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The act of December 12, 1792, s. 6 and 9, Rev. | which the legislature of Kentucky passed no Code, p. 80, 81 re-enacts those clauses of the act of 1788.

Mason, for defendant in error.

It is not denied that the acts of congress are, in many cases, paramount to the laws of the individual states; but even a general position of that kind will not decide the present question. This action was brought in a state court, under a state law, before congress legislated upon the subject, and even before congress, or the constitution of the United States, had an existence. Can such an action be affected by subsequent acts of Congress?

The law by which Kentucky was erected into a separate state passed the Virginia legislature in December, 1789. This is an unalterable law, 61*] embracing the citizens of both states. It is a compact by which they mutually agreed that the rules of property should not be altered. If we admit that by the act of 1792, appeals were allowed in the case of caveats, the admission proves nothing in the present question, because the law of 1789 is an unalterable law, and confined to the then existing state of things. It was not in the power of one of the contracting parties to change the terms of the compact. But it is said that there was a right of appeal at the time of that compact. Let us examine the laws relative to this subject. The first act is that of 1779, mentioned by the opposite counsel, which declares that caveats shall be tried in the general court, and that there shall be no appeal or writ of error. The next is the act of 1788, which transfers the jurisdiction of the general court to district courts, and declares that "they shall have the same jurisdiction concerning" "caveats" "as the general court heretofore had by law." But the jurisdiction which the general court heretofore had by law was an exclusive and final jurisdiction, from which there could be no appeal. If, then, the district courts were to possess the same jurisdiction, it must be an exclusive and a final jurisdiction. But it is said that by the same act of 1788, an appeal in all cases from the district court was a matter of right. This must evidently mean in all cases where a right of appeal before existed from the general court to the court of appeals; but cannot be understood to give an appeal in a case where it had been expressly excluded by an existing law. The intention of the legislature was to put the district court, as to all cases arising within the district, exactly in the place of the general court, and to give them the same jurisdiction, to be exercised in the same manner, with the same limitations, and liable to appeals only in the same cases. But the act of 1788, erecting district courts on the eastern waters, did not affect Kentucky. The legislature had before, by an act passed in 1782, erected a court on the western waters, called the supreme court for the district of Kentucky, to which it had transferred all the powers and jurisdiction theretofore exercised by the general court of Virginia; and with the rest, the power to try caveats and to give judgment thereon, without any appeal or writ of error to their judgment. The act of 1788 did not take away the ex62*] *clusive cognizance which the supreme court for the district of Kentucky had respecting caveats, but they retained it till the final separation of Kentucky from Virginia; after

law authorizing an appeal; so that under the state laws, it is clear that no appeal or writ of error would lie. There being then no appeal. under the state laws, the question will be simply whether a writ of error will lie to the district court of the United States for the Kentucky district, upon an action carried there from the state court, which, under the laws of the state, had a final and exclusive jurisdiction of the cause.

The 22d section of the judiciary act of 1789, (Laws U. S., vol. 1, p. 61,) which allows appeals and writs of error generally, did not contemplate a case like the present. This court is bound to take notice of the laws of the several states. By the 34th section of the same judiciary act, p. 74, the laws of the several states are to be the rules of decision in cases where they apply. The remedy by caveat is given by the state law, and the party who chooses to take that remedy must take it with its condition annexed, that no appeal or writ of error shall be allowed. A purchaser under the commonwealth of Virginia acquires his right under this condition. It is a part of the contract from which this court cannot absolve him. The parties to this suit are not the only parties interested in this question; for while the right is hung in dubio, whilst it is uncertain to whom the grant ought to issue, the state taxes cannot be collected, the commonwealth having no tenant to whom to resort. Wilson has sought the summary process by caveat, and ought to be bound by the restrictions of that law under which he claims his remedy. He was not compelled to use the summary remedy; he might have resorted to chancery, and then the commonwealth would have had a tenant to pay the taxes. He ought not to have the benefits of this kind of process, without submitting to the inconveniences which may be supposed to attend it. If this opinion is correct, although the laws of the United States provide generally that writs of error may be had, they can only give them as a remedy where a right exists; and if Wilson's right is gone by the judgment of the court below, he is precluded from suing it out by the statute under which he claims. *Lee, in reply.

[*63

This caveat is brought from the district court of the United States, and not from a state court. It is true that it originated in the state court, but it was the defendant Mason, and not Wilson the plaintiff, who brought it into the court of the United States; and if the judg ment of that court becomes thereby liable to be reversed upon a writ of error, it is a consequence attributable to the act of Mason alone.

There is nothing peculiar in the nature of the proceeding by caveat, to exclude it from the general appellate jurisdiction which is given to this court by the constitution and laws of the United States. It is not true that this court are to look into the laws of Virginia for their right to correct the errors of the inferior courts of the United States. When a cause is brought from a state court into a court of the United States, it is to be proceeded upon as if it had originated in the latter court, and the act of congress has expressly provided for an appeal or writ of error in the very case of an action removed from a state court into an inferior

language of the act of June 13, 1798, towa nation whom she considered as an enemy.

to be condemned as a French armed vessel, ex- | and, surely, congress could only employ cludes the idea. Nor can an implied contract be raised on the retaining her, because that was a state of duress, which cannot be made the ground of a reward.

But if this case is to be considered upon a quantum meruit, then the amount of salvage must depend upon the danger and the exertion. 1 Rob. 151, (The St. Bernardo,) and 1 Rob. 240, (The Two Friends.) It is said that in cases of unauthorized capture or recapture, the property goes to the crown; 2 Rob. 45, (The Princessa ;) and it is sometimes referred to the court to fix the reward of the captors. It follows, then, that the property goes to the government, and they alone can fix the reward. But our code gives no right to salvage in this case, nor does the state of hostilities between the two countries, as disclosed on the record, justify it. But if the decree and the notoriety of the misconduct of France, are to be admitted to prove a benefit conferred, who can say it was worth 94,000 dollars, the half of the gross amount of sales of the ship and cargo? Neither the service rendered, the danger to the property, nor the exertion in saving it, can justify so enormous a reward.

The decree of France might be only in terrorem, and so no danger. If the Amelia was not liable to condemnation in the French courts, then no service was rendered, and, consequently, no salvage ought to be allowed.

22*] *But if she was liable to condemnation, then the recapture is a violation of the rights of France.

If France violates the laws of nations, it is no justification of a violation of them on our part. An illegal power to take, given by France to her cruisers, does not authorize us to retake. In the case of Bass v. Tingey, Feb. term, 1800, in the Supreme Court of the United States, the reasoning of the court seems to admit that the act of 2d March, 1799, will not apply, in the present state of hostilities, to recaptures of the vessels of nations in amity with the United States, unless the owners are residents of the United States; because there could be no lawful recapture of a neutral from the hand of a bellig

erent.

Judge Moore, in delivering his opinion in that case says, "It is, however, more particularly urged that the word 'enemy' cannot be applied to the French; because the section, in which it is used, is confined to such a state of war as would authorize a recapture of property belonging to a nation in amity with the United States, and such a state of war does not exist between America and France. A number of books have been cited to furnish a glossary on the word enemy; yet, our situation is so extraordinary, that I doubt whether a parallel case can be traced in the history of nations. But if words are the representatives of ideas, let me ask by what other word the idea of the relative situation of America and France could be communicated, than by that of hostility or war? And how can the characters of the parties engaged in hostility or war, be otherwise described than by the denomination of 'enemies.' It is for the honour and dignity of both nations, therefore, that they should be called enemies; for it is by that description alone, that either could justify or excuse the scene of bloodshed, depredation and confiscation, which has unhappily occurred;

"Nor does it follow that the act of M 1799, is to have no operation, because al cases in which it might operate, are not in existence at the time of passing it. D the present hostilities, it affects the case captured property belonging to our own zens, and in the event of a future war it r also be applied to the case of recaptured erty belonging to a nation in amity wit United States."

And in the same case, Judge Washingto served, "that hostilities may subsist bet two nations, more confined in its nature an tent, being limited as to places, persons things; and this is more properly termed perfect war; because not solemn, and be those who are authorized to commit hostil act under special authority, and can go no ther than to the extent of their commiss And again he says, "It has likewise been that the 7th section of the act of March, embraces cases which, according to pre-exi laws, could not then take place, because n thority had been given to recapture frie vessels from the French, and this argument strongly and forcibly pressed.

"But because every case provided for by law was not then existing, it does not fo that the law should not operate upon suc did exist, and upon the rest whenever should arise. It is a permanent law embra a variety of subjects; not made in relatio the present war with France only, but in tion to any future war with her, or with other nation. It might, then, very pro allow salvage for recapturing of American sels from France, which had previously beer thorized by law, though it could not imr ately apply to the vessels of friends; and w ever such a war should exist between United States and France, or any other na as, according to the law of nations, or sp authority, would justify the recapture of fr ly vessels, it might, on that event, with sin propriety, apply to them; which furnish think, the true construction of the act.

"The opinion which I delivered at York, in Talbot v. Seeman, was, that alth an American vessel could not justify the ta of a neutral vessel from the French, bed subsi neither the sort of war that

nor the special commission under which the American acted, authorized the proceed yet that the 7th section of the act of 1799 plied to recaptures from France, as an en in all cases authorized by congress. And on points my opinion remains unshaken; rather, has been confirmed by the very able cussion which the subject has lately under in this court, on the appeal from my dec

Similar sentiments were also expressed Judge Chase and Judge Paterson, in the case. From these opinions it seems clear result that the act of March 2, 1799, cann the rule of salvage in this case.

On the part of the libellant, it was state reply, as to the admissibility of the dispa from the American envoys, and the Fr

1. This case of Talbot v. Seeman, was a once before, in this court, at Philadelphia.

arret of 18th January, 1798, that courts of admiralty will always take notice of such laws of foreign countries as go to modify or change the law of nations, and are not bound by the same rules of evidence, as courts of common law. 1 Dal. 364. Loft. 631. Doug. 619, 622, 649, 650, 554. The opposite counsel have cited and relied on Robinson's Reports to show what was the ancient law of France, and surely we have as good a right to cite the same book to show what is the present law of France. In 1 Rob. 288, (The Maria,) this arret of France is cited and argued upon by the judge.

The cases cited by the opposite counsel to show that foreign laws must be proved as facts, are all cases at common law, or relate to the mere municipal laws of a foreign country; and are not such as go to modify or explain the law of nations, as that country has adopted it.

The case in P. Williams refers to a municipal law which had no connection with the law of nations. The same observation applies to the cases from 6 Mod. and 2 Salk. No case can be produced where a law of a foreign country, authenticated as this is by an act of the legislature of our country, has been refused to be considered by a court.

25*] *As to the objection that the cargo does not appear to be the production of England, or her possessions, because there is no evidence that the whole of the province of Bengal has been subjected to the dominion of England; it may be sufficient to observe, that the libel and answer admit Calcutta to be an English port, and the case stated says, the vessel sailed from Calcutta, in Bengal, loaded with a cargo of the product and manufactory of that country. It being admitted that Calcutta is an English port, and that the cargo was the production of that country, it follows, unless the contrary is clearly shown in evidence, that the cargo was the product of an English possession.

restored with damages and costs, she would have been condemned and totally lost to the owners. Is no salvage due for so certain and so signal a benefit?

*It is said that unless salvage is ex- [*26 pressly given by the act of congress, it can only be claimed upon a contract, either express or implied. This is not the case. The claim of salvage upon recapture never is supposed to arise ex contractu. It is given as a reward for the benefit received, and where there is no express statute upon the subject, the amount is to be regulated, not by the labour or hazard of the recaptor, nor by his intention to confer a benefit, but by the supposed amount which the owner would have been willing to give for the rescue of his property. Wooddeson, 423. In 1 Rob. 234, 235, (The Two Friends,) the rule of salvage on rescue is said to be quantum meruit. And in the same case, p. 232, Sir W. Scott says, "it has been slightly questioned in the act of court, (which contains the exposition of facts given by both parties,) whether there was such a state of hostilities between America and France as to raise a title of salvage for American goods retaken from the French. But this point has not been pursued in argument; and indeed I should wonder if it had, after the determinations of this court, which have, in various instances, decreed salvage in similar cases. It is not for me to say whether America is at war with France, or not; but the conduct of France towards America has been such de facto, as to induce American owners to acknowledge the services by which they have recovered their ships and cargoes out of the hands of French cruisers by force of arms."

In the case of Bass and Tingey, the question was not argued, whether salvage could be claimed upon the recapture of a neutral, on the ground of benefit rendered; and, therefore, the opinion of the court in that case does not militate with our claim.

August 11. MARSHALL, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to a decree of the circuit court for the district of New York, by which the decree of the district court of that state, restoring the ship Amelia to her owner on the payment of one half for salvage, was reversed, and a decree rendered, directing the restoration of the vessel without salvage.

*The facts agreed by the parties, and [*27 the pleadings in the cause, present the following case:

It is said that there is no evidence that France carried her unjust decrees into execution, and that they might only be enacted in terrorem. But the fact is notorious to all the world. Congress have expressly declared it in the preambles of their acts. The whole system of hostility is founded upon it, and can be justified on no other ground. They have further declared it by ordering the dispatches to be published and distributed among the citizens of the United States, for their information. It would be strange if this court, sitting here as a court of the law of nations to try a cause in which all the world are parties, should be the only persons in the world ignorant of the fact. The general principle is admitted that salvage is not due for the recapture of a neutral from a belligerent, and for this reason that by the law of nations the neutral would be restored by the captor with damages and costs. But cessante ratione, cessat lex. And it follows by powerful inference, that if the captor would not have restored the neutral with damages and costs, salvage ought to be allowed. To bring the Amelia within this inference, it is only necessary to show that she would not have been restored with damages and costs. If the court should take into consideration the arret of the 18th of January, 1798, and the fact that the At the time of the recapture, the Amelia had cargo was the production of an English posses-eight iron cannon, and eight wooden guns, with sion, there is no doubt but, instead of being which she left Calcutta. From the ship's pa

The ship Amelia sailed from Calcutta, in Bengal, in April, 1799, loaded with a cargo of the product and manufactory of that country, and was bound to Hamburgh. On the 6th September, she was captured by the French national corvette La Diligente, commanded by L. J. Dubois, who took out the captain, part of the crew, and most of the papers of the Amelia, and, putting a prize-master and French sailors on board her, ordered her to St. Domingo, to be judged according to the laws of war.

On the 15th of September, she was recaptured by Captain Talbot, commander of the Constitution, who ordered her into New York for adjudication.

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SILAS TALBOT v. HANS FRED. SEEMAN.

Salvage allowed to a United States ship of war, for the recapture of a Hamburgh vessel out of the hands of the French, (France and Hamburgh being neutral to each other,) on the ground that she was in danger of condemnation under the French decree of 18th January, 1798. The United States and France, in the year 1799, were in a state of partial

war.

rendered.

the said ship became, and was to be considered as a French ship.

Whereupon he prays usual process, &c. and condemnation; or, in case restoration should be decreed, that it may be on payment of such salvage as by law ought to be paid for the same.

The claim and answer of Hans Frederic Seeman, in behalf of Messrs. Chapeau Rouge & Co. of Hamburgh, owners of the ship Amelia To support a demand for salvage, the recapture and her cargo, stated, that the said ship, commust be lawful, and a meritorious service must be manded by Jacob F. Engelbrecht, as master, Probable cause is sufficient to render the recap- sailed on the 20th of February, 1798, from ture lawful. Where the amount of salvage is not regulated Hamburgh on a voyage to the East Indies, by positive law, it must be determined by the prin- where she arrived safe; that in April, 1799, she ciples of general law. Marine ordinances of foreign left Calcutta bound to Hamburgh; that during countries, promulgated by the executive, by order her voyage, and at the time of her capture by of the legislature of the United States, may be read in the courts of the United States, without further the French, she and her cargo belonged to Messrs. Chapeau Rouge & Co. citizens of HamMunicipal laws of foreign countries are gener-burgh, and if restored she will be wholly their ally to be proved as facts. property; that on the 6th of September, on her sexs by a French armed coonded r voyage home, she was captured on the high

authentication or proof.

This was a writ of t, which reversed the deHIS was a writ of error to reverse a decree

cree of the district court of New York, so far as it allowed salvage to the recaptors of the ship Amelia and her cargo.

The libel in the district court was filed November 5th, 1799, by Captain Talbot, in behalf of himself and the other officers and crew of the United States ship of war the Constitution, against the ship Amelia, her tackle, furniture and cargo; and sets forth,

1. That in pursuance of instructions from the President of the United States, he subdued, seized, &c. on the high seas, the said ship Amelia and cargo, &c. and brought her into the port of New York.

2. That at the time of capture she was armed with eight carriage guns, and was under the command of citoyen Etienne Prevost, a French officer of marine, and had on board, besides the commander, eleven French mariners. That the libellant has been informed that she, being the property of some person to him unknown, sailed from Calcutta, an English port in the East Indies, bound for some port in Europe; that upon her said voyage she was met with and captured by a French national corvette, called La Diligente, commanded by L. J. Dubois. who took out of her the captain and crew of the Amelia, with all the papers relating to her and her cargo, and placed the said Etienne Prevost, and the said French mariners, on board of her, and ordered her to St. Domingo for adjudication, as a good and lawful prize; and 2*] that she remained in the *full and peaceable possession of the French from the time of her capture, for the space of ten days, whereby, the libellant is advised, that, as well by the law of nations, as by the particular laws of France, NOTE-What is salvage; who is a salvor; rates of salvage-see note, 8 L. ed. U. S. 846.

citizen Dubois, who took out the master and thirteen of her crew and all her papers, leaving on board the claimant, who was mate of the Amelia, the doctor, and five other men. That the French commander put on board twelve hands, and ordered her to St. Domingo, and parted from her on the fifth day after her capture. That on the 15th of September, the Amelia, while in possession of the French, was captured, without any resistance on her part, by the said ship of war the Constitution, and brought into New York. That the Amelia had eight carriage guns, it being usual for all vessels in the trade she was carrying on to be armed, even in times of general peace. That there being peace between France and Hamburgh at the time of the first capture, and also between the United States and Hamburgh, and between the United States and France, the possession of the Amelia by the French, in the manner and for the time stated in the said libel, could neither by the law of nations, nor by the laws of France, nor by those of the United States, change the property of the said ship Amelia and her cargo, or make the same liable *to condemnation in a French court of ad- [*3 miralty; that the same could not, therefore, be considered as French property; wherefore, he prays restoration in like plight as at the time of capture by the ship Constitution, with costs and charges.

On the 16th of December, 1799, the district judge, by consent of parties, made an interlocutory decree, directing the marshal to sell the ship and cargo, and bring the money into court; and that the clerk should pay half of the amount of sales to the claimant, on his giving security to refund in case the court should so decree; and that the clerk should retain the

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