ence shall be accorded. This rule was not applied to a contract by which a long-distance telephone company made an agreement for the interchange of messages with a local company to the exclusion of all other like companies.11 Transportation Act, 1920 (Post, Section 443) relieves carriers from the operation of the Anti-Trust Laws so far as to permit carriers to consolidate. § 390. Clayton Anti-Trust Law. The purpose of the Anti-Trust Statute approved Oct. 15, 1914,12 was to make more definite the provisions of the Sherman Act, and to provide more effective means for enforcing the former Act. Section 11 of the Clayton Act gives authority to the Interstate Commerce Commission to enforce the provisions of designated sections of the Act, and Section 10 is a regulation of interstate carriers with reference to certain contracts therein specified. § 391. Federal-Trade-Commission Law. The Act to create a Federal Trade Commission, approved September 26, 1914,13 gives the commission so created certain regulatory 11 Pacific Telephone & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 Fed. 699, citing and discussing State v. Cadwaller, 172 Ind. 619, 87 N. E. 644, 89 N. E. 319; Home Tel. Co. v. Sarcoxie Light & Tel. Co., 236 Mo. 114, 139 S. W. 108; Home Tel. Co. v. Peoples Tel. Co., 125 Tenn. 270, 141 S. W. 845; Home Tel. Co. v. Granby Tel. Co., 147 Mo. App. 216, 126 S. W. 773; Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Denver, etc., R. R. Co., 110 U. S. 667, 28 L. Ed. 291, 4 Sup. Ct. 185; St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Southern Express Co., Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 29 L. Ed. 791, 6 Sup. Ct. 542, 628; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 59 Fed. 813, 827, 8 C. C. A. 282, 296. 12 See Charleston & Norfolk Steamship Co., 47 I. C. C. 365, 368. 13 The words "unfair methods of competition' in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act are indefi nite; and the contention that they are too vague to authorize an administrative finding of their violation, is plausible, probably sound. Circuit Judge Baker finds an analogy between the words and other legislative terms. -Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307. Circuit Judge Ward holds that "Section 5 is intended to provide a method of preventing practices unfair to the general public and very particularly such as if not prevented will grow so large as to lessen competition and create monopolies in violation of the Anti-Trust Acts." However, he said that unfair methods" are "not restricted to such as violate the AntiTrust Acts, Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 258 Fed. 314, 317. The Federal Trade Commission was established in the exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to regulate powers over corporations, firms and partnerships engaged in interstate commerce other than those subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Act, Sec. 4, defines certain words, among which are: "Commerce means commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, or in any territory of the United States, or in the District of Columbia, or between any such territory and another, or between any such territory and any state or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any state or territory or foreign nation. 66 'Acts to regulate commerce means the act entitled 'An Act to Regulate Commerce' approved February 14th, 1887, and all acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto.' Sec. 11 provides: "Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent or interfere with the enforcement of the provisions of the anti-trust acts, or the acts to regulate commerce, nor shall anything contained in this act be construed to alter, modify or repeal the said anti-trust acts, or the acts to regulate commerce, or any part or parts thereof." § 392. Merchant Marine.-The Shipping Act, Appendix 3, post, contains regulatory provisions relating to water carriers, and is to an extent supplementary to the Interstate Commerce Act. Section 33 provided: "That this act shall not be construed to affect the power or jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, nor to confer upon the board concurrent power or jurisdiction over any matter within the power or jurisdiction of such commission; nor shall this act be construed to apply to intrastate commerce. interstate and foreign commerce, and that Commission has no power to demand access to the books of a patentee for the purpose of obtaining information for the Navy Department, United States v. Basic Products Co., 260 Fed. 472. Citing and relying on United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 63 L. Ed. 992, 39 Sup. Ct. 465, Circuit Judge Ward with indicated reluctance holds that it is lawful to refuse to sell and says, "The obvious purpose of the respondent is to prevent any competition as to the resale price, between purchasers of its products."-Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 264 Fed. 885; Federal Trade Commission V. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 66 L. Ed. 307, 42 Sup. Ct. 150. See, in this connection, United States v. Schrader, 252 U. S. 85, 64 L. Ed. 471, 40 Sup. Ct. 251; Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 64 L. Ed. 993, 40 Sup. Ct. 572. § 393. Safety-Appliance Law.-Under the title "Safety Appliance Acts" may be included the Automatic Coupler Act of March 2, 1893, as amended April 1, 1896; a supplement to the Automatic Coupler Act passed March 2, 1903; the supplement to the Automatic Coupler Act approved April 14, 1910, and March 4, 1911; the Act requiring reports of accidents, approved May 6, 1910; the Medals of Honor Act, approved Feb. 23, 1905; the Hours of Service Act approved March 4, 1907; the Ash Pan Act approved May 30, 1908; the Explosive Acts, approved March 4, 1909; the Boiler Inspection Act approved Feb. 17, 1911. These Acts may not all be logically classed as "Safety-Appliance Acts," yet they all relate to the safety of interstate transportation and may properly be considered together. These Acts rest upon the right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states. The primary object of all of these Acts was to promote the public welfare by securing the safety of employees and travelers; the Acts are, therefore, remedial and should be so construed as not to defeat the obvious intention of Congress. By the Sundry Civil Appropriation Act of June 28, 1902, the Commission is given authority to employ "inspectors to execute and enforce the requirements of the Safety-Appliance Acts." § 394. Hours-of-Service Law. The Hours-of-Service Act limits the time for which railroads may require or permit employees subject to the Act to be or remain on duty, gives the Commission power "after full hearing in a particular case and for good cause shown to extend" the time within which the carriers included in the Act shall comply with the proviso of Section 2, and provides for penalties for violations of the Act.14 The Commission has held that this Act applies to street 14 Schweig v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 205 Fed. 96. See for a full discussion of these acts Kent's Digest of Decisions under Safety Appliance Acts. car lines which are interstate carriers;15 that it does not apply to employees "deadheading" on passenger trains not engaged in the performance of any service,16 nor to a ferry owned by a railroad not used as a car ferry,17 nor to a trainman occasionally using the telegraph or telephone to meet an emergency.18 The Act has been reviewed and held to be valid.19 A separate penalty is incurred for each employee remaining on duty in violation of the Act, and the statute relates to employees on duty, although they may be inactive.20 § 395. Employers'-Liability Law. The first Employers' Liability Act, that of June 11, 1906, Chap. 3073, 34 Stat. 232, was declared by the Supreme Court of the United States to be unconstitutional, because, as construed, it applied not only to the employees of carriers engaged in interstate, but also to carriers while engaged in intrastate, commerce. Whether the Act violated the Fifth Amendment was not decided, but reference was made to decisions of the court holding valid state laws making a special regulation as to a carrier's liability to its employees.21 The present Act was approved April 22, 1908,22 and its validity has been sustained by the Supreme Court.23 Differences of opinion having arisen as to the jurisdiction of 15 Conf. Rul. 56 since withdrawn without affecting the principle stated. 16 Conf. Rul. 74; South Covington R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U. S. 537, 59 L. Ed. 350, 35 Sup. Ct. 158. 17 Conf. Rul. 108-withdrawn, but principle not cancelled. 18 Conf. Rul. 342-withdrawn, but principle not cancelled. 19 See Adamson Eight Hour Law, Comp. Stat. 1916, Sections 8680a to 8680d and Transportation Act, 1920, Title III. Adamson Law valid-Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 61 L. Ed. 755, 37 Sup. Ct. 298. 20 Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 231 U. S. 112, 58 L. Ed. 144, 34 Sup. Ct. 26. S. 463, 52 L. Ed. 297, 28 Sup. Ct. 141; 22 35 Stat. 65, Ch. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322; Fed. Stat. Ann. 1909 Supp., p. 584, 1912 Supp., p. 1735. 23 Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., (Second Employers' Liability Act), 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. Ed. 327, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 38 L. R. A., N. S., 44; Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U. S. 603, 56 L. Ed. 911, 32 21 Employers' Liability Cases, Howard v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 207 U. Sup. Ct. 589. the state courts, the Act was amended in 1910 by providing that state and federal courts should have concurrent jurisdiction in suits brought under the Act and also providing for the survivorship of causes of action.24 § 396. Arbitration and Labor Laws.-The Act of June 1, 1898,25 known as the Arbitration Act, or the Erdman Act, had as its purpose the settlement of controversies between carriers and their employees. This statute is persuasive and does not attempt to be compulsory. Arbitrators under the Act are essentially common-law arbitrators and rights of the parties thereto rest upon the contract of arbitration, which contract must be construed in accordance with the rules governing contracts. In an arbitration had in accordance with the terms of the Act, Judge Van Fleet speaks of the "very commendable object aimed at by the Act" and says:26 "The evident purpose of the law was to afford a ready, summary, and speedy method of amicably adjusting labor disputes arising between the class of employers and employees to which it applies.' By Act of March 4, 1911, 36 Stat. 1397, Fed. Stat. Ann. Supp. 1912, p. 260, it is provided: "The President of the United States from and after the passage of this Act is authorized to designate from time to time any member of the Interstate Commerce Commission to exercise the powers conferred and the duties imposed upon the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission by the provisions of the Act concerning carriers engaged in interstate commerce and their employees, approved June first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight; and the member so designated during the period for which he is designated, shall have the powers now conferred by said Act on the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission." 24 Act Apr. 5, 1910, C. 143, 36 Stat. 391; U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916, Vol. 8 Section 8657 et seq. Fed. Stat. Ann. 1912, Supp. p. 335. See proviso to Sec. 28 Judicial Code. Barnett V. Spokane P. & S. Ry. Co., 210 Fed. 94. 25 Arbitration Act, also called Erd man Act, approved June 1, 1898, Chap. 370, 30 Stat. 524, et seq., 4 Fed. Stat. Ann. 784, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3205. 26 Re Southern Pacific Co., 155 Fed. 1001. |