the following report, showing the status of the affairs of the company and his administration of the office: Outstanding Obligations. 1. Receiver's certificates 2. Receiver's notes 3. Bills payable 4. Edgar Zielian 5. Accts. payable Ice account Cash $ 30,000 00 25,341 13 18,445 53 14,028 59 9,442 65 $ 97,257 90 $ 3,686 59 330 17 $101,274 66 $ 86,698 43 486 05 86 61 7,885 07 579 90 1,345 00 970 08 298 97 604 00 1,125 00 $100,079 11 1,195 55 $101,274 66 It also appears that on the 12th of November, 1909, the receivers sold all the property of the company for $34,500, and there remained for distribution the sum of $21,504, to be paid on account of the authorized receiver's certificates, being the first lien upon the company's assets. On the 15th of November, 1909, on petition of the Fairbanks Company, a creditor of the ice company, and holding $7,650 of the unauthorized and overissued receiver's notes, the court below directed the receiver to bring into court the sum of $7,650, to be paid the petitioner, and that the receiver bonds be put in suit. of the court to say that the fact that the defendant owes this precise sum is so conclusively established as to be open to no further controversy at any stage of the controversy. This brings us to a consideration of the questions raised on the appeals, from the decrees of the 20th of July and August 5, In McKim v. Thompson, 1 Bland, 155, the 1910, relating to the Fairbanks Company's chancellor, there, in dealing with this subclaim, being the amount of the notes held by ject, said: "It is held to be a fundamental them and which the auditor found were in- axiom that the judgment of a court must cluded in the unauthorized overissue of notes. be the conclusion of law arising from the Practically, the only question before the facts presented to it. And in the applicaauditor was the fact whether the notes tion of this maxim there is nothing peculiar formed a part of the unauthorized issue. in the character of the court, or in the mode By the order of the 3d day of December, of judicial proceeding, by which it can be 1909, the papers were referred to the audi- at all affected or varied. It is a fundamentor "to state an account of all notes issued tal principle applicable to all courts, and by the receiver in excess of the authority from which none are allowed to depart. conferred by the orders of court, and show- The judgment of a court of law is the legal ing whether or not the receiver's notes held result of the facts admitted by the parties, by the Fairbanks Company were included or found by the jury; and so, too the decree in the unauthorized overissue. The report of a court of chancery is the result, accordof the auditor, on May 2, 1910, shows that ing to principles of equity, arising from the he was unable to ascertain the total over- facts found in the bill, answer, proceedings issue, but that the Fairbanks notes were a and proofs. Such is the acknowledged founpart of them. The court in its decrees here dation of all final and general judgments appealed against not only ratified the audi- or decrees. But interlocutory orders and detor's report as to the finding of the over- crees affecting rights must, so far as they issue, but it made this report a basis for the go, have a similar basis, because no court order, directing the receiver to bring the of judicature can arbitrarily make a paramount of the Fairbanks notes into court to tial, any more than a total, disposition of be paid to that company and directed the the rights of things or persons, without bonds of the receiver to be put in suit. such a foundation. The judge can go no In other words, the court held that, because | further than to apply the rule to the case, the auditor found that these notes were or to pronounce the law upon the facts, overissues, the finding of this fact was a sufficient reason and ground for directing the money to be brought into court, and to be paid to the holder of these notes. either partially or wholly. It is of the very nature of judicial power to be so limited. It is, however, of no importance, as regards this principle, how the facts are made to appear, or in what shape they are presented to the tribunal; whether by confession, by arithmetical calculation, by necessary deduction, or by positive and direct proof. It is enough that the facts are so placed before the tribunal as to preclude all further denial of them. The court may then be called on, in cases like this, to pass an order, or, in other words, to pronounce the equity resulting from the facts." We shall not undertake to recapitulate the facts. nor to answer the various contentions of the parties to the record, in this case, because we are clearly of the opinion that the decrees, upon this state of the record, were not properly passed. In Dillon v. Connecticut Ins. Co., 44 Md. 386, it is said, though the practice of ordering money into court has become one of the most ordinary methods by which the court enforces its jurisdiction of preserving property in dispute pending a litigation, there are certain well-defined restrictions and limitations upon it which courts of equity should There was no proper foundation to jusalways be careful to observe. These limitify, the final decree, directing the money tations are are well stated in the cases in to be paid to the Fairbanks Company, or our own state. Daniell, Ch. Pr. c. 41, § 1; Contee v. Dawson, 2 Bland, 270. In Hopkins v. McEldery, 4 Md. Ch. 23, the chancellor said the facts upon which the party relies must be found in the case, either admitted or so established as to be open to no further controversy at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, and in concluding the opinion held that, at all to warrant the conclusion of the liability of the receiver to this company. The fact that these notes were unauthorized did not justify a decree or judgment for the amount of the notes, in favor of the Fairbanks Company, under the facts of the case. It was not conclusive as to his liability without further proceedings, and without an opportunity to defend, and this liability was clearly de Md.) IN RE BRISTOR'S ESTATE 25 asset of the trust estate for distribution by | error in the auditor to have charged them a the receivers, but a claim to be asserted in second time. an action at law, by. the Fairbanks Company, if such right existed. The record shows the assets of the company for distribution to claimants amounted to about $21,504, while the receiver's certificates outstanding which constitute a first lien amount to $30,000. [2] Besides this, there are other holders of unauthorized notes in the same position as the Fairbanks Company, and the order of court constituted a preference over the other creditors in the identical situation. The question of the measure of damages and the liability of a person acting in a representative capacity, for an unauthorized act, is settled in this state, and elsewhere. Broumel v. Rayner, 68 Md. 47, 11 Atl. 833; Lane, Adm'x, v. Lantz, 27 Md. 212; Fairbanks v. Humphries, 18 Q. B. Div. 54; Simmons v. Patchett, 7 El. & Bl. 570; Cyc. vol. 34, p. 303. The next inquiry relates to the appeals from the decrees directing the receiver to bring into court the sum of $3,942.52, alleged to be the funds of the receivership misappropriated by him. It is admitted there is a balance, an overdraft of about $800, due by the receiver to the trust estate, for funds unaccounted for; but it is insisted that the principle adopted and the method by which the liability of the receiver was ascertained in the case was improper and erroneous. It will be seen that the books and accounts of the receiver were kept by an accountant appointed by the court, and they appear to be in proper balance. The record shows that the account contains an entry of all amounts advanced by the receiver to the trust estate, and the repayment of those amounts by him. A separate account was kept on the books, marked "Edgar Zielian," and it shows the transactions of the receiver with the company in this regard. The basis of the co-receivers' claim is that the receiver has overdrawn this personal account, and the auditor so found to the extent of the amount stated in the decree, and it was directed to be brought into court. [3] The first question presented here is whether the receiver shall be held accountable for certain checks drawn by him as such receiver and payable to his own order or to the order of his individual creditors. While his liability in this respect is not denied, it appears that these checks were charged in the ledger to his personal account, and the effect of the auditor's again charging them was to charge him twice with the same payments. The record shows that the money was charged to his personal account, and, this having been done, it was As to the error of a cash balance of $330.17 charged against the receiver, there seems to be but little doubt. The ledger shows that this was an overdraft, and not a cash balance on hand, and was charged as a liability of the receiver with bills payable, etc. [4] The remaining question is whether the $14,800 loaned by Hopper and others to the receiver constituted a proper credit to the receiver's personal account, and this depends largely upon whether the money belonged to the company, or was raised upon obligations for which the company is liable. It is not claimed that the money was taken from the funds of the company, and it is difficult to see, under the facts of this case, upon what ground the company can be held liable, upon the unauthorized notes that were issued by the receiver upon which the money was raised. The notes were signed, "Edgar Zielian, Receiver," and were indorsed by him personally. The purchaser of these receiver's notes took them with constructive notice of the receiver's want of authority to issue them, and the company is not liable on the notes. [5] The money went into the company's treasury and plant, and the receiver has a right to a credit therefor. Nat. Bank v. Lange, 51 Md. 144, 34 Am. Rep. 304; Marbury v. Ehlen, 72 Md. 206, 19 Atl. 648, 20 Am. St. Rep. 467; Gable v. Cheston, 51 Md. 352. We find no error in that part of the order removing the appellant as receiver and denying him commissions, and it will be affirmed in this respect. It follows, for the reasons stated, that the decrees of the 20th of July, 1910, and of the 5th of August, 1910, in re the Fairbanks Company will be reversed. The decrees of the 20th of July, 1910, and of August 5, 1910, in re the petition of the co-receivers, will be affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause remanded for a new accounting, with costs. Decrees of the 20th of July, 1910, and of August 5, 1910, in re Fairbanks Company's claim reversed. The decrees in re co-receivers claim, affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded for new accounting, with costs to the appellant, on all four appeals. (115 Md. 614) In re BRISTOR'S ESTATE. (Court of Appeals of Maryland. April 19, 1911.) 1. INSANE PERSONS (§ 27*)- INQUISITION — RIGHT TO REVIEW. Under Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 16, direct' the affairs of insane persons, and under § 107, giving the chancery court authority to Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 5, § 26, per *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes mitting appeals from orders in the nature of a final decree passed by a court of equity, appeal would lie from an order confirming a finding on an inquisition of lunacy. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. §§ 37, 38; Dec. Dig. § 27.*] 2. INSANE PERSONS (§ 19*)-INQUISITION AUTHORITY OF DEPUTY SHERIFF. An inquisition as to insanity may be conducted by a sheriff's deputy. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insane Persons, Dec. Dig. § 19.*] - 3. INSANE PERSONS (§ 27*) — INQUISITION REVIEW. The finding of the jury in an inquisition as to insanity is not conclusive on appeal, though they had opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the alleged insane during a protracted hearing and while she was testifying. supported my son. He is not a strong man, and at one time early in life he had an attack of melancholia and wandered from home hoping to get a position. He is a member of the Presbyterian Church, perfectly moral in his habits, but in my opinion persons who have had mental trouble should not marry, and Charles would be a prey if I left him all I have made or even all I have inherited. I provide for him amply, but at his death these rents in which he has a life interest go to the Presbyterian Board for special work among destitute girls in India, China and Africa. The other deed will convey a number of ground rents to you for the same work." (It was stated elsewhere in the letter that these rents would amount to about $1, [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insane Per-000 per year.) "What I have reserved for sons, Déc. Dig. § 27.*] myself, my son's and my own use, will prob4. INSANE PERSONS (§ 2*)-INQUISITION-EV-ably be deeded to you later on, or at least IDENCE. Evidence held insufficient to sustain a finding of insanity on inquisition. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insane Persons, Dec. Dig. § 2.*] Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; George M. Sharp, Judge. In the matter of the estate of Jane B. Moore Bristor. From an order confirming From an order confirming the finding of the jury on an inquisition as to insanity of the said Bristor, she appeals. Reversed, and inquisition quashed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, PATTISON, and URNER, JJ. H. N. Abercrombie and William L. Marbury (Francis A. Buschman, on the brief), for appellant. George Moore Brady and William Milnes Maloy, for Charles M. Bristor. URNER, J. The appellant, Jane B. Moore Bristor, on September 16, 1910, wrote to a representative of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church a letter in part as follows: "As I have entered my seventieth year and am an invalid from exposure and wounds received upon battle fields of the Rebellion where with my mother I worked to relieve the wounded, I am putting my affairs in order to be ready for the great Lately I have given my pictures and books largely to Lincoln University and Ashville Industrial School, N. C., and as I read again in The Land of the Vedas of the awful condition of women in India I long to do something for their relief. If I had known that special work would be allowed, then several deeds that have been made to the American Board would have been in favor of my beloved church. I intend to prepare, that is my lawyers will, two deeds, one of which will give to my son, my only living child, about forty years old, and single, nearly one thousand dollars per year in ground rents and in which he is to have a life interest only. * * * I have always My some to home and some to foreign. tastes are all literary and I greatly wished to do some good work in that line before I go, but more was to be made by attending to investments, and I have made in twenty years more than three times what was left me by my mother, besides giving away about thirty thousand dollars. *** I want to deed now lest I should be called away suddenly. * impressed many years ago by the statement My mother was very much in the life of Wesley that he attended so faithfully to all his affairs that he left direc tions what should be done with any loose change that might be found in his pockets at the time of his death." This letter, sealed in an envelope, was handed by Mrs. Bristor to her son Charles to be mailed. He performed this duty after he had opened and read the letter and had it copied by his attorneys. Soon afterwards he filed a petition in circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore City for an inquisition as to his mother's sanity. He alleges in substance in the petition that his mother has been for more than 10 years past "of that degree of unsoundness of mind that unfits her to be in possession of her property and to be clothed with the power of alienating any part of her estate"; that she has been "a woman of strong personality and active mentality; that she was a nurse on battlefields in the Civil War, and during her subsequent years has suffered from the exposure and hardship to which she was subject in that honorable service"; that her husband, from whom she was divorced, is deceased; that she has been for many years interested in the temperance cause, but more recently has devoted all her time, thought, and energy to the woman's suffrage cause and the work of foreign missions; that to such an extent has she thought and written upon these movements and so largely has she contributed to their advancement, especially in the case of mission work in foreign fields, that her mind, enfeebled by |