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think every

not to

to stand for a thing having the real essence, on which these properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by a plain abuse it adds to it when we would make them stand for something, which not being in our complex idea, the name we use can no ways be the sign of. Hence we

$ 19. This shows us the reason why in

mixed modes any of the ideas, that make change of the composition of the complex one, being our idea in substances

left out or changed, it is allowed to be

another thing, i. e. to be of another spechange the

cies : it is plain in chance-medley, manspecies. slaughter, murder, parricide, &c. The reason whereof is, because the complex idea signified by that name is the real as well as nominal essence; and there is no secret reference of that name to any other essence but that. But in substances it is not so. For though in that called gold one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out, and vice versa; yet men do not usually think that therefore the species is changed: because they secretly in their minds refer that name, and suppose it annexed to a real immutable essence of a thing existing on which those perties depend. He that adds to his complex idea of gold that of fixedness and solubility in aq. regia, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species ; but only to have a more perfect idea, by adding another simple idea, which is always in fact joined with those other, of which his former complex idea consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we had not the idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real essence of that species of bodies, the word gold (which, by standing for a more or less perfect collection of simple ideas, serves to design that sort of body well enough in civil discourse) comes to have no signification at all, being put for somewhat, whereof we have no idea at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the body itself

prois away. For however it may be thought all one ; yet, if well considered, it will be found a quite different thing to argue about gold in name, and about a parcel in the body itself, v. g. a piece of leaf gold laid before us; though in discourse we are fain to substitute the name for

the thing: $ 20. That which I think very much

The cause of disposes men to substitute their names for

the abuse, a the real essences of species, is the supposi- supposition tion before-mentioned, that nature works of nature's regularly in the production of things, and working alsets the boundaries to each of those species,

ways regu

larly. bygiving exactlythe same realinternal constitution to each individual, which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who observes their different qualities can hardly doubt, that many of the individuals called by the same name, are, in their internal constitution, as different one from another as several of those which are ranked under different specific names. This supposition, however, that the same precise and internal constitution goes always with the same specific name, makes men forward to take those names for the representatives of those real essences, though indeed they signify nothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in such a kind of use, cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses; especially in those who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of substantial forms, whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to be determined and distinguished.

$ 21. But however preposterous and ab- This abuse surdit be to make our names stand for ideas contains two we have not, or (which is all one) essences

sitions. that we know not, it being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing ; yet it is evident to any one, whoever so little reflects on the use men make of their words, that there is nothing more familiar. When

false suppo

a man asks whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrous fætus, be a man or no; it is evident, the question is not, whether that particular thing agree to his complex idea, expressed by the name man; but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things, which he supposes his name man to stand for. In which way of using the names of substances there are these false suppositions contained.

First, that there are certain precise essences, according to which nature makes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished into species. That every thing has a real constitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible qualities depend, is past doubt : but I think it has been proved, that this makes not the distinction of species, as we rank them, nor the boundaries of their names.

Secondly, this tacitly also insinuates, as if we had ideas of these proposed essences. For to what purpose else is it to inquire whether this or that thing have the real essence of the species man, if we did not suppose that there were such a specific essence known? which yet is utterly false : and therefore such application of names, as would make them stand for ideas which we have not, must needs cause great disorder in discourses and reasonings about them, and be a great in. convenience in our communication by words.

$ 22. Sixthly, there remains yet another sition that

moregeneral,though perhapsless observed, words have a certain and

abuse of words: and that is, that men havevident sig- ing by a long and familiar use annexed to nification. them certain ideas, they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a connexion between the names and the signification they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is, and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered, as if it were past doubt, that, in the use of those common received sounds, the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise ideas. Whence presuming, that when they have in discourse used


6. A suppo

term, they have thereby,as it were,set before others the very thing they talk of; and so likewise taking the words of others as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or understand clearly others' meaning. From whence commonly proceed noise and wrangling, without improvement or information; whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own ideas. And yet men think it strange, if in discourse, or (where it is often absolutely necessary) in dispute, one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms; though the arguings one may every day observe in conversation make it evident, that there are few names of complex ideas which any two men use for the same just precise collection. It is hard to name a word which will not be a clear instance of this. Life is a term, none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an affront to be asked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, whether a plant, that lies ready formed in the seed, have life; whether the embryo in an egg before incubation, or a man in a swoon without sense or motion, be alive or no: it is easy to perceive that a clear, distinct, settled idea does not always accompany the use of so known a word as that of life is. Some gross and confused conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common words of their language; and such a loose use of their words serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs. But this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries. Knowledge and reasoning require precise determinate ideas. And though men will not be so importunately dull, as not to understand what others say without demanding an explication of their terms; nor so troublesomely critical, as to correct others in the use of the words they receive from them; yet where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case, I know not what fault it can be to desire the explication of words whose sense seems dubious; or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance in what sense another man uses his words, since he has no other way of certainly knowing it but by being informed. This abuse of taking words upon trust has nowhere spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst men of letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, which have so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of words. For though it be generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies theworld is distracted with, yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they speak different languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think all the same: though perhaps what they would have, be different. The ends of

§ 23. To conclude this consideration language: of the imperfection and abuse of language; 1. To convey the ends of language in our discourse with

others being chiefly these three : first, to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another; secondly, to do it with as much ease and quickness as possible; and, thirdly, thereby to convey the knowledge of things : language is either abused or deficient when it fails of any of these three.

First, words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open one man's ideas to another's view : 1. When men have names in their mouths without any determinate ideas in their minds, whereof they are the signs; or, 2. When they apply the common received names of any language to ideas, to which the common use of that language does not apply them: or, 3. When they apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for another idea.

$ 24. Secondly, men fail of conveying 2. To do it

their thoughts with all the quickness and

our ideas.

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